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Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele and Nicola Maggini
This book is dedicated to the European Parliament (EP) elections of 22–25 
May 2014. Elections that were expected to be the first truly European elec-
tions, rather than a collection of second-order elections, focused on national 
issues as had happened in all previous elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Hix 
and Marsh, 2011).
There were good reasons for such expectations. After 2008, the financial 
and sovereign debt crisis has impacted Europe, with important, and sometimes 
dramatic, consequences in economic, social, and political terms. Indeed, the 
crisis did not have an immediate impact, in terms of economic policies that 
would affect the everyday life of ordinary people. As a result, the 2009 EP elec-
tions—held almost nine months after the Lehman Brothers default—did not 
show particularly clear effects of the crisis (De Sio and Legnante, 2010). But 
in subsequent years, the reaction to the crisis has seen the emergence of the 
European Union, its institutions, and other international institutions as key 
players in terms of economic policy of the Euro member states. Several of the 
states that were most impacted by the sovereign debt crisis had to negotiate 
bailout deals with the “Troika” committee (European Commission, European 
Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund) that strongly limited, if not 
temporarily cancelled, their economic policy sovereignty. Also, most other 
eurozone countries had to take economic measures with a strong impact on 
the everyday life of ordinary people.
It is in this context that according to many observers, the European Parlia-
ment elections of 2014 would become much more relevant than in the past—a 
first, key test to assess the response of European citizens to the austerity poli-
cies decided in Brussels. With the expected consequence of citizens becoming 
aware that what is decided in Brussels is not abstract, it is something with a 
strong and immediate impact on their real life.
1 This text is original for this book.
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Finally, further expectations of increased relevance were due to the new pro-
vision, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, that—for the election of 
the President of the European Commission—the European Council would have 
to “take into account” the election results and thus the balance of power among 
different groups in the European Parliament. This represents a reinforcement 
of the connection between popular vote and the election of the President of the 
Commission, leading to an expectation of higher voter mobilization.
Based on these considerations, several commentators, in the months pre-
ceding the elections, suggested that the 2014 elections could seriously chal-
lenge the consolidated theoretical framework that identifies EP elections as 
second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) compared to the more im-
portant national elections. For the first time since 1979, the 2014 elections 
could become the first truly European elections, with campaigns disputed on 
European (more than domestic) issues, albeit filtered and declined through 
national points of view. In other words, a general expectation was that these 
elections might be closer to first-order elections.
Yet, a more careful and articulated theoretical reflection suggests that 
in terms of pre-electoral expectations, more articulated and specific results 
should have been expected such as the following:
1) First and foremost, a differentiation within the European Union, between 
Euro and non-Euro countries. If a higher relevance of the elections was 
a consequence of the austerity policies, such higher relevance should be 
observed only in Euro countries.
2) In Euro countries, there was the expectation of a politicization of the con-
flict over the importance of Europe in regulating national economies—a 
politicization that would obviously boost Eurosceptic parties.
3) Still, even in this case, a differentiation might be expected. Our pre-elec-
toral hypothesis was that the success of Eurosceptic parties would have 
been stronger in two (albeit very different) subgroups of Euro countries. 
On the one hand, debtor states that had to sign a memorandum of under-
standing with the Troika (Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland) 
and on the other hand, the richest creditor countries (Germany, Austria, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). In the former, austerity policies have 
created a strong social malaise, preparing fertile terrain for populist and 
anti-EU parties; in the latter, conversely, a populist and Eurosceptic protest 
could collect the resentment of citizens “forced” to finance debtor coun-
tries, fearing the loss of their prosperity. There is finally a third, interme-
diate group that includes countries with macroeconomic indicators (per 
capita GDP, yearly GDP growth, public debt-to-GDP ratio, and unemploy-
ment) mostly in line with EU averages. It is a very heterogeneous category, 
ranging from those closer to the creditor group (France, Belgium, and Fin-
land) to those closer to the debtor group (Italy). These countries, albeit in 
13
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a situation of crisis, did not surrender their economic sovereignty to the 
Troika; at the same time, unlike the richest group, they do not perceive the 
Euro as a dampening factor for their economic development. In this third, 
residual category, we expected a less strong success of Eurosceptic parties 
and a general lower salience of European issues.
4) Finally, we expected a symmetrical differentiation—in terms of overall 
salience of European issues—among non-Euro countries. In particular, 
it is necessary to distinguish between Western European countries with 
a high economic status (UK, Sweden, and Denmark) and Central East-
ern European countries, which strongly benefit from EU structural funds 
since their entry into the EU, being now almost economically dependent 
from them. It was then plausible to expect that Euroscepticism would find 
more fertile terrain in the former group, whose countries joined the EU 
to exploit the economic advantages of the single market, but would fear 
further integration because of the economic difficulties of the Eurozone. 
While in the latter group, the EU is still a fundamental engine of economic 
development.
So far on the main hypotheses on the general trends in the 28 EU coun-
tries. But of course, we dedicated a special attention to Italy. Partly because 
it is our home country and the main focus of the CISE activity and partly 
because—shortly after the elections—Italy would take the presidency of the 
Council of the European Union so that elections results in Italy might have an 
indirect impact on the negotiations for the President of the Commission and 
on the general policy priorities of the first semester of the new EP legislature.
The 25 May election in Italy represented a key electoral test for several 
political actors. First and foremost for the Democratic Party (PD), the main 
party in office. Such election came little more than a year after the previous 
general elections but in a completely different political context.
After the lack of a clear victory by the PD in 2013, its leader Bersani re-
signed—after failing to form a government. Complex negotiations led then 
to the formation of a cabinet led by Enrico Letta, with an oversized majority 
including Berlusconi’s PDL. Political tensions continuously surrounded the 
life of the Letta cabinet: first, with Berlusconi passing to the opposition (but 
a splinter from his party, forming the government-loyal Ncd—Nuovo Centro-
Destra—led by Angelino Alfano, allowed the government to survive); and 
secondly, with the election of the new secretary general of the PD, seeing in 
December 2013 the triumph of Matteo Renzi. As a result, the Letta cabinet 
was in crisis already at the beginning of 2014, and a new Renzi cabinet was 
already in office in February 2014.
For Renzi, and for the popularity of his newly-formed cabinet, such election 
was a crucial test. The PD is a particular case of a mainstream party which, 
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through innovative procedures (open primaries) was able to radically change 
its leadership and public image. The question before the election was then 
whether the use of an innovative strategy (which also in part borrowed some 
communication strategies from populist parties) would pay off in electoral 
terms, especially for a party in office, which is usually penalized in second-
order elections. While it is true that as stated by electoral cycle theory (Van 
der Eijk and Franklin, 1996), government parties are less disadvantaged when 
EP elections are held shortly after the last general elections (during the so-
called “honeymoon” period), however, Renzi came to office without an elec-
toral legitimation and, moreover, in a time of economic crisis and extremely 
low trust in political parties and the political class in general. As a result, the 
context for Renzi’s PD was not extremely favourable.
In the centre-right camp, the other large mainstream party, Silvio Ber-
lusconi’s Forza Italia (the old label revived by Berlusconi after the splinter 
from the Pdl of the pro-government Ncd led by Alfano), was in an extremely 
difficult time of its political history, with Berlusconi not only banned from 
public office and thus not running but also facing severe campaign limits due 
to its alternate-punishment social work obligations.
For the Five Star Movement (M5S), on the contrary, the context of the EP 
election was extremely favourable. For the first time in a large European coun-
try, a nonmainstream party had arrived, in February 2013, on the verge of 
joining a government, after obtaining 25.6% of votes. As an antiestablishment, 
opposition party, it would enjoy in an EP election a particularly favourable 
arena, according to second-order elections theory. Yet, after more than a year 
of hard opposition (and of a total refusal of any collaboration with the whole 
party system), the election would be an interesting test of the popular ap-
proval of such strategy.
Finally, due to the austerity measures adopted in Southern Europe (includ-
ing Italy), support for EU institutions in Italy had strongly decreased. Thus, 
yet another crucial aspect would be to observe the electoral performance 
of Eurosceptic parties (not only the M5S but also the Northern League and 
Brothers of Italy, which openly support exiting the Euro) and finally of those 
parties that had clearly focused their campaign on a radical critique of the 
EU-imposed austerity measures (Lista Tsipras).
In this book, we confront these research questions from a variety of view-
points, in looking for an overarching interpretation of the 22–25 May vote. The 
book is structured as follows: Part I presents a set of pre-electoral analyses, 
dedicated to various aspects of the EP election (a brief history of the EP and of 
its functions, electoral systems across Europe, the selection of the newly-intro-
duced potential candidates to the presidency of the EU Commission, and final-
ly, a brief electoral history of the five main EP groups). The book then moves on 
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to the election results, starting in Part II with a quick spotlight on Italy, while 
Part III is dedicated to all other 27 EU countries, with concise reports covering 
the campaign, the results, and providing first interpretations. Finally, Part IV 
analyses the overall result at the European level, in terms of turnout, results of 
different EP groups, and the structuring of different party systems.
Once again, we need to state clearly the scope of this book. In offering 
a pack of analyses just few weeks after the election, we aim at providing an 
agile, essential tool able to deliver basic, essential—yet accurate—information 
on the 22–25 May EP election results, covering all 28 EU countries. With this 
contribution, as in the previous CISE book in English on Italian elections, 
we target an audience that is well beyond the academia, aiming at spreading 
greater knowledge and data on the functioning of electoral democracy in Italy 
and across Europe. 
In terms of the group of scholars involved, this book marks a strong dis-
continuity with the previous books published by the CISE, both in Italian 
and in English. Just until a few days before the elections, our project was still 
aimed at covering essentially Italy, with some reflections about the general 
results at the EP level. Then we thought it might be interesting to also cover 
some other European countries, perhaps by local scholars, in order to provide 
information and insights both on the campaign and on the general interpreta-
tion of the results. We then first contacted our Italian colleagues (and friends) 
working abroad—a lively, well-connected and technically skilled community 
of young, brilliant scholars of elections and public opinion. Even more, they 
would be able to comment in Italian shortly after the election. We received 
an unexpected, enthusiastic response from all of them, who accepted to write 
short reports to be immediately published on the CISE website, in a matter of 
few days after the election.
This changed the whole picture and inevitably whetted our appetites; we 
then moved on to the goal of covering all 28 EU countries, by tapping into 
our broader international network of young friends and colleagues from all 
around Europe. Needless to say that the response was just as enthusiastic, if 
not more. As a result, we think we did something pretty unique. In a mat-
ter of few days after the elections, we published on the CISE website a set of 
concise yet informative reports, both in Italian and English, covering elec-
tions in all 28 EU countries. Together with the contributions prepared by CISE 
researchers, this external contribution forms an important part of this book. 
This is why we want to reward with a special thank you all those external 
scholars whose enthusiasm made this possible. It’s all your fault (!): Konstan-
tinos Athanasiadis, Marcello Carammia, Mikołaj Cześnik, Patrick Dumont, 
Marta Fraile, Vlastimil Havlík, Andrija Henjak, Henrique Hernández, David 
Johann, Raphaël Kies, Michał Kotnarowski, Sylvia Kritzinger, Simona Kustec-
16
Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele and Nicola Maggini
Lipicer, Nina Liljeqvist, Marco Lisi, Roderick Pace, Carolina Plescia, Lukas 
Pukelis, Luana Russo, Sorina Soare, Peter Spáč, Laura Sudulich, LiisaTalving, 
Federico Vegetti, Tom Verthé, and Kristian Voss.
We also wish to thank Luca Carrieri, Luigi Di Gregorio, Federica Izzo, 
Bruno Marino, Rocco Polin, Stefano Rombi, and Michail Schwartz. They were 
all involved early on in the project (or even volunteered to join) to cover spe-
cific aspects of the election, and their contribution was vital for this book. 
Last, but obviously not least, a big thank you is due to Andrea De Angelis and 
Davide Morisi, who accepted to translate to English a number of articles in re-
cord time, and finally to Riccardo Petrini, whose precise visual craftsmanship 
(performed in unimaginably short time) has allowed us to deliver this book 
just few weeks after the election.
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Towards the European elections:  
An introductory framework
Vincenzo Emanuele and Nicola Maggini
26 March 20141
In about two months, precisely between the 22nd and the 25th of May de-
pending on the country, voters from 28 member states of the European Union 
will be called to the ballot boxes to elect the new members of the European 
Parliament.
Traditionally considered “second order” elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) 
with respect to the more important national ones, the 2014 European elections 
appear to have acquired centrality and wider importance compared to the 
past. This does not depend exclusively on the growing importance of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of its legislative functions in the Union but especially 
on the consequences of the economic crisis that hit sovereign debts across 
Europe since 2008, leading the EU to emerge as the main decision maker re-
garding the political economy of member states.
The next European elections can thus be deemed as the “first” true European 
elections, in which the electoral campaigns in the various states is not connected 
to domestic politics but rather to the European policy orientation proposed by 
the national actors. The reform introduced with the Lisbon Treaty (coming into 
force in December 2009) is also contributing to push towards the Europeaniza-
tion of the electoral campaign. For the first time, it is stated that the President of 
the Commission will be practically elected by the European Parliament while 
the European Council would maintain exclusively a control role. In practice, the 
relationship between popular vote and the election of the highest charge in the 
EU (the head of the executive branch) will be strengthened. 
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
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In the last weeks, the main political groups in the European Parliament 
(EP) have indicated their own candidates to the presidency of the Commis-
sion. The European political group that will achieve the relative majority of 
the seats in the EP will have its own candidate to the presidency obtaining 
the charge, and this will introduce an element of electoral competition closer 
to that characterizing competitive parliamentary democracies. The two main 
candidates are the Luxembourgian Jean-Claude Juncker for the European 
People’s Party (EPP) and the German Martin Schulz for the Party of Euro-
pean Socialists (PES). The other candidates include the Belgian Guy Verhof-
stadt for the Liberals, the Greek Tsipras—leader of Syriza—for the European 
Left, and the co-candidates Keller and Bovè for the Greens. The group of Eu-
ropean Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)—that includes the British con-
servatives—will not present any candidate to the presidency of the Commis-
sion. The group of Eurosceptic parties (Europe of Freedom and Democracy, 
EFD)—led by the National Front of Marine Le Pen—shared the same deci-
sion. The Northern League and the Brotherhood of Italy-National Alliance 
represent the group in Italy. 
Further than choosing indirectly the President of the Commission, Eu-
ropean voters will vote to select the members of the EP. As a consequence 
of the entrance of the 28th member state—Croatia, which joined the Union 
in July 2013—the number of EP members will increase from this election to 
751 (from 736). Table 1 resumes the changes in the seats for each state with 
respect to 2009. As we can see, Germany loses three seats, reducing to 96; Italy 
gains one seat increasing its number to 73, the same as the U.K.; France and 
Sweden obtain two additional seats; and Spain even four while Croatia will 
have 11 seats assigned. It is interesting to notice how the two basic principles 
of representation on which all democratic parliaments are grounded—namely 
the one of people’s representation usually concerning a lower chamber and the 
one of territorial representation expressed by a higher chamber—are present 
and act as counterbalancing forces. The representatives assigned to each MS 
in fact depend on the ratio between the country’s resident population and 
the population in the EU. However, would this principle be entirely applied, 
smaller countries such as Malta, Luxembourg, Cyprus, or Estonia would have 
very few representatives. To safeguard territorial representation—i.e., mem-
ber states—the Treaty establishes that no country can have less than six rep-
resentatives. Thus, while Germany obtains an additional representative every 
about 860,000 citizens, in case of Malta, the same amount reduces to 69,000.
Each member state can decide the electoral system for the election of the 
European Parliament although with the Treaty of Amsterdam, it has been 
established that member states are constrained to adopt a proportional system 
and to apply electoral thresholds up to a maximum of 5%.
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For voters in traditionally majoritarian countries, as France or the United 
Kingdom, the possibility to vote with a proportional system represent an im-
portant change that generally produces an underrepresentation of the main 
political actors with an advantage of the political options in the minority, 
typically marginalized in the national political system. To a similar extent, 
however, also in the other countries, the “second order” competition dynamic 
Table 1 – Seats’ distribution in the EP and changes between 2009 and 2014
Country Seats 2009 Seats 2014 +/-
Austria 17 18 1
Belgium 22 21 -1
Bulgaria 17 17 0
Croatia n/a 11 n/a
Cyprus 6 6 0
Czech Republic 22 21 -1
Denmark 13 13 0
Estonia 6 6 0
Finland 13 13 0
France 72 74 2
Germany 99 96 -3
Greece 22 21 -1
Hungary 22 21 -1
Ireland 12 11 -1
Italy 72 73 1
Latvia 8 8 0
Lithuania 12 11 -1
Luxembourg 6 6 0
Malta 5 6 1
Netherlands 25 26 1
Poland 50 51 1
Portugal 22 21 -1
Romania 33 32 -1
Slovakia 13 13 0
Slovenia 7 8 1
Spain 50 54 4
Sweden 18 20 2
United Kingdom 72 73 1
Total 736 751 15
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characterizing the European elections—namely the smaller relevance of the 
charges at stake—implies patterns recurring over time: turnout decrease with 
respect to the national elections, a loss in the support for incumbent parties, 
and growing vote shares for smaller parties. More broadly, the consequence is 
a fragmented electoral contest and the smaller room for strategic2 considera-
tions for vote decisions compared to domestic electoral arenas. 
Notwithstanding these tendencies to favour smaller parties over governing 
parties, the larger European party families of the Populars and the Socialists 
have always been largely majoritarian within the EP. In the 2009 elections, 
these two groups have collected more than 60% of the seats jointly considered. 
As reported in Table 2, the leaving parliament presents a relative majority of 
the EPP (36%) while the PES with no more than 25% of the seats, the lowest 
share ever. In 2009, the EPP achieved its third victory in a row, and since 1999, 
it outperforms the PES as a consequence of its effective policy of integration 
of political parties that has expanded to include almost all the conservative 
political parties and not merely those identified with a Christian-social and 
Christian-democrat tradition as originally pursued. Moreover, with the East-
ern Enlargement of 2004, the advantage of the EPP on the PES has further 
crystallized given the weakness of socialist parties in Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries while the EPP has benefited from the support of the stronger 
conservative parties in those countries. 
2 On the concept of strategic voting, see Cox (2005).
Table 2 – Composition of the EP after the 2009 elections
Group N seats % seats
European People’s Party (EPP) 265 36.0
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) 184 25.0
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 84 11.4
Greens (Greens-EFA) 55 7.5
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) 54 7.3
European United Left (GUE-NGL) 35 4.8
Europe for Freedom and Democracy (EFD) 32 4.3
Non-Inscrits (NI) 27 3.7
Total 736 100
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Far from the position of the EPP in the EP, the Liberals (ALDE) repre-
sents the third European political group. Having collected 11% of the seats 
in 2009, they outperformed the Greens (7.5%) and the group of Conserva-
tives and Reformists (7.3%). The latter group has been formed by the decision 
of the British Tories to leave the EPP, given the growing anti-Europe stance. 
Then we find the two most extreme political groups, namely, the radical left 
and the anti-Europe and anti-Euro one. In 2009, they both achieved less than 
5% of the seats although they are likely to expand their support in the next 
elections under the weight of the economic crisis and the strong leadership of 
political figures as Tsipras and Marine Le Pen. Finally, 27 members in 2009 
were simply “non-inscrits” to any political group. This process is in constant 
decline, given the increasing “institutionalization of the European party sys-
tem” (Bardi, 2002).
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The Parliament that European citizens have elected in May 2014 is a very 
different assembly from the one that convened for the first time in September 
1952 under the name of “Common Assembly.” The 78 original MPs have now 
become 750, and they are no longer nominated by six national parliaments 
but rather elected by 400 million citizens from 28 different countries. Together 
with the number of its members, the European Parliament (EP) has signifi-
cantly increased also its powers, to the extent of becoming an equal partner 
with the European Union Council in almost all policy areas (Hix and Hoyland, 
2013, p. 172). The goal of this short article is to review the evolution of the Eu-
ropean Parliament, from a small and almost irrelevant second-order assembly 
to a fundamental pillar of European democracy and of the function of the EU.
Infancy: The Common Assembly of the European Communities (1952–1979)
The Schuman declaration of May 9, 1950, today rightly celebrated as the 
founding act of the European Union, does not make any reference to the need 
of a representative assembly. Such need was however felt by Jean Monnet, wor-
ried about the democratic legitimacy of the European Coal and Steal Com-
munity (ECSC) of which he was set to become the first president. Article 20 
of the 1951 Paris Treaty hence mandated the creation of a “Common Assem-
bly” whose only power was that of voting a no-confidence motion against the 
ECSC High Authority.
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
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Few months after its creation, however, the newborn Assembly gave an 
early proof of its high ambitions. Taking the name of “Ad hoc Assembly,” it 
engaged in the drafting of a treaty for a new European Political Community, a 
project that quickly failed after the French Parliament rejected the European 
Defence Community. The hypothesis contained in this project, that of trans-
forming the Common Assembly in a powerful chamber directly elected by 
European citizens, continued however to linger on until it eventually found a 
gradual but more and more effective realization.
Once the federalist great leap forward failed, the project of European inte-
gration regained the slow but steady pace of Monnet’s functionalist approach. 
In 1957, the Rome treaties established the European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC), later merged 
together with the ECSC in the European Communities (Brussels Treaty of 
1965). The Common Assembly, which in 1962 renamed itself European Par-
liament (a name officially adopted by the Single European Act of 1986), be-
came a shared institution for all three communities. In its first meeting af-
ter the Rome Treaty, the Common Assembly elected Robert Schuman as its 
president and structured its parliamentary groups according to their political 
positions rather than their national affiliations. Such decision, taken on May 
13, 1958, is since then considered the founding act of the modern European 
Parliament. As for the functions and the powers of the assembly, the Rome 
Treaty introduced the obligation for the EEC Council to consult the Assembly 
before adopting any legislative act. This was the first recognition of the Euro-
pean Parliament’s legislative role, a role that the EP will be called to fulfil with 
ever increasing powers in the following decades.
After a long stalemate in the years of De Gaulle, in the 70s, the European 
project and the Parliament gained new dynamism. In 1970, the EP obtained 
the first powers over the budget albeit initially limited to the so called “non-
compulsory expenditures” (which excluded the substantial agriculture budg-
et). Already in 1975, however, such powers were extended, and the Parliament 
was given the power to reject the budget as a whole and to discharge its im-
plementation. In the subsequent decades, the control of the budget becomes 
a formidable instrument of pressure in the hands of the EP, and it was often 
used during interinstitutional negotiations to obtain further powers in other 
domains.2
2  See, for example, the power struggles over the creation of the European External Action 
Service (Wisniewski, 2013).
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Childhood: A Parliament Elected by the People (1979–1992)
In 1979, the introduction of direct popular elections marked an important 
step in the life of the European Parliament.3 While such innovation was not 
accompanied by any formal increase in power and functions, the new demo-
cratic legitimacy significantly increased the authority of the Parliament and 
its political ambitions. Its prestige was then further increased by the election 
of Simone Veil as its first president—a holocaust survivor and a woman who 
fully embodied the deep values and profound historical reasons of the Euro-
pean integration project. 
In the 80s, the European Parliament thus started to view itself as the driving 
force of the integration process and to fight with ever stronger vigour for increas-
ing its powers. An important victory was obtained in 1980 when the European 
Court of Justice annulled a regulation approved by the Council without consult-
ing the Parliament. Even if—according to the Rome Treaty—the Parliament’s 
opinion was not binding, it was nevertheless a mandatory part of the legislative 
process. In 1985, to underline and reinforce its centrality in the government of 
the EU, the EP, which until then had convened in Strasburg, moved some of its 
works in Brussels.4 Finally, in 1986, the approval of the organic treaty reform that 
goes under the name of Single European Act owned much of its ambition and 
federalist afflatus to the “Spinelli Plan” that was adopted by the EP in 1984.
The Single European Act introduced two new legislative procedures. The 
first one, known as “cooperation procedure” (abolished by the Lisbon Treaty 
in 2002) increased the Parliament’s influence by allowing for a second reading 
of legislative proposals. The second, known as “assent procedure,” and still 
used under the name of “consent procedure” (e.g., for the approval of interna-
tional treaties), gave full veto power to the EP over proposed legislative acts.5 
Even more significant in terms of legislative empowerment was however the 
codecision procedure, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Accord-
ing to this procedure, if the Parliament and the Council are unable to reach 
a compromise during the second reading, a special Conciliation Committee 
is set up and tasked with agreeing on a common text, which then needs to be 
approved by both institutions in a third reading.
3  Such possibility was already envisaged by the Rome Treaty of 1958.
4  Even if an initial compromise was reached in 1992, the issue of the double seat is still sub-
ject to heated debates. The opposition of France notwithstanding, it is reasonable to hope 
that the definitive relocation of all parliamentary activity to Brussels is only a matter of time.




The Maastricht Treaty also introduced other important innovations in 
terms of legislative initiative and control over the executive bodies. As for the 
former, Maastricht gave the Parliament the right to invite the Commission 
to introduce the legislative proposals that it deems necessary for the full im-
plementation of the treaties. While the EP, unlike most national parliaments, 
still lacks the full right of initiative, the Treaty also obliges the Commission, 
in case of refusal to follow up on the Parliament’s requests, to fully justify its 
decision. As for the powers of control over the executive, the Parliament ob-
tained the right to be consulted in the choice of the Commission’s president, 
to vote the confidence to the incoming Commission (but not to the single 
commissioners), to set up temporary committees of enquiry, and to name im-
portant officials such as the head of the European Central Bank, the Ombuds-
man, and the members of the Court of Auditors.
Adolescence: From Maastricht to Lisbon (1992–2009)
With the approval of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Parliament es-
sentially acquired its current functions: it has relevant powers of control over 
the Commission and other executive agencies, it acts as co-legislator with the 
Council in an increasing number of policy areas, and it holds the power to ap-
prove and discharge the community budget. The expansion of powers in the 
two following decades thus proceeded along already consolidated directions.
The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 formalized the veto power that the Parlia-
ment holds over the nomination of the Commission president and increased 
from 15 to 32 the number of policy areas that fell under the codecision legisla-
tive procedure (they became 37 with the Nice Treaty in 2001). The Amsterdam 
Treaty also strengthened the position of the EP in the codecision procedure by 
eliminating the possibility for the European Council to reintroduce its origi-
nal proposal as a “take it or leave it” offer in case of failure of the Conciliation 
Committee. It is however interesting to notice how such innovation was in 
fact a mere ratification of a de facto situation—in its internal rules of proce-
dure, the Parliament had already committed itself to reject any text proposed 
by the Council in a take-it-or-leave-it form (Hix, 2002). Generally speaking, it 
is important to keep in mind how the gradual empowerment of the European 
Parliament was due to the amending of internal procedures and to innova-
tions in the political practice as much as to treaty reforms (Kappel, 2002).
Over the last few decades, particularly important victories have been se-
cured by the EP in its efforts to create a more binding relationship with the 
European Commission. In 1999, the Parliament obtained the resignation of 
the Santer Commission, first by refusing to approve its budget and then by 
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menacing a no-confidence vote. Furthermore, albeit the treaties do not foresee 
individual confidence votes for each commissioner, the Parliament became 
able to exercise considerable influence over their nominations, vetoing those 
of Mr. Buttiglione in 2004 and Ms. Jeleva in 2009. In the course of such arm 
wrestling with the Commission, the Parliament was also able to extract other 
important concessions, later formalized in ad hoc interinstitutional agree-
ments. These included the rights to receive periodical reports, to question the 
Commissioners, to be consulted during the drafting of legislative proposals, 
and to take part in international negotiations.
The last far-reaching reform of the European treaties so far was signed 
in Lisbon in 2007. It extended the codecison procedure to most policy areas, 
transforming it in the standard procedure under the new name of Ordinary 
Legislative Procedure. Furthermore, according to the Lisbon Treaty, the presi-
dent of the Commission is now “elected” by the Parliament albeit on the base 
of a proposal made by Council taking into account the results of the parlia-
mentary elections (art. 17.7, TEU). This latest innovation, together with the 
fact that this year, for the first time, each one of the main European political 
parties has indicated a presidential candidate, suggests that the 2014 elections 
will mark a new important step in the empowerment of the European Parlia-
ment. Indeed, the treaties themselves now recognize how the functioning of 
the Union shall be founded on representative democracy (art. 10, TEU) and 
thus the essential role of the European Parliament. It is then possible that after 
a long and difficult adolescence, the European Union and its Parliament will 
finally reach a full and responsible maturity. 
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The European elections to be held between 22 and 25 May 2014 (depend-
ing on the country) may acquire, according to many observers, a centrality 
and significance much wider than in the past. To understand it, it is worth 
looking at how many Europeans go to the polls to elect their representatives 
in the European Parliament. In fact, in the field of electoral studies, Euro-
pean elections have always been regarded as “second-order” elections (Reif 
and Schmitt, 1980), i.e., elections where the stakes are lower—or perceived as 
such—than in the general elections—when the competition aims at the for-
mation of a government of their own country—and consequently, the turnout 
is lower than in national elections. 
To understand the results in terms of electoral participation of the upcom-
ing European elections, it is therefore necessary to have a clear picture of the 
historical evolution of turnout levels in the course of the seven European elec-
tions, which were held between 1979 and 2009. Figure 1 shows, diachronically 
and in percentages, the turnout at each election in the EU countries. As it ap-
pears, there is a clear downward trend over time in the rates of participation; 
it goes from 62% of voters in 1979 to 43% in 2009, namely, a decline of more 
than 19 percentage points. The biggest drop is recorded between the elections 
of 1994 and those of 1999 when the percentage of voters in the EU declined 
from 56.7% to 49.5%. Therefore, since 1999 onwards, the absolute majority of 
Europeans have deserted the polls, further weakening the democratic legiti-
macy of the European institutions. This trend regarding the overall decline in 
turnout rates—yet not starting from particularly high levels— may actually 
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
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hide highly heterogeneous levels and trends of participation characterizing the 
different countries. In fact, it has to be emphasized that as during the historical 
period taken into account, the European Union has been enlarged to a growing 
number of member states, each carrying its own “tradition” in terms of voter 
turnout. At the first election of 1979, there were nine member states: Germany, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Den-
mark, and Ireland. Since the 1984 elections, Greece—who had joined the EU 
in 1981—also joined the group. At the elections of 1989 and 1994, 12 member 
states participated, given the entrance into the EU of Spain and Portugal in 
1986. Member states then increased to 15 in the 1999 elections, thanks to the 
entry into the EU of Austria, Sweden, and Finland in 1995. Finally, since 2004, 
the citizens of Eastern European countries also took part in the European elec-
tions. In particular, 10 countries have joined the EU in 2004 (Poland, Hungary, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, and 
Malta) and two in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania). Hence, from the initial nine 
countries in 1979, the number has increased to 27 countries in 2009; as a con-
sequence, political heterogeneity—also in terms of electoral participation—has 
increased in the EU in the time series considered here. 
Table 1 reports turnout rates in each EU country over time. As it appears, 
the heterogeneity is very high; turnout values range from very high levels in 
certain countries to particularly low levels in other ones. Among the former 
find their place without any doubt Belgium and Luxembourg, with a turnout 
rate always around 90% between 1979 and 2009. This circumstance is un-
doubtedly due to the fact that in both countries, voting is compulsory. Quite 
high levels of turnout albeit with a decreasing trend over time are registered 
also in Greece—particularly until 1994—and, especially, in Malta and Italy. 
The second group of countries is contained most of the Eastern European 
countries: Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia; in particular, the par-
ticipation ranges from 17% to about 30%. Low levels of voter turnout are 
registered also from the beginning in one of the countries that during the 
first EP elections was already part of the EU, namely, the United Kingdom 
(which stood always below 40% of the voters). In general, there is a downward 
trend in voter turnout over time, but this trend seems to have stabilized in 
the 2000s: most of the countries have reached a historic minimum in 1999 
or 2004. There are some exceptions: France, Italy, Portugal, Malta, Cyprus, 
Hungary, and Lithuania have reached their historic minimum in 2009 (we 
do not consider countries with few decimal points of difference compared to 
2004, and it should be noted that Malta, Cyprus, Hungary, and Lithuania took 
part in only two European elections). It should be noted, however, that the 
long-term trend seems to be that of a homogenization towards lower turnout 
levels. Finally, regarding the Italian case, it stands out the fact that until the 
European elections of 1989 (included), participation is very high, above 80%. 
33
The evolution of turnout in European elections from 1979 to 2009
Italy in general, as mentioned earlier, is among the countries characterized by 
higher levels of turnout.
According to what has been said insofar, the value of electoral participa-
tion calculated in the European Union—as presented at the beginning of the 
article— was conflating levels and trends of participation differing sharply 
across countries. As further evidence of this fact, we reported the average 
turnout in the European elections separated by groups of countries. Figure 2 
shows the average turnout across time, for four groups of countries: the nine 
initial countries (all being part of Western Europe), the three Southern Euro-
pean countries that joined the EU in the 1980s (Greece, Spain, and Portugal), 
the three countries of Central and Northern Europe that joined the EU in 
the 1990s (Sweden, Austria, and Finland), and, finally, the 12 Eastern Euro-
pean countries that joined the EU in the early 2000s (counting in this group 
Malta as well though not being in the East). The first fact that emerges is that 
looking at turnout rates for separate groups of countries, the almost linear 
decrease shown in Figure 1—considering the whole EU—cannot be detected. 
The nine initial countries register a starting average turnout of 66% in 1979 
and reach their historic minimum not in 2009 but in 1999 (55% turnout); 
after 1999, turnout increases slightly, standing around 58%. The countries of 
Southern Europe (excluding Italy) start from a level of electoral participation 
very similar to the initial values of the first nine countries, namely, 62% in 
1989 (in 1984 instead, there was only Greece, with a rate of 80.6%, well above 
that of the group of nine countries). During the 1990s, the average turnout 
in the three Southern countries considered is quite similar to that of the nine 
countries and in 1999 becomes even higher (57.7% vs. 55%). The gap between 
the two groups of countries in terms of electoral participation spread in the 
last two elections: in 2004, the participation in the three Southern countries is 
lower by almost 10 percentage points compared to the nine countries, and in 
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Table 1 – Turnout rates by EU country across time (%)
    1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009
Belgium 91.4 92.1 90.7 90.7 91.1 90.8 90.4
Denmark 47.8 52.4 46.2 52.9 50.5 47.9 59.5
Germany 65.7 56.8 62.3 60.0 45.2 43.0 43.3
Ireland 63.6 47.6 68.3 44.0 50.2 58.6 58.6
France 60.7 56.7 48.8 52.7 46.8 42.8 40.6
Italy 85.7 82.5 81.1 73.6 69.8 71.7 65.1
Luxembourg 88.9 88.8 87.4 88.6 87.3 91.4 90.8
Netherlands 58.1 50.9 47.5 35.7 30.0 39.3 36.8
United Kingdom 32.4 32.6 36.4 36.4 24.0 38.5 34.7
Greece   80.6 80.0 73.2 70.3 63.2 52.6
Spain     54.7 59.1 63.1 45.1 44.9
Portugal     51.1 35.5 39.9 38.6 36.8
Sweden         38.8 37.9 45.5
Austria         49.4 42.4 46.0
Finland         30.1 39.4 40.3
Czech Republic         28.3 28.2
Estonia           26.8 43.9
Cyprus           72.5 59.4
Lithuania           48.4 21.0
Latvia           41.3 53.7
Hungary           38.5 36.3
Malta           82.4 78.8
Poland           20.9 24.5
Slovenia           28.4 28.3
Slovakia           17.0 19.6
Bulgaria             39.0
Romania             27.7
EU Total 62.0 59.0 58.4 56.7 49.5 45.5 43.0
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2009, it is smaller by 13 percentage points (touching the lowest level of 44.8%). 
The other group of three countries considered (Austria, Sweden, and Finland) 
starts from a very low level of participation (39.5% in 1999) and is significantly 
lower both than the group of nine countries and the three Southern countries 
(a difference of nearly 20 percentage points). However, the turnout trend in 
this group of countries is a slight increasing, reaching 43.9% in 2009, and 
then actually equalling the average turnout of the three Southern countries. 
Finally, the average turnout rate of the group of Eastern European countries is 
the lowest and decreases slightly between 2004 (when 40.4% was almost equal 
to that of the group consisting of Sweden, Austria, and Finland) and 2009 
(the lowest value, 38.4%). In 2009, the difference between the group of coun-
tries with the highest turnout rate (the nine initial countries) and the group of 
countries with the lowest turnout (Eastern European countries) reached 19.4 
percentage points. In conclusion, it can be argued that the sharp decline in 
turnout occurred since 1999 in the EU; it is caused particularly by the decline 
in the participation of the three Southern countries that joined the EU in the 
1980s and—even more—by the entry into the EU of countries with low turn-
out levels at the European elections (Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Eastern 
European countries in general). In contrast, the average participation rate of 
the group of the nine initial countries remains fairly stable over time.
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9 EU initial countries Greece, Spain and Portugal (in 1984 only Greece)
Austria, Sweden and Finland New 12 EU eastern countries (10 in 2004)
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The electoral system represents a fundamental contextual variable to be 
taken into account when studying an election. In fact, the electoral system 
can have an influence on the competitive strategies of political actors as well 
as on voters’ voting behaviour (these are the so-called “psychological effects”) 
further than clearly affect the transformation of the votes cast by the elector-
ate into seats (the so-called “mechanical effect”). This is an element to shed 
light on since we are about to undertake the analysis of European elections.
What is the electoral system for the European Parliament elections? Is 
there a common system or each member state has its own system? With a 
decision of the Council (n. 772/2002) approved by the European Parliament 
(EP) in May 2002, the European Union has introduced some common prin-
ciples to harmonize the elections for the EP, previously regulated under the 
jurisdiction of the member states. Undertaking this decision (that incorpo-
rates a legislative position already present in the treaty of Amsterdam), the EU 
has established that the members of the EP have to be elected with a system 
of proportional representation, using either the party list vote or the single 
transferable vote system. Member states may decide in the adoption of an 
election threshold albeit inferior to 5% on national basis. Member states can 
also decide how to subdivide the electoral areas although this cannot general-
ly affect the proportional nature of the voting system. Based on these general 
principles, the electoral systems in the 28 member states have become more 
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
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homogenous albeit they leave a lot of room for discretionary measures of the 
member states. Further than the number of electoral areas and the adoption 
of an election threshold, the states are allowed to decide on the age of eligible 
voters and candidates, the electoral formula (namely, the mechanism trans-
forming votes into seats), the election method of single deputies, and the pres-
ence of sanctions for those who decide to abstain. Table 1 resumes the main 
features of the electoral systems for the EP in the 28 member states. Overall, 
it represents a proportional system with variable geometry and 28 national 
variants. This produces chaos of formulas and election thresholds that in turn 
offer different incentives and constraints in the various national contexts.
As we can see, the minimum age to be attained to become eligible voters is 
18 years in Europe with the exception of Austria where voting age is 16. Greater 
variability can be observed for the minimum age of candidates, set at 25 years in 
Italy, Cyprus, and Greece. All the other countries have set a lower age of candi-
dacy, granting eligibility for candidates at the age of 23 (Romania), 21 (Belgium, 
Ireland, and the majority of Eastern European countries), or even 18 (fifteen 
countries, among which France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden). 
Moreover, in four countries (Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, and Luxembourg), vot-
ing is compulsory although any formal sanction is applied with the exception of 
Luxembourg. Here, abstainers receive a fine between 100€ and 250€ in case of 
first offence while for repeat offenders, the fine is increased up to 500€–1,000€. 
Besides the different eligibility criteria for voters and candidates and the 
rules on compulsory vote, the most interesting differences dealing with the 
evaluation of voting systems refer to the number of electoral districts, the 
electoral formula, and the election threshold. A comparative analysis of these 
elements allow us to classify the various systems based on their expected de-
gree of “disproportionality” (Gallagher, 1991), namely of the distortion they 
are able to introduce in the transformation of votes into seats. A further vari-
able to be taken into consideration for its marked ability to affect expected 
disproportionality is the number of available seats: the smaller this number, 
the greater the implicit disproportionality in the electoral system.2
2 More precisely, what has to be considered is the ratio between the number of electoral 
districts and the number of seats to be assigned, namely the magnitude of the district 
(M), given that the seats are allocated with respect to the district-specific result. If in one 
district, 100 votes are cast and 20 seats are to be assigned (M=20), the maximum implicit 
threshold of the system would be 5% (100/20=5); maximum five votes are needed to grant 
one seat. If the seats to be assigned are only 4, then the maximum implicit threshold will 
be 25% (100/4=25); to receive a seat, maximum 25 votes are needed. We are referring to 
the concept of maximum threshold because the real implicit threshold will depend on the 
specific distribution of the votes among the various candidates/parties.
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Based on the characteristics mentioned insofar, it is possible to classify 
electoral systems on an ideal continuum ranging between proportionality and 
disproportionality. One end of the continuum (proportionality) represents 
systems with many seats to be assigned in a single national electoral district 
(very high M) using the Hare quota method without election threshold; the 
other end of the continuum represents electoral systems characterized by few-
er seats to be assigned in many electoral districts (very low M) using D’Hondt 
formula and high election threshold. 
In the vast majority of EU member states, representatives are elected with 
a unique national electoral district. Exceptions are represented by some big 
countries as Italy, the United Kingdom, France, Poland, and by two small but 
culturally heterogeneous countries as Belgium and Ireland where the seats 
are allocated through various electoral districts to protect local representa-
tiveness. Table 1 further reports the average magnitude values (M) in each 
country. This value is given by the ratio between the total available seats and 
the number of electoral districts. It can be observed a rather high degree of 
variability in the average value of M as it ranges between 2.75 registered in 
Ireland and the 96% computed in Germany. An additional difference can be 
detected in the electoral formulas. The mechanism of transformation of votes 
into seats characterized by the widest adoption is the D’Hondt method, used 
in 17 countries; the Hare quota method (and its variants Hagenbach-Bischoff 
and Droop) is the most proportional one and has been adopted by six coun-
tries; the Sainte-Lague method has been adopted by three countries; and fi-
nally, Ireland and Malta adopted the Single Transferable Vote (STV) method 
for their respective political elections as well. Only half of the countries have 
introduced an election threshold, generally set at 5% (9 cases3) or in fewer 
cases 4% (Austria, Italy, and Sweden), 3% (Greece), or 1.8% (Cyprus). For what 
concerns the selection of candidates, about two-thirds (18 out of 28) of the 
countries introduced a preference vote in their system, although following 
different specific procedures (open list, flexible list, or even panachage as in 
Luxembourg), while eight countries vote with a closed list (in which the order 
of candidates is decided by party officials).
In conclusion, it is possible to categorize the 28 electoral systems based 
on the previous considerations in terms of expected disproportionality in 
the transformation of votes into seats. As previously recalled, the electoral 
system represents a crucial variable to understand a specific party systems 
and its competitive dynamics. A relatively disproportional system will tend 
to overrepresent big parties and underrepresent smaller ones. As a conse-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































quence, these incentives will promote strategic behaviours both on the supply 
side (creation of electoral cartels and merges among small parties) and on 
the demand side (voters will tend not to support small parties and to prefer 
suboptimal political options with concrete possibilities of winning seats). We 
have thus quantitatively evaluated the 28 electoral systems in terms of their 
expected disproportionality by making use of a 7-points scale (ranging from 
“very high” to “very low”). A case of extreme proportionality is represented by 
Germany, whose 96 representatives in the EP are elected in a unique electoral 
district without election threshold. The electoral systems of Spain and—to a 
lesser extent—Netherlands, Portugal, and Bulgaria result highly proportional 
as well. On the other end of the scale, we situated Ireland, whose average M of 
2.75 makes this system particularly disproportionate even in the absence of an 
election threshold. Similarly to Ireland, Poland results as a highly dispropor-
tionate system, considering its average M of 3.9, the adoption of the D’Hondt 
formula to assign the seats, and the national election threshold of 5%. Further 
countries characterized by a highly disproportionate system are Cyprus, Es-
tonia, Malta, and Luxembourg. These countries elect only six deputies in the 
EP, and thus, the implicit threshold is so high to make irrelevant the adoption 
of an explicit one. France and the United Kingdom present respectively a “me-
dium-high” and a “high” degree of disproportionality for a different reason. 
In these two countries, the high number of available seats is allocated in the 
various electoral districts (average M of about nine for France and six for the 
U.K.); moreover, the election threshold has been set at 5% (at the district level 
in France and at the national level in the U.K.), and the formula to allocate 
the seats is the D’Hondt method. Far less disproportionate results the Italian 
system: in this case, notwithstanding the territorial subdivision into five elec-
toral districts, the allocation of the seats is conducted on national basis, and 
the election threshold is set at 4% with the Hare quota method. 
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Europarties’ choices—Who are the 
candidates for the presidency of the European 




One of the biggest European Union’s problems is the so-called “demo-
cratic deficit” (Norris, 1997; Majone, 2008; Katz, 2001). This is a political and, 
most importantly, a legitimacy-related problem. In other words, since within 
the European Union the classical democratic processes do not really work, 
why should we believe European decisions to be morally right and suitable, 
i.e., legitimate (Dahl, 1963, 72–73)?
EU politicians have decided to address this issue in an interesting way. 
Quoting the website europarlamento24,2 “We are expecting […] with an 
Italian-politics-related logic, that the candidate for the presidency of the Eu-
ropean Commission, supported by the European party which will gain the 
highest number of seats within the European Parliament, will be the first to be 
considered in order to understand whether he/she will be available to obtain 
the support of the absolute majority of the European Parliament.”
Who are these candidates? How have they been selected? This article will 
be devoted to answer these questions. I will use two dimensions of analysis 
devised by Hazan (2002) and by Hazan and Rahat (2010), i.e., the “candidacy” 
and the “selectorate.” The first dimension will address the questions on who 
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-





can stand as a candidate and whether there are some conditions to present the 
candidacy. On the other hand, the second dimension will be related to the is-
sue of who can select a candidate.3
European People’s Party
EPP’s candidate is Jean-Claude Juncker, former Luxembourg’s Prime Min-
ister. On his website,4 Juncker presents his five political priorities. First, devis-
ing reforms to create jobs and economic growth (for example, via the creation 
of a digital European market); second, implementing policies that will favour 
a European energy union, to deal with political troubles in some areas of the 
world and to foster the development of renewable energy production; third, 
negotiating a trade agreement with the USA; fourth, devising a Euro area 
reform that will limit ECB’s powers, increasing the weight of the European 
Commission and of the Eurogroup5; moreover, Juncker wants to give more 
power to the Eurozone within the IMF; and fifth, it has been proposed to 
negotiate an agreement with the United Kingdom, in order to give more au-
tonomy to English politicians, provided that they will not try to weaken single 
market’s hallmarks and future Eurozone’s reforms.
Candidacy – the candidate must have been prime minister. Moreover, he/
she needed to get the support of his/her national party and at least of other two 
parties coming from different countries. Two people stood as a candidate: Jean-
Claude Juncker and Michel Barnier, member of the European Commission.
Selectorate – EPP’s congress, held in Dublin last March, selected Juncker 
as the candidate for the presidency of the European Commission. There were 
several congress delegates with voting rights, including the EPP national par-
ties’ presidents and delegates and also European Commission’s and Council of 
Europe’s members who were also members of the EPP.6 To summarise, there 
3 Unless otherwise specified, information on candidacy and selectorate for each candidate 
is taken from this website: http://europedecides.eu/candidates/european-political-parties/
4 http://juncker.epp.eu/
5 On the alleged necessity to have an independent Central bank to avoid that monetary 
policy decisions are controlled by politicians’ short-term electoral necessities, see Stiglitz 
(1998); Drazen (2002); McNamara (2002).
6 See also EPP’s regulations, http://dublin2014.epp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Vot-
ing-regulation-Dublin-2014-EN.pdf
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were more than 800 people with voting rights (Piedrafita & Renman, 2014, pg. 
5). Six hundred and twenty-seven votes were cast. Juncker obtained 382 votes 
while just 245 votes supported Michel Barnier.7
Party of European Socialists (PES)
PES has decided to present the candidacy of Martin Schulz. He has been a 
member of the German party SPD since the 1970s and has been a European 
member of Parliament since 1994. In 2012, he was also elected as president of 
the European Parliament. On his website,8 Schulz puts forward some propos-
als on minimum wages, on the devising of policies to fight unemployment and 
fiscal evasion in Europe and to support education.
Candidacy – parties and organisations that were members of the PES could 
present a candidate, who needed the support of 15% of full member PES’ par-
ties and organisations. Only Martin Schulz obtained the necessary support 
and, therefore, in November 2013, he became the “candidate designate” of PES.
Selectorate – within each PES national party, there has been a voting to 
confirm the “candidate designate,” according to national statutes and regula-
tions. Results should have been ratified by each party’s national board that 
had been democratically elected. PES’ election congress held in Rome from 28 
February until 1 March 2014 confirmed Schulz’s candidacy.
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party (ALDE)
The ALDE Party has presented the candidacy of Guy Verhofstadt, who is 
a Belgian liberal politician and was a prime minister for 10 years before being 
elected as a member of the European Parliament in 2009 and, later on, as a 
president of the ALDE group in the Parliament. On his website,9 he puts for-








vising European economic reforms (such as the implementation of the bank-
ing union and the creation of a “European energy community”), protecting 
civil rights (thanks to the creation of a European privacy regulation, an anti-
discrimination law and a European immigration policy), and reforming the 
European Commission.
Candidacy – people were required to present their candidacy within 20 
December 2013, when ALDE Party’s congress would have ratified them. In or-
der to stand as a candidate, a person needed either the support of at least two 
parties coming from more than one country or the support of 20% of ALDE 
Party’s delegates with voting rights.11 It seemed that two people were ready to 
present their candidacy, Guy Verhofstadt and Olli Rehn.
Selectorate – ALDE Party’s election congress, held in Bruxelles in Febru-
ary 2014, was supposed to select the candidate, but an agreement between 
Verhofstadt and Rehn was reached. The latter renounced to the candidacy in 
exchange for a high-profile seat within European Union.12 Therefore, the con-
gress simply ratified the agreement between the two politicians.
Party of the European Left
The European Left’s candidate is Alexis Tsipras, leader of the Greek party 
SYRIZA. Despite his relatively young age (he was born in 1974), Tsipras has 
been a politician for many years. He was local councillor in Athens, and he 
has been a member of the Greek Parliament since 2009. On his website,13 we 
can find his electoral manifesto,14 based on many points, such as a radical 
change of European austerity policies, the elimination of the Fiscal Compact 
and the renegotiation of the treaties, the creation of a European Conference 
on Public Debt, the regulation of financial activities, the pursuing of full em-
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Candidacy and Selectorate – In October 2013, the Council of the European 
Left’s Presidents (made up of 30 people15) decided to present the candidacy 
of Alexis Tsipras to the Congress of the European Left. In December 2013, 
Tsipras was officially nominated as a candidate. The proposal of Tsipras’ can-
didacy obtained the approval of 138 delegates out of 164.16
European Green Party
European Greens have decided to present a joint candidacy. The two can-
didates are José Bové (a French no-global leader and a member of the Europe-
an Parliament since 2009) and Ska Keller (a German member of the European 
Parliament since 2009). The two candidates’ manifesto17 is based on some key 
points: a reform of the financial services industry, a more equal taxation sys-
tem, the development of a green industry, the implementation of an effective 
action against climate change, and, finally, reforming the food industry.
Candidacy – Perspective candidates needed the support of at least four 
and of a maximum of eight parties which were members of the European 
Green Party. Each party could support one candidate. Four candidacies were 
presented on 4 November 2013: José Bové, Ska Keller, Monica Frassoni (an 
Italian member of the European Parliament since 1999), and Rebecca Harms. 
Selectorate – In November 2013, the Party decided to propose an online 
primary election. All European citizens who were at least 16 years old were 
entitled to vote. The primary election lasted for two months and a half and ap-










In this article we have analysed the choices of European parties regarding 
the candidacy for the presidency of the European Commission.19 It is inter-
esting to notice that different methods were implemented to select the can-
didates. Some parties have presented to their selectorates a single candidate 
(therefore making the selectorate’s action a simple ratification of a decision 
taken somewhere else). On the other hand, European Greens have decided to 
give European citizens the power to select their candidate(s). Even if not so 
many people voted in the Greens’ online primary election, this could be the 
first step towards the creation of European parties’ primaries, partly compat-
ible with American parties’ ones.
2014 European election is becoming more and more attractive for Europe-
an media, also thanks to the presentation of European parties’ candidates for 
the presidency of the European Commission. This is something potentially 
important for European institutions because it could bring many people to 
the ballot boxes, avoiding a dangerous low turnout. Let us hope this expecta-
tion will become reality.
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Expansion and electoral success: The winning 
strategy of the EPP 
Vincenzo Emanuele
10 April 20141 
With the presentation of symbols and lists, the election campaign for the 
elections to the European Parliament (EP) has now begun. It seems therefore 
appropriate to engage in an analysis of the protagonists of European politics, 
the European parties. Although, as noted by Bardi (2002, p. 252), using the 
famous classification of Katz and Mair (1993) on the three “faces” of parties 
(party in the territory, party as organization, and party in public offices) one 
face clearly predominates over the other two—that of the party in the territo-
ry—represented by the national parties, the Europarties have greatly strength-
ened in recent decades, acquiring a status and a major prestige, thanks to the 
consolidation of the role of the EP in the decision-making process of the EU. 
In this and subsequent articles, we will dedicate ourselves to the analysis of 
electoral history and composition of the main political groups within the EP. 
The EPP (European People’s Party), since 1999, has the relative majority 
in the Parliament. In the last European elections, it obtained 265 seats, repre-
senting 36% of the EP, neatly outperforming the rivals of the PES (200 seats 
corresponding to 25% of the EP). The EPP, along with socialists and liberals, is 
one of the three historical groups within the EP.2 Even before the direct elec-
tion of the EP (1979), the representatives of the parties of the Christian-dem-
ocrat tradition of the six European founding countries (the Italian Christian 
Democracy, the German CDU-CSU, and the Christian-social and Christian-
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
2 The overlap between the European group and the party is not complete. Some national 
parties belong to a parliamentarian group in the EP even though they are not formally 
part of the European party. In our analysis, we will consider the political groups.
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democrat parties of Benelux) had begun to develop some forms of interna-
tional coordination. The party itself was created in July 1976 and was initially 
led by the then Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans. The EPP included the 
Christian-democrat parties of the six European countries, plus the Irish Fine 
Gael Party, as Ireland had entered in European community in 1973. Yet, this 
initial composition, although capable of making the EPP an ideologically co-
herent and politically solid group,3 made  it weak against rivals PSE so that the 
EPP lost both the elections of 1979 and those of 1984 (see Figure 1). 
Already at the beginning of the 1980s, a heated internal debate was opened 
within the EPP. The German component had indeed realized that with the 
entry of Great Britain and Denmark in the community, and especially with 
the perspective of further enlargements to other countries that were lacking 
a strong Christian-democrat tradition, the EPP would have weakened sub-
stantially with respect to the PES (Delwit, 2001). It was therefore necessary to 
open the party at the entrance of conservative and liberal forces, that despite 
not being part of the Christian-democrat tradition, they were however politi-
cal forces competing against the left in their respective countries. This revo-
lutionary idea was not appreciated by the Benelux parties nor by the Italian 
Christian Democracy, which used to create alliances with moderate govern-
ing parties of the left but systematically refuse to accept alliances with other 
right-wing parties. 
Despite of the internal resistance, the strategy of opening the EPP “to the 
right” pursued by the CDU-CSU was recognized as necessary to respond to 
the gradual erosion of support among traditional Christian-democratic forc-
es. The EPP s´ political strategy of opening begun in 1981 with the entry of the 
Greek conservative New Democracy, to continue then at the end of the 1980s 
with the arrival of the Portuguese conservatives and the Spanish People´ s 
Party, heirs of Franco regime. Despite these inclusions in the Euro-party, the 
electoral outcome did not improve; in 1989, the EPP reached the lowest point 
in its history, getting only 23.4% of seats against the 34.7% of the PES.
The beginning of the 1990s was marked by a further strengthening of the 
enlargement policy; in 1992, the British Tories and the Danish conservatives, 
openly Eurosceptic parties, were allowed to become part of the Parliamentary 
Group of the EPP. These new inclusions have the effect of a permanent change 
in the nature of the party and in its internal balance of power as—due to the 
disappearance of the Italian Christian Democracy—the Christian Democrat-
3 On this point, see the analysis of Hix (2002) regarding the voting behavior of political 
groups in the EP.
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ic parties become minority4 with respect to the other “right-located” parties 
(Hix, 2002). From the point of view of the electoral outcome, the 1994 Euro-
pean elections mark a reversal in the trend, as the EPP rises up to 27.7% of the 
seats, although still far from the 34.9% of the PES. During the 1994–1999 leg-
islative term, the EPP takes the decisive step to bridge the historic gap against 
the rivals PSE: the Italian representation—which had lost the Christian-dem-
ocratic components—is strengthened by the entry of Forza Italia. At the same 
time, also the main centre-right parties of Portugal and France, namely the 
Portuguese social democrats and the French Gaullist Party (RPR, then UMP) 
join in the European group. The enlargement of Austria, Sweden, and Finland 
finally allowed the inclusion of the Austrian Christian-democrats of the ÖVP, 
the Swedish conservatives of Moderata and the Finnish KOK. 
Armed with this powerful strategy of inclusion, the EPP manages to win 
the 1999 elections, winning 233 seats against the 180 of the PES and reaching 
the historic maximum (37.2%). The victory was made possible by the extraor-
dinary growth of the group in some key states (see Table 1). These countries 
include Italy, in which the members of the EPP increased from 13.9% to 38.1% 
4 To be precise, the “overtaking” takes place only during the legislature with the entry of 
the deputies of Forza Italia as reported in Van Hecke (2003).















of the vote share; France (from 12.8% to 22.1%); the United Kingdom (from 
27% to 35.8%); and Germany (from 38.8% to 48.7%). This pattern of growth 
was also favoured by the general retreat of incumbent political forces in these 
countries, all socialist-led, consistently with the predictions of the “second 
Table 1 – Electoral results of EPP in the member states (1979–2009)
Paese
% Totale di voti dei partiti membri del PPE
1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009
Austria       29.7* 30.7 32.7 30
Belgium 37.7 27.4 29.2 24.2 18.7 23.1 19.5
Bulgaria           30.8* 32.3
Cyprus           28.2 35.6
Croatia             36.8**
Czech Republic           39.6 7.7
Denmark 0 6.6 8 18.9 14.9 12.6 12.7
Estonia           10.5 12.2
Finland       23* 27.7 23.7 27.4
France 8.9 9.4 7.8 12.8 22.1 16.6 27.9
Germany 49.1 46 37.7 38.8 48.7 44.5 37.9
Greece 31.3* 38 40.5 32.7 36 43 32.3
Hungary           52.7 56.4
Ireland 33.1 32.2 21.6 24.3 24.6 27.8 29.1
Italy 37.1 33.5 33.4 13.9 38.1 29.7 41.8
Latvia           26.4 33.7
Lithuania           15.3 26.2
Luxembourg 36.1 34.9 34.9 31.5 31.7 37.1 31.3
Malta           35.5 37.3
Netherlands 35.6 33 34.6 30.8 26.9 24.4 20.1
Poland           30.4 51.4
Portugal   11.8* 14.2 12.5 31.1 25,9 40.1
Romania           34.3* 38.6
Slovakia           46.6 39.2
Slovenia           41.2 46.8
Spain   26.9* 23.7 42.6 41.9 41.2 42.7
Sweden       27.1* 28.4 23.9 23.5
United Kingdom 0 0 0 27 35.8 26.7 0
* Elections held during the legislative term, due to the entry of the country in the EC
** Elections held in 2013
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order elections” theory (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). The victory, however, hap-
pens at a price of paradoxical ideological contradictions, as in the emblematic 
Italian case, in which parties competing in rival domestic political poles, like 
Forward Italy and the Italian Popular Party, were both members of the EPP.
Since 1999, the EPP has pursued a policy aimed at consolidating its leader-
ship within the EP, proceeding forward on the road of the inclusion of con-
servative forces of the right and preferring the electoral success at the expense 
of the internal coherence of the group.5 With the sizable eastward enlargement 
of the community (2004), the EPP parliamentary group in the EP includes 
parties from all the states of the new Europe-25, eager to become part of the 
EPP for the powerful democratic legitimacy deriving from it internationally. 
In particular, to the political forces already present in the group will be added 
the conservative or liberal parties from Hungary, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and the Christian-democratic par-
ties of Slovakia and Slovenia. Stronger for this expansion and leveraging on 
the substantial absence of a social-democratic tradition in Eastern Europe, 
the EPP triumphs it to the EP elections getting 268 seats (36.6%) compared to 
the 200 of the socialists. With the exception of small countries as Estonia and 
Malta, the EPP outperforms the socialists in all the new member states, result-
ing in nearly 53% of the vote in Hungary and percentages equal to or greater 
than 40% in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
In 2009, finally, the entry of Romanian and Bulgarian delegations com-
pensates the loss of seats in the UK, due to the leakage of the British Con-
servatives, incompatible with the group for their growing Euroscepticism.6 
The EPP remained essentially unchanged at 36% of the seats (265), further 
widening the gap with respect to the PSE (25%) and reconfirming as president 
of the Commission Barroso. 
On the eve of the forthcoming elections of May 22 to 25, the EPP can count 
on 52 parties from 27 member countries, 10 of which is in charge a prime 
minister or a president adhering to EPP (Table 2). The only exception con-
sists of the United Kingdom, the only state without representation in the EPP, 
while even the new member Croatia is represented in the group of the People’s 
Party with two parties (HDZ and HSS). 
The elections of 2014 are full of risks for the EPP, presenting the Luxem-
bourgish Jean-Claude Juncker as a candidate for president of the Commis-
5 About the transformation of the EPP’s policy platform, see Hanley (2002); on the de-
clining cohesion within the parliamentary group, see Bardi (2002) and Hix (2002).
6 Since 2009, the British Conservatives have formed the group of the European Conserva-
tives and Reformists (ECR).
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Table 2 – List of the members of the EPP on the eve of the 2014 European elections
Country Members of the EPP
Austria Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP)
Belgium Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V); Centre Démocrate 
Humaniste (CDH)
Bulgaria Grazdani za Evropeisko Razvitiena Balgarija (GERB); Demokrati 
za silna Bulgaria (DSB); 
Sajuz Na Demokraticnite Sili (SDS); Demokraticeska Partija (DP)
Croatia Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (HDZ); Hrvatska Seljacka Stranka 
(HSS)
Cyprus Dimokratikos Synagermos (DISY)
Czech 
Republic
Top 09; Křesťanská a demokratickáunie-
Československástranalidová (KDU-ČSL)
Denmark Det Konservative Folkeparti (C); Kristendemokraterne (KD)
Estonia Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit (IRL)
Finland Kansallinen Kokoomus (KOK); Kristillisdemokraatit (KD)
France Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP)
Germany Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU); Christlich-Soziale Union in 
Bayern (CSU)
Greece Nea Demokratia (ND)
Hungary Fidesz-Magyar Polgari Szovetseg (FIDESZ); Kereszténydemokrata 
Néppárt (KDNP)
Ireland Fine Gael (FG)




Luxembourg Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei (CSV)
Malta Partit Nazzjonalista (PN)
Nether-
lands
Christen Democratisch Appel (CDA)
Poland Platforma Obywatelska (PO); Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL)
Portugal Partido Social Democrata (PSD); Centro Democrático e Social-
Partido Popular (CDS-PP)
Romania Partidul Democrat Liberal (PDL); Romániai Magyar Demokrata 
Szövetség/Uniunea Democrată
Maghiarădin România (RMDSZ/UDMR); Partidul Naţional 
Ţărănesc Creştin Democrat (PNŢCD)
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sion. Will the EPP be able to maintain a relative majority in the EP as it has 
been for the last 15 years? On the one hand, the neat success obtained in the 
last two elections in Central Eastern Europe and the simultaneous weakness 
of the PES in the new member states would suggest that the electoral advan-
tage has become structural and can hardly be affected. On the other hand, 
one cannot underestimate the fact that the EPP is now perceived more than 
any other political force as the governing party in the EU as well as the po-
litical force that is responsible for the policies of fiscal rigor and austerity in 
the public accounts pursued in recent years by the EU, especially due to the 
hegemony on rest of the group exercised by the CDU led by the Chancellor 
Merkel. Being perceived as an incumbent in a time of a harsh economic crisis 
could have a negative impact on the election results of the EPP, threatened to 
the right-wing by the growth of the anti-European parties group led by the 
National Front of Marine Le Pen.
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Country Members of the EPP
Slovakia Kresťanskodemokratickéhnutie (KDH); Most-Híd; Sloven-
skádemokratická a kresťanskáúnia-
Demokratickástrana (SDKÚ-DS); Strana Maďarskej Komunity/Mag-
yar Közösség Pártja (SMK/MKP)
Slovenia Slovenska demokratska stranka (SDS); Slovenska ljudska stranka 
(SLS); 
Nova Slovenija-Krščanski demokrati (N.Si)
Spain Partido Popular (PP); Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC)
Sweden Moderata samlingspartiet (MD); Kristdemokraterna (KD) 
United 
Kingdom
Note: Parties reported in bold font are those in which the leader of the party is also in charge 
as PM (or president in Cyprus).
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The group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) 
represents in the European Parliament the socialist, the labour, the social 
democratic, and the progressive forces present in the 28 states belonging to 
the European Union. It pertains to the Party of European Socialists (PES), and 
is currently the second political force in Parliament, backed up by 195 MEPs 
(184 after the vote in 2009), coming from all the 28 member countries of the 
Union.
The name is only the latest in a long series (see Table 1) and owes its “com-
plexity” to a compromise that has been reached close to the last European 
elections (June 2009). The choice changing its name was in fact a direct con-
sequence of the entrance in the group of parties only in part related to the 
Socialist and Social Democratic tradition, including the Italian Democratic 
Party (PD), the Democratic Party of Cyprus (Edek), and the Party Latvian 
National Harmony (TSP). As these parties present in their internal compo-
nents political areas proceeding from the centre (as catholic, liberal, or en-
vironmentalist) and being the representatives of these currents reluctant to 
adhere in a group labelled socialist, a compromise had to be found to make 
reference to the new enlarged and more heterogeneous nature of the group.
The history of the S&D Group begins well before the creation of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the introduction of direct elections in 1979. Already a 
group of socialist parties belonging to the “six” founding countries had come 
to form, in September of 1952, inside the Assembly of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC). Initially, the socialist family found itself deeply 
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
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divided in the early stages in supporting of the process of European integra-
tion, counting among its ranks a number of opponents (such as the German 
SPD or the Italian PSI). It was thus created “an immediate division between 
those who considered European integration as essential to control markets 
and complete the creation of national welfare systems and those who thought 
it could only interfere with this goal” (Hix and Lord, 1997). 
With the enlargement of the EU from six to nine states (1973), additional 
parties were added to the initial group, and in 1979—with the introduction of 
direct elections to the European Parliament—a proper parliamentarian group 
was structured. To the parties belonging to the “six” were added also parties 
with a labour political root, such as the British Labour Party, as well as a Scan-
dinavian one as the Danish Social Democratic Party. Election results were fa-
vourable to the socialist group that had won 27.6% of the votes, thus becoming 
the first group in terms of number of seats in the first European parliamen-
tary assembly directly elected. However, the considerable heterogeneity of the 
group, together with the marked Euroscepticism of some of the new members 
as the British Labour Party and the Danish Social Democrats, greatly under-
mined the internal cohesion of the group, particularly on matters relating to 
the deepening of the European integration path (Ladrech, 2006). 
In the next three elections (see Figure 1), the leadership of the socialists in 
the EP not only remained intact but also grew steadily, reaching its peak with 
the 1994 elections when the newly-created group of the Party of European 
Socialists obtained 34.9% of the vote (against the 27.7% won by the second 
parliamentary group, the European People’s Party).
Meanwhile, with the enlargement of the European Community (now Eu-
ropean Union in 1992), first to 10 members—with the accession of Greece 
in 1981—and then to 12 members—with the entry of Spain and Portugal in 
1986—the socialist group grew in its composition. In 1994, the social demo-
cratic parties of the new members Austria, Finland, and Sweden also joined.
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A turning point in the history of the socialist group took place between the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. The dissolution of the two blocks at the international 
level and the creation in Europe of a Single Market (ESM) backed by a monetary 
union (EMU) pushed much of the socialist group leader to look for a redefini-
tion of its political identity (Ladrech, 1996). This effort also brought with it an 
expansion of its internal composition with the entry, among others in October 
1992, of the Italian PDS. The socialist group also contributed in a decisive way 
(pushed by the new Article 138a “about the parties” in the Maastricht Treaty 
) to the deconstruction of the old Confederation of the Socialist Parties of 
the European Community (CSPEC) and the creation, in November 1992, of 
the new Party of European Socialists (PES), in an attempt to unite the frag-
mented social democratic front and find new solutions to social challenges 
posed by the acceleration in the monetarist sense of the process of European 
integration. 
The positive trend began with the first elections of 1979 came to an end in 
1999. At that elections, the group of the Party of European Socialists suffered 
a decline of 6% and was outperformed by the group of the European People’s 
Party, which became (and still remains) the first party within the hemicycle 
of Strasbourg.
From this point onwards, the European Socialists experienced a period 
of steady decline, who led them in the fall of 2009 to obtain only 25% of the 
Figure 1 – Electoral performance of the socialist group, (1979–2009)
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vote (almost 10 points less than in the golden days of the early 1990s) and “the 
most meager representation in the European Parliament after the elections of 
1979” (Hix, 2009).
Precisely because of this steady decline in the electoral support (marked 
by the enlargement to East, where the strongest parties were conservative or 
Christian-popular) and with the looming of the European elections of 2009, the 
socialist group has changed strategy, opening to new political forces proceeding 
from other experiences within the field of the left, in an attempt to close the gap 
with the predominant group of the European People. Obviously, the focus fell 
on the newly-formed Democratic Party, which at the time represented the sec-
ond Italian party. From the entrance of the latter, as mentioned before, derives 
the name change in the “Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats”2 as well as the change of the historic symbol of a rose surrounded by 
12 stars. All this was not enough, though, to avoid a sharp loss for the socialists 
in 2009. The group lost in the vast majority of EU countries, and that led to a 
result well below their stronger adversary, the European People’s Party. 
On the eve of the European elections in May, the socialist proposed as a 
candidate for the presidency of the European Commission the German Mar-
tin Schulz. Despite the merciless debacle of 2009, they can now rely on several 
prime ministers and heads of state (Matteo Renzi and François Hollande in 
particular) and a group in the European Parliament that despite being clearly 
in a minority condition is in good health. The 21 MEPs, elected by the PD in 
2009, in fact helped the S&D Group count among its ranks at least one party 
for each member country, thus, registering a maximum level of “inclusive-
ness,” both “parliamentarian”3 and at the “party-level”4 (Calossi 2011, 165). 
Inclusiveness is not the only factor that indicates the good state of health 
of the S&D group, though. Taking into account the indicators proposed by 
Calossi to measure the degree of institutionalization and strengthening of 
groups within the European Parliament, the S&D Group also presents a high 
degree of “persistence”5 and a high degree of “voting cohesion” (the highest 
between the various parliamentary groups (see Table 3).
2 Initially, the name proposed was the “Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats” 
(PASD), but it was soon dismissed preferring the reported one. 
3 With “inclusiveness,” it has to be intended the “number of EU countries that support the 
group with at least one deputy” (Calossi 2011, 165).
4 With “inclusivity at the party-level,” it has to be intended the number of countries in 
which national parties are linked to the group in the EP (Ibid.). 
5 With “persistence,” it has to be intended the “time period of existence of the parliamen-
tarian group, computed in terms of EP legislative terms’ number” (Ibid., 165).
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Table 2 - Parties members of the S&D Group in the 28 EU countries
Country Party
Austria Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ)
Belgium Parti Socialiste (PS) Belgique
Socialistische Partij.Anders (SP.A)
Bulgaria Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)
Croatia Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske (SDP)
Cyprus Eniea Dimokratiki Enosis Kyprou (EDEK)
Czech Republic Česká Strana Sociální; Demokratická (ČSSD)
Denmark Socialdemokraterne (SD)
Estonia Sotsiaal demokraatlik Erakond (SDE)
Finland Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue (SDP)
France Parti Socialiste (PS)
Germany Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)
Greece Panellinio Sosialistikó Kínima (PA.SO.K)
Hungary Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP)
Ireland Labour Party
Italy Partito Democratico (PD)
Latvia Tautas Saskaņas Partija (TSP)
Lithuania Lietuvos Socialdemokratų Partija (LSDP)
Luxembourg Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesch Aarbechterpartei (LSAP)
Malta Partit Laburista (PL)
Netherlands Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)
Poland Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD)
Unia Pracy (UP)
Portugal Partido Socialista (PS)
Romania Partidul Social Democrat (PSD)
Slovakia Smer–sociálnademokracia, Smer (SD)
Slovenia Socialni Demokrati (SD)
Spain Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)
Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC)
Sweden Arbetarepartiet-Socialdemokraterna (SAP)
United Kingdom Labour Party
Source: http://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/
The bold font signals that the PM or the Head of the Executive is member of the party.
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If we also consider the low “party concentration,”6 the lowest in both cases 
(A and B) within the Parliament (see Table 4), which is also a sign of a clear 
independence from the national parties, however, is still very strong and in-
fluential in the decision-making process of the Union.
That considered, it has to be observed that the socialists find themselves at 
a crossroads. The last elections saw them succumb in all the key states of the 
Union. The Labour Party and the French socialists have recorded the lowest 
vote shares, collecting respectively 16% and 17%. The Italian Democratic Par-
ty found itself nearly 10 percentage points below the PDL while in Finland, the 
Netherlands, Poland, and Ireland, the parties pertaining to the S&D Group 
were even third rank in their respective elections. Also, the losses in Austria, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slove-
nia, and Spain should be considered. These results, combined with the almost 
ubiquitous presence of right-wing governments in EU countries, led the so-
cialists to be in minority also in the other two main political institutions of 
the EU (Commission and Council). Thus, it will be interesting to observe to 
what extent the candidacy of Martin Schulz (single candidate, supported by 
6 “Party concentration” refers to the “percentage of deputies in the EP group correspond-
ing to the deputies in the biggest national party and the percentage of EP deputies cor-
responding to the two biggest national parties” (Calossi 2011, 165).
Table 3 – Vote cohesion in the first 18 months of the VII legislature
EPP S&D ALDE G/EFA ECR EUL-NGL EFD NA
0.93 0.94 0.90 0.96 0.86 0.84 0.49 0.43
Source: Hix, Noury, and Roland (2013)
Table 4 – Degree of “party concentration”: A=takes into account the first party; 
B=takes into account the two biggest parties
  EPP S&D ALDE G/EFA ECR EUL-NGL EFD
MEPs 275 194 85 58 56 35 32
A 15.8 12.5 14.2 31.8 44.6 22.8 40.6
B 26.7 23.9 27.3 61.3 71.4 35.1 65.6
Personal elaborations of the author; source: http://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu
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virtually the entire PSE) can stimulate the rise in the electoral support for the 
socialists. This is particularly important as this time, to be at stake for the first 
time in the history of the European Union, there will be a fully legitimized 
chair of president of the Commission.
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The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Group (from now on, 
ALDE Group) is the third most numerous group within the European Par-
liament, after the European People’s Party group and the Party of European 
Socialists group. The ALDE group is made up by Members of the European 
Parliament (from now on, MEPs) coming from two different European par-
ties, i.e., the European Democratic Party and the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe Party.
The liberal democratic group2 has had a very interesting historical devel-
opment. In the 1960s, after the exit of the Gaullist MEPs, the liberal group 
formed within the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity started a long path of change and inclusion of new members as the 
European integration went on. Analysing the history of the liberal democratic 
group also means analysing the change of its name.
From 1979 until 1985 within the European Parliament, there was the Lib-
eral and Democratic Group, in which there were different parties, such as the 
French UDF, the Italian PRI and PLI, or the German FDP. From 1985 until 
the mid-1990s, the liberal democratic group changed its name, becoming the 
Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group. In this period, parties coming from 
different countries (like the Portuguese Social Democratic Party) joined the 
group. In 1994, there was another change; the Group of the European Liberal 
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
2  I will use this term in a very broad way, referring to all the groups formed within Eu-
ropean parliamentary institutions in the last decades—therefore, both to the groups that 
were the predecessors of the ALDE group and to the ALDE group itself. I will also use this 
term to refer to the parties that have been connected to the ALDE (group). 
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Democrat and Reform Party was born. The group kept this denomination un-
til 2009, and in these years, the British Liberal Democrats joined the group.3 
In 2004, there was the last change. After the inclusion of the MEPs coming 
from the European Democratic Party, the ALDE group was created.
These name-related changes have also been influenced by the inclusion 
of different parties, which can be all considered as “liberal” ones. It is well 
known that this adjective can have different meanings (see, for example, the 
difference between social liberalism and liberal conservatism) and can be 
used in different ways by parties coming from different areas of the political 
continuum. Think about Mr. Berlusconi’s promises to foster a “liberal revolu-
tion” in Italy in the 1990s and 2000s or about the attempt by sectors of the 
Italian Left to be recognised as “liberal” in order to put away their communist 
heritage.
Quoting Ladrech (2006, p. 494) on the European Liberal Democrat and 
Reform Party, in the ALDE group there is a bigger heterogeneity than in the 
PES or in the PPE groups. The flexibility of the word “liberal” can help us 
understand this phenomenon. It is interesting to notice the extremely di-
verse parties that are or were part of the liberal democratic group (therefore 
implicitly admitting they are or were “liberal”): the moderate PRI and the 
right-wing PLI (which, despite its name, on some political stances, was more 
right-wing than the Christian democrats), the British Liberal Democrats and 
the Basque Nationalist Party, the post-Christian-Democratic Italian party 
“Daisy-Democracy is Freedom,”4 and the anticlerical Italian Radicals.
Despite the above-quoted differences and transformations, liberal demo-
cratic MEPs have always had a noticeable strength within the European Par-
liament. At the last European election, they got more than 80 seats (with an 
important contribution from the British Liberal Democrats and the German 
FDP, which obtained 24 seats in total, approximately 30% of the liberal demo-
cratic seats). This was an interesting result for a group that aims at being an 
alternative to both the socialists and the populars. 
Analysing Figure 1, we can see that electoral performances of liberal dem-
ocratic parties in European elections follow a fluctuating pattern. A decrease 
3  In the last years, this party has had an interesting development, having formed a coali-
tion government with the British Conservative Party. The Liberal Democrats were cre-
ated at the end of 1980s, after two parties (the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic 
Party) merged. See also Webb (2000).
4 Which was formed in the 2000s by the merging of several parties that had stemmed in 
the 1990s from the Christian-Democratic breakup. Notice that, basically, no big liberal 
democratic party was involved in the creation of this party. For further information, see 
the useful contribution by Baccetti (2007).
69
The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Group: Towards an inevitable decline?
in the percentage of seats in 1984 is followed by an increase in 1989. To add 
more, in 1994, the liberal democratic parties suffer from a weakening while, 
on the contrary, 1999 and 2004 European elections are very positive. Indeed, 
after 2004 European election, the liberal democratic group gets the highest 
percentage of seats in the European Parliament since 1979. This positive trend 
is stopped by the results of 2009 European election, after which the ALDE 
group loses several MEPs. Looking at the results from 1979 until 2009, it can 
be said that liberal democratic parties have been able to survive many trans-
formations (like European Union enlargement), maintaining a noticeable 
electoral support along many years. This is even clearer if we analyse electoral 
performances of liberal democratic parties at national level.
Taking a look at Table 1, it is clear that support for liberal democratic par-
ties is more or less stable and relevant in some countries (such as Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, the Netherlands, Slovenia, and Sweden) 
and very fluctuating in other countries (such as Hungary, Luxembourg, Slova-
kia, and the United Kingdom). Italy, as explained in the footnote, is a very spe-
cific country regarding liberal democratic parties, since very different parties 
have been part of the liberal democratic groups in the European Parliament 
along more than 30 years, and this can explain the highly variable perfor-
mances of liberal democratic parties in Italian European elections.
Figure 1 – Electoral results of liberal democratic parties. Percentage of seats in the 
European Parliament (1979–2009)











Table 1 – Electoral performances of liberal democratic parties in European Parliament 
elections at national level (1979–2009)
  1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009
Austria       4.3* 2.7    
Belgium 9.4 18.1 17.8 20.6 23.6 23.9 22.5
Bulgaria           26.5* 22.1
Croatia              
Cyprus           17.1  
Czech Republic              
Denmark 14.4 12.4 16.6 27.4 33.1 25.8 20.2
Estonia           29.7 41.4
Finland       30.1* 28.1 29.1 25.1
France 27.6 43 28.9 25.6   12 8.5
Germany 6 4.8 5.6 4.1 3 6.1 11
Greece              
Hungary           7.7 2.2
Ireland     12       24.1
Italy 6.2 6.1 4.4 7.3 8.3 35.5 8
Latvia           6.5 7.5
Lithuania           41.4 19.7
Luxembourg 28.1 22.1 19.9 18.8 20.5 14.9 18.7
Malta              
Netherlands 16.1 18.9 19.6 29.6 25.5 17.4 22.7
Poland           7.3  
Portugal   37.4* 32.7        
Romania           16.4* 14.5
Slovakia           3.2 9
Slovenia           21.9 21.2
Spain   4.4* 11.3 4.7 7.6 5.1 5.2
Sweden       12* 19.8 16.1 19
United Kingdom 12.6 19 6.2 17 12.7 14.9 13.8
*Elections held in the year when the country entered the EEC or the EU.
Note: As for Ireland, the percentages in the table are the ones obtained by parties which took 
(take) part in the liberal democratic groups in the European Parliament after 1989, 2009, and 
2014 European elections; from 1984 until 1994, the French UDF formed an electoral list with 
Gaullist parties; in 1999, the Belgian Liberal Reformist Party formed an electoral list with the 
Democratic Front of the Francophones; in 1999, the Spanish Convergence and Union formed 
an electoral list with the European Coalition; and finally, regarding the percentage of votes 
obtained by liberal democratic lists in 2004 Italian European election, I h ave added together 
the votes of the United in the Olive Tree list (which included Daisy-Democracy is Freedom and 
the European Republicans Movement), the votes of the Bonino list, and the votes of the Civil 
Society of Di Pietro-Occhetto list.
Data source: http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/eu2.html
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Table 2 – ALDE member parties before 2014 European election
Country Parties
Austria /
Belgium Open VlaamseLiberalen en Democraten (VLD); Mouvement Réformateur (MR)




Denmark Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti (V)
Estonia Eesti Keskerakond (KESK); Eesti Reformierakond (RE)
Finland Suomen Keskusta (KESK); Svenskafolkpartieti Finland (SFP)
France Mouvement démocrate (MoDem); Citoyenneté Action Participation pour le 21ème siècle (Cap21)




Italy Italia dei Valori (IDV)
Latvia Latvijas Pirmā Partija/Latvijas Ceļš (LPP/LC)
Lithuania Darbo Partija (DP); Lietuvos Respublikos Liberalųsąjūdis (LRLS)
Luxembourg Parti démocratique (DP)
Malta /
Netherlands Volkspartijvoor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD); Democraten 66 (D66)
Poland /
Portugal /
Romania Partidul Naţional Liberal (PNL)
Slovakia Ľudovástrana-Hnutiezademokratické Slovensko (L’S-HZDS)
Slovenia Liberalnademokracija Slovenije (LDS); Zares-socialno-liberalni (Zares)
Spain Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC); Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV)
Sweden Folkpartietliberalerna (FP); Centerpartiet (C)
United Kingdom Liberal Democrats (LD)
Parties in bold are the ones from which the head of a national government comes from; the 
Latvian party LPP/LC has disappeared at national level.
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The ALDE group has published on its website5 the five priorities that will 
inspire its future actions: a fight against discriminations and a stronger civil 
rights protection; a push towards a greener economy, in order to deal with 
climate change; a more effective European Union influence in the world, es-
pecially regarding democracy promotion; a reform of the European Union 
budget and a strong support for “fiscal rectitude” (for example, by defending 
the stability and growth pact); and a strong and clear regulation of European 
financial markets, paired with the implementation of a new economic govern-
ance by the European Commission.
The next European election is a fundamental challenge for European lib-
eral democratic parties. On the one hand, the widespread opposition to Eu-
ropean and German austerity policies could favour extremist parties in many 
European countries. On the other hand, pre-electoral surveys seem to show 
that some ALDE parties (such as the Liberal Democrats in the United King-
dom or the Italy of Values) could lose many seats compared to 2009 European 
election. In May, we will see whether this is just a pessimistic idea or a more 
realist forecast. 
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From the Italian Communist Party to Tsipras: 
The path of Europe’s radical left 
Federica Izzo
25 April 20141
This essay is aimed at analysing the history of the Confederal Group of the 
European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL). The group, formed by 
the Party of the European Left and by the Nordic Green Left, gathers the com-
munist, socialist, and ecologist parties represented in the European Parlia-
ment (EP). Its member parties are inspired by the ideals of international soli-
darity that are characteristics of the communist ideology. Indeed, the group’s 
constituent declaration states that despite being opposed to the Union insti-
tutional structure, it is actively committed to fostering European integration. 
In other words, without characterising themselves as Eurosceptic parties, the 
members of the GUE-NGL aim at modifying the structure of the EU, in order 
to increase its democratic character and promote polices in line with their 
reference ideology. 
The communist and socialist parties represented in the European Par-
liament have been cooperating since 1973 when the Communist and Allies 
Group (GCA) sanctioned the collaboration of the French and Italian com-
munists in Brussels. With the first European parliamentary elections in 1979, 
the group won the 11.1% of the seats. The GCA, with Italian, French, and Dan-
ish delegates, was therefore the fourth largest group in the EP. Its expansion 
continued when Greece joined the EU in 1981. Both the Greek radical left 
parties (Greek Communist Party and Synapsimós), in fact, joined the group. 
At the European elections in 1984, the Communist and Allies Group con-
firmed its positive performance, obtaining the 9.5% of the preferences. With 
41 members, the group confirmed itself the fourth largest in the parliament. 
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
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The arrival of Spain and Portugal in the Union, in 1986, triggered a process 
that would have led, three years later, to the birth of two new parliamenta-
ry groups. The Italian Communist Party, the Spanish Izquierda Unida, the 
Greek Synapsimós, and the Danish People’s Party formed the group European 
United Left (Gauche Unitaire Européenne or GUE). On the other hand, the 
communist parties of France, Portugal, and Greece, together with one del-
egate from the Irish Worker’s Party, formed the Coalition Des Gauches. In 
1989, the two groups obtained, respectively, the 5.4% and 2.7% of preferences, 
almost matching the result of the GCA in the previous elections.
The history of the groups hit a turning point at the beginning of the 1990s, 
also due to the radical changes occurring within the Italian party system. The 
newborn Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS), willing to remove every 
legacy of its communist roots, abandoned the GUE in order to join the Party 
of European Socialists (PES). The exit of the PDS had a heavy repercussion on 
the results of 1994 elections. The Coalition des Gauches was not represented 
in the new parliament, and the European United Left (GUE) obtained a mere 
5.3%, with its members falling to 28. The exit of the Italian PDS from the 
group was, virtually, responsible for the loss of 16 delegates (this is the number 
of members of the PDS who entered the EP and joined the PES). Such electoral 
defeat was probably the decisive incentive to start the process of gathering to-
gether all the forces within the nonsocial democratic European left. Such pro-
cess started with an enlargement of the European United Left (GUE). Besides 
the original members (the communist parties of Italy, Spain, and Greece), the 
Parti Communiste Francaise, the Partido Comunista Portugues, and the Greek 
Synapsimos joined the group. The second decisive step was the “EU northern 
enlargement,” on January 1, 1995. Austrian delegates joined the GUE while 
the Swedish and Finnish parties, together with the Danish socialists, formed 
the Nordic Green Left. Finally, on January 6, 1995, the Confederal Group of 
the European United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL) was born. In 1998, 
following the arrival of the British Ken Coates, former member of the PES, 
and of the Italian Carlo Ripa di Meana, previously in the Green party, the 
group counted 34 members. However, the GUE-NGL had its electoral debut 
only in 1999. The group, presided by the Spanish Alonso José Puerta (Izqui-
erda Unida), obtained the 6.7% of the seats, improving the result of the Coali-
tion Des Gauches in 1994. All the parties adhering to the group in the previ-
ous term were able to obtain representation in the new parliament. To these, 
added themselves the German Party of the Democratic Socialism and a third 
Greek party, the DIKKI (Social Democratic Movement). Finally, five members 
of the French Lutte Ouvrière also joined. The GUE-NGL arrived thus at 42 
members, once again representing the fourth largest group in the EP. If we 
analyse the electoral trend of the communist and socialist parties from 1979 
to 2009 (see figure 1), it is apparent that the birth of the GUE-NGL produced 
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positive electoral results, with a partial inversion of the negative trend record-
ed in previous years. Nonetheless, it is also evident that such results were quite 
ephemeral and, moreover, that the figures do not even get close to the ones 
registered in the period antecedent to the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Nevertheless, the group continued its expansion during the fifth legis-
lature, counting 49 members in 2009. Moreover, following the arrival of 10 
new EU member states, in 2003, the group welcomed observers from Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Slovakia (who became full members in May 
2004). In the meantime, the French Francis Wurtz (French Communist Par-
ty) was elected to the presidency of the group. This positive trend, however, 
was abruptly interrupted with the elections in June 2004. The GUE-NGL set-
tled with a mere 5.2% of the preferences, and its members went down to 40. 
The Northern Irish Sinn Féin and a second Portuguese party joined the group 
with one member each. It seems clear that the expansion strategy, while suc-
cessful, was not enough to compensate the losses the European communists 
and socialists inevitably were to suffer in a post-ideology era.2 In fact, analys-
2 On this point, see Hay (2007).
Figure 1 - Electoral trend of communist and  socialist groups within the EP. Percentage 
of seats within the EP (1979–2009) 
For 1979 and 1984, the figures refer to the GCA while for 1989, to the total of the prefer-
ences of the European United Left and the Coalition des Gauches. For 1994, the data refer 




ing the data by country (see Table 1), we can notice that the new members (the 
Czech, Cypriot, Irish, and Northern Irish parties) brought the GUE-NGL 10 
new parliamentarians. At the same time, however, the poor electoral perfor-
mance of the older member parties caused the loss of 12 delegates. 
The electoral decline of the group continued with the 2009 elections, with 
a poor 4.8% (see Figure 1). In this case, however, the disastrous performance 
Table 1 - Electoral results of the GUE-NGL in the member states (1999–2009)
Country
GUE-NGL member parties, total % of votes
1999 2004 2009
Austria 0.73 0.78 0.66
Belgium 0 0 0
Bulgaria 0
Czech Republic 20.26 14.2
Croatia 5.8*
Cyprus 27.89 34.8
Denmark 7.3 14.17 7
Estonia 0 0.8
Finland 9.1 9.13 5.9
France 12 8.44 6
Germany 5.8 6.13 7.5
Greece 20.8 13.64 13
Hungary 0 1
Italy 6.3 8.93 7
Latvia 0 19.6
Lithuania 0 0
Luxemburg 0 2.86 3.4
Malta 0 0
Netherlands 5 6.97 7.1
Poland 0 0.7




Spain 5.9 4.71 3.77
Sweden 15.8 12.79 5.7
UK 1.1 0.85 0.6
*Elections held on April 14, 2013.
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of the Italian member parties is mainly to blame for the disappointing results. 
Three parties adhering to or affiliated with the GUE-NGL ran in European 
Elections in Italy: Rifondazione Comunista, Sinistra e Libertà, and the Partito 
Comunistadei Lavoratori. None of them went above the 4% threshold, neces-
sary to obtain representation in the EP. Because of this, the GUE-NGL lost 
seven members. This brought the count to 35 members from 17 states (this 





Cyprus Progressive Workers’ Party
Czech Republic Komunistickástrana Čech a Moravy
Denmark Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne
Estonia
Finland
France Parti communiste français; Parti de Gauche; Parti Communiste Réunionn-ais; Marie-Christine Vergiat
Germany Die Linke




















includes the loss of the Finnish delegate and the new member from Latvia). 
The group thus became the sixth, and penultimate, for number of members 
in the EP. 
During the last term, first, the German Lothar Birky (Party of the Demo-
cratic Socialism) and then his conational Gabriele Zimmer (Party of the Dem-
ocratic Socialism) presided the group. 
The elections that will be held in May represent a precious occasion for 
the GUE-NGL. Radical left parties have always adopted a critical attitude to-
wards the economic management on the part of EU institutions. The current 
European system, accused of pursuing excessive economic liberalism, is con-
sidered the agent of the current economic and financial crisis rather than its 
victim. The declared goal of the GUE-NGL is therefore to reform the EU insti-
tutions, and promote policies in line with its reference ideology, thus improv-
ing the life of European citizens.3 Therefore, it is easy to understand why these 
parties may benefit from the current economic situation and from the anti-
Europe climate, which is also fuelled by the national media. Moreover, the 
GUE-NGL is betting on the charisma of the young leader of the Greek Syriza, 
Alexis Tsipras. Indeed, an article published by the think tank Notre Europe, 
by Bertoncini and Kreilinger (2013), foresees a particularly positive electoral 
performance for the Spanish Izquierda Unida, for Syriza, and possibly for 
the French and German parties as well. This would substantially increase the 
group’s membership. The authors go as far as hypothesising 50 members in 
the next term. If such previsions were to be confirmed, it would be the best 
electoral result for the socialist and communist parties in Europe since the 
birth of the EP. The challenge is hard, but it is possible that the GUE-NGL will 
be able to reverse the negative electoral trend observed in over a decade. 
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The evolution of its electoral success 
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29 April 20141 
The campaign for the elections to the European Parliament (EP) has now 
begun, and at this point, it becomes undoubtedly necessary to undertake the 
analysis of the protagonists of European politics, the Europarties, and the po-
litical groups in the EP. 
In this article, we analyse the electoral history and composition of the 
group Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD), a political group that col-
lects right-wing populist and Eurosceptic parties—when not explicitly anti-
Euro and anti-EU—in the EP. The EFD is born as a political group in July 
1, 2009, and in the last European elections won 32 seats, corresponding to 
4.3% of the EP. Currently, it can count on 31 MEPs from 13 parties of 12 EU 
Member States. In particular, the major parties are the Northern League (LN), 
the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), LAOS (Greek Orthodox-
Christian party), the Danish People’s Party, the Movement for France, the 
Reformed Political Party of the Netherlands (SGP), the Finns Party (formerly 
known as the True Finns), and the Slovak National Party (Table 1). The EFD 
has two cochairs, Nigel Farage (UKIP) and Francesco Speroni (Northern 
League), which correspond to the two most important delegations of the group 
(8 and 7 MEPs, respectively). The new group was formed by the dissolution of 
the Independence and Democracy Group (IND/DEM) and the Union for Eu-
rope of the Nations (UEN). Some delegations of the EFD (the English, Danish, 
French, and Finnish) have actively participated in the campaign against the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in the second referendum in Ireland (October 
2009). Between 2009 and 2011, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) has been 
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
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negotiating its entry in the EFD, however, encountering the veto by different 
parties of the parliamentary group including the SGP, UKIP, and the Slovak 
National Party. However, further MEPs have joined the EFD during the term, 
such as the Italian Magdi Allam (currently member of the Brothers of Italy 
National Alliance) in December 2011, after having left the Union of Chris-
tian Democrats, being part of the EPP. Also, four MEPs of United Poland left 
the group of European Conservatives and Reformists (ERC) on 26 December 
2011, thus joining the EFD. Finally, in September 2013, the National Front 
for the Salvation of Bulgaria (party formed in 2011) joined the group. In ad-
dition to the new entrants in the course of time, there have been also some 
expulsions and defections, especially towards the group of Conservatives and 
Reformists (ECR). 
Most of the parties in the EFD are part of the Europarty Movement for a 
Europe of Liberties and Democracy (MELD), except the UKIP. In November 
2013, the Northern League (which used to be part of the MELD) has joined 
the Europarty European Alliance for Freedom (EAF), consisting of populist 
and anti-Euro right-wing parties as the French National Front led by Marine 
Le Pen, the Flemish Vlaams Belang, the Austrian FPÖ (all these parties do 
not belong to any group in the EP), and the Swedish Democrats (who has no 
elected MEPs). The EAF was founded in 2010 and has been recognized by the 
EP in 2011. The role and the importance of the party is likely to expand in the 
next European elections in May 2014 when it will count on the support of the 
National Front, the Party for Freedom (PVV) led by the Dutch Geert Wilders, 
the Flemish Vlaams Belang, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Swedish 
Democrats, the Slovak National Party, and the Northern League. The Dan-
ish People’s Party, UKIP, and Alternative for Germany (AFD) have refused to 
join the new alliance, while more radical and anti-Semitic nationalist parties 
in Europe as the National Democratic Party of Germany, the British National 
Party, the Greek Golden Dawn, and the Hungarian Jobbik were not allowed 
to join the alliance. Besides, here we are not concerned with the parties of the 
extreme right and neofascist. The least common denominator of the parties 
adhering to the MELD and EAF consists of the conservative political orienta-
tion, the aversion towards Europe, and the populism (Mudde, 2007; Szczer-
biak and Taggart, 2008), aiming to exploit electorally the distance that has 
arisen between the rulers and the citizens in many European countries, and 
the popular discontent that has been generated as a result of epochal phenom-
ena such as the globalization of markets, mass migration, and the global eco-
nomic crisis after the collapse of Wall Street in 2008. The populist challenge 
brought forward by these parties usually grounds on communication skills 
and on a charismatic leader to coagulate around a single political project the 
lack of confidence that the average citizen feels facing the difficulties typical 
of modern democracies. This is namely the challenge that a leader, placed at 
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the head of a people, considered the repository of all virtues, aims at a palace 
considered the house of every flaw (Tarchi, 2003).
As mentioned earlier, the EFD comes from the dissolution of the Independ-
ence and Democracy Group (IND/DEM) and the Union for Europe of the Na-
tions (UEN). The Union for Europe of the Nations was a political group in the 
European Parliament that was created in 1999 and collected until June 2009 
the MEPs inspired by the values of the national conservative right and who 
belonged to the European political party Alliance for Europe of the Nations 
(AEN). To the UEN belonged, among others, the Italian National Alliance. The 
UEN was itself the heir of the Union for Europe (UPE), European parliamentary 
group formed on 6 July 1995 as a result of the confluence of two distinct political 
groups: the European Democratic Alliance (national conservative orientation, 
whose main political party was the French Rally for the Republic) and Forza 
Europa (liberal conservative and Christian democratic orientation consisting 
of Forza Italia). Both the FRR and FI then abandoned the UPE to join the EPP 
between 1998 and 1999. The Independence and Democracy group gathered in-
stead the deputies with a Eurosceptic nationalist or democratic inspiration. The 
group was born in 2004, heir of the group Europe for Democracy and Diversity, 
grouping regionalist or nationalist Eurosceptic parties (including the Northern 
League and UKIP), making reference to the European parties EU Democrats 
and the Alliance of Independent Democrats in Europe. The Europe for Democ-
racy and Diversity in turn was the heir of the Europe of Nations (EDN), a Euro-
pean parliamentary group that included parties inspired by Euroscepticism and 
conservatism. Founded by 19 members, among which figured the Movement 
for France, the Reformed Constitutional Party, the Movement of June, and the 
People’s Movement against the EU. The group was born in 1994 and took over in 
1996 the name of Independents for a Europe of Nations. Finally, in 1999, it gave 
rise in fact to the group Europe for Democracy and Diversity. From what has 
been said so far, the right-wing Eurosceptic parties have a proper coordination 
at the EP level only since 1994, with the foundation of the EDN. Figure 1 shows 
the electoral trend—measured as the percentage of seats obtained in the EP—
of right-wing Eurosceptic parliamentary groups appeared over time: Europe of 
Nations (EN, then the group of Independents for a Europe of Nations), Europe 
of Democracies and Diversities (EDD), Independence and Democracy (IND/
DEM) and the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN), and finally the Europe 
of Freedom and Democracy (EFD).
As it appears, the Eurosceptic right-wing groups (obtained 3.4% of the 
seats in Parliament in 1994), show a net increase in its electoral performance 
between 1999 and 2004, more than doubling its seats in the EP (7.3% in 1999 
and 8.7% in 2004). At the last European elections in 2009, however, the Euro-
sceptic right halves their seats compared to five years ago, obtaining the 4.3%. 
This fact, however, can be misleading for two reasons: 1) in 2009 are not part 
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of the EFD some important populist and anti-Euro parties of the right wing 
including the National Front of Marine Le Pen, the Flemish Vlaams Belang, 
the Austrian Freedom Party, and the Dutch PVV, as all these parties were 
not members of any group in the EP; 2) in Figure 1, we reported for the elec-
tions of 1999 and 2004 also the UEN seats. However, in this group there were 
also parliamentary parties such as the National Alliance, the Republican Irish 
party Fianna Fáil, the Portuguese Social Democratic Centre-People’s Party, 
and the Polish Law and Justice party (since 2004), which will later become 
part of the parliamentary groups belonging to traditionally pro-Europe po-
litical families or in any case only moderately Eurosceptic. In 2006, the CDS 
joined the EPP group. In 2009, the Fianna Fáil joined the Alliance of Liberals 
and Democrats for Europe; National Alliance merged into the People of Free-
dom adhering to the Group of the European People’s Party, and the Law and 
Justice formed—with the Czech and British Conservatives—the group of the 
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR).
For the reasons set out above, Figure 2 reports the same data as Figure 1 
but excludes the seats of the UEN.
As can be noticed, after the exclusion of the UEN group, the electoral per-
formance of the groups of the Eurosceptic right results as more constant over 
time. In this case, in 1999, the percentage of seats is less than in 1994 (2.6% vs. 
3.4%), and the maximum share obtained (5.1% in 2004) is not too far from the 
percentage of seats of the EFD in the last election (4.3% in 2009). 















1994 1999 2004 2009
Eurosceptic right-wing ( 1994=EDN; 1999=UEN+EDD; 2004=UEN+IND/DEM; 2009=EFD)
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At this point, in order to have a more complete picture of the electoral 
strength of populist right-wing Eurosceptic and anti-Euro (when not anti-EU) 
parties in Europe, we report the election results in the European elections—
expressed in percentage terms—of the parties that are currently members of 
the EFD or adherent to the EAF for each of the EU member states (Table 2).
The data show that the parties of the populist and anti-European right 
wing reach considerable percentages in some countries since the 1990s when 
they exceed 22% in Austria and France (in this case only in 1994); in 2004, 
the highest votes shares range between 14% and 17% in Belgium (14.3%), the 
UK (15.6%), and France (17.4%); finally, the last European elections of 2009 
percentages between 12% and 24% are achieved in Austria (12.9%), Denmark 
(15.3%), Lithuania (12.2%), the Netherlands (23.8%), and the United Kingdom 
(15.9%). Among the countries which are part of the Union since 1979, the 
Netherlands and Belgium are the ones by the longest presence of populist and 
Eurosceptic right-wing electoral forces (since 1979 in the Netherlands and in 
Belgium since 1984). In the Netherlands, the last 2009 European elections reg-
istered a sharp success for these parties, especially due to the success of the 
PVV. France also has a similar electoral tradition, with percentages around 
11% in 1984, while in the UK the success of UKIP in the European elections is 
more recent (since 2004). Finally, the greatest electoral share in Italy has been 
reached by the Northern League in the last 2009 EP elections with 10.2%. 
In conclusion, the next European elections could be a turning point for 
the parties of the populist and anti-Euro right wing since there are some im-
Figure 2 – Electoral trend of the EFD and its predecessors in percentage of seats in the 
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portant conditions that may favour their electoral success. In the first place, 
European elections traditionally represent a context favourable to opposi-
tion parties as stated by the theory of the “second order elections” (Reif and 
Schmitt, 1980). Namely, in the European elections, the stakes are lower (or are 
perceived as such) than in the general election (when the prize is represented 
by the government of the country). Voters thus feel freer in their electoral 
choices, and punish at the ballot box incumbent parties more easily when 
they perceive that they are not carrying out policies effective and appropriate 
to their expectations. According to this perspective, then, the elections for the 
EP electoral arena are particularly favourable for protest opposition parties 
while government parties are usually disadvantaged on the basis of the theory 
of electoral cycle (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). 
Moreover, in the wake of the toughest economic crisis since the Second World 
War, in several European countries, there has been a rise in antiestablishment 
parties that openly oppose the austerity policies of the EU and the European 
integration. Also, at the next European elections in May 2014, these parties 
have the goal of bringing the anti-EU protest directly within the institutions 
of the European Union, primarily the EP. Paradoxically, it may be the first 
Table 2 – Electoral results of the EFD parties and of the populist anti-Europe right (ad-
herents to the EAF) in the EU member states at the European elections (1979–2009)
Country
% total votes for EFD and/or EAF
1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009
Austria 27.5* 23.4 6.3 12.9
Belgium 0 1.3 4.1 7.8 9.4 14.3 9.9
Denmark 0 0 0 0 5.8 6.8 15.3
Finland¹ 0.7* 0.8 4.3 9.8
France 0 11 11.7 22.8 5.7 17.4 11.1
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 4.1 7.2
Italy 0 0.5 1.8 6.6 4.5 5 10.2
Lithuania 6.8** 12.2
Netherlands² 3.2 5.2 5.9 7.8 8.7 5.9 23.8
Slovakia 2 5.6
Sweden 0 0.3 1.1 3.3
United Kingdom 0 0 0 1 6.5 15.6 15.9
*Elections held in 1996, after the entry of the country in the EC
**Elections held in 2007 
¹In Finland in 2004, the TF (True Finns) is part of the SKL (Finnish Christian League).
²In the Netherlands in 2004 and in 2009, the SGP is in alliance with the CU (Christian Union).
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European elections in which issues concerning the European Union are at the 
heart of the campaign, thanks to the anti-Europe parties. From being second 
order, the EP elections could thus become first order also by virtue of a vote 
against Europe in Europe.
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The result of European Parliament (EP) elections is unambiguous: the 
Democratic Party (PD) led by Matteo Renzi has obtained a neat success reach-
ing a record share of 40.8% of the votes. No centre-left party had previously 
achieved a similar result. Since the EP elections are held in 1979, the PD is 
overall the Italian political party that has obtained the highest share of votes 
ever. If we look at general elections, only De Gasperi in 1948 and Fanfani in 
1958 had achieved greater electoral successes in terms of vote shares. Clearly, 
the same does not hold if we take into account the absolute votes: the PD has 
obtained about one million votes less in the present EP elections compared 
to the PD led by Veltroni in 2008 (counting only 33.2% in terms of percent-
ages). The reason lies in the fact that the turnout level registered for those po-
litical elections was the 80.5% whereas for the EP elections, the turnout value 
registered for resident Italian citizens was 58.7%. Whenever the difference in 
turnout rates becomes so relevant, it is more appropriate to take into account 
percentage measures to evaluate the electoral performances of a political par-
ty in relative terms. The consideration of electoral results by geopolitical area2 
(Table 1) reveals some interesting patterns. For the first time, the PD reveals a 
rather homogeneous electoral strength nationwide: if on the one hand, the PD 
confirms its traditionally highest vote share in the area of the (formerly) Red 
Belt with the 52.5% (among which stands out the 56.4% obtained in Tuscany), 
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
2  The areas that have been considered include North-West (Piedmont, Liguria, and Aosta 
Valley), North-East (Lombardy, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and Trentino Alto Adige), 
the Red Belt (Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Marche, and Umbria), and the South (Lazio, 
Molise, Abruzzi, Campania, Basilicata, Apulia, Sicily, and Sardinia).
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on the other, the PD reaches vote shares beyond 35% also in other geopolitical 
areas. In particular, it achieves a vote share of 41.1% in the North-West, the 
39.1% in the North-East, and the 36% in the South (the area in which the PD 
registered the worst results). Therefore, the PD remains overrepresented in 
the regions of the Red Belt and underrepresented in the South. Notwithstand-
ing, it should be acknowledged the superb results obtained in the Northern 
regions. In particular, the fact that the PD stands out as the first political party 
in the North-East of the country—namely, in the “white area” formerly domi-
nated during the First Republic by the Christian Democracy and thereafter 
by “forzaleghismo” (Berselli, 2007) [TN: this expression refers to electoral al-
liance of Forza Italia and the “Northern League”]—is unprecedented. In the 
North-West, the PD has become the first political party, and the votes it ob-
tained exceed the number of votes collected by all the centre-right political 
parties: 39.1% versus 35.3%. 
To bring the analysis one step further, it is needed to compare the results 
of the PD with those obtained by the other two main Italian political parties: 
the Mr. Grillo’s Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five Star Movement, M5S) and Mr. 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (Go Italy, FI). Grillo’s M5S has achieved 21.2% of the 
votes at the national level, and the area where its performance has been better 
is the South of the country (25%). In particular, the regions where the M5S 
proved to be most successful have been Abruzzi (29.7%), Molise (27.3%), and 
in the big islands, reaching 30.5% of the votes in Sardinia and 26.3% in Sicily. 
In the North-West, the Movement has won 22.7% of the votes whereas the 
areas in which the M5S reported the least satisfactory results include the Red 
Belt (19.1%) and especially the North-East (17%). For what concerns Forza Ita-
lia, Mr. Berlusconi’s party has achieved almost 17% of the votes at the national 
level, characterised by a geographical distribution closer to the one of M5S 
than to PD’s one. As for Grillo’s Movement, FI also registers its best perfor-
mance (20.6%) in the South: particularly high vote shares have been achieved 
by Berlusconi’s party in Campania (almost 24%), in Apulia (23.5%), in Molise 
(23.4%), and in Sicily (21.3%). Regarding the other geographical areas, FI has 
become by now a party with average dimensions within the Red Belt (12.2%) 
although its results are fairly disappointing also in the North-West (15.2%) 
and in the North-East (15.6%). The result in the North-East is particularly in-
formative because it includes the area of “lombardo-veneto” [TN: area consist-
ing of Lombardy and Veneto], namely, the economically most dynamic part 
of the country, formerly characterised by the electoral strength of Berlusconi’s 
party. In this area of the country, neither FI nor M5S obtains satisfying vote 
shares. Analysing the geographical distribution of the votes, it becomes clear 
that both the M5S and FI are characterised by a process of “meridionalizzazi-
one” [TN: Southernisation] of the electorate compared to Renzi’s PD. As for 
the remaining political parties, only the Northern League (LN) led by Matteo 
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Salvini, the New Centre-Right in alliance with the Union of Christian Demo-
crats (NCD-UdC), and the left-wing list “the other Europe with Tsipras” have 
passed the 4% threshold, thus obtaining seats in the European Parliament. 
The Northern League, riding Euroscepticism as similarly done by the Front 
National of Marine Le Pen in France and the UKIP of Nigel Farage in the 
United Kingdom, has obtained a satisfying 6.2% of the vote share nationwide, 
with the following geographical distribution: 7.1% in the North-West, 14.1% 
in the North-East (almost achieving the 20% of the votes in Veneto), 3.6% 
in the Red Belt, and 1% in the South (where its list was presented anyways). 
The NCD-UdC has collected 4.4% of the votes, benefiting especially from its 
electoral strength in the South, where it collected the 6.2% of the votes. Dif-
ferently, the Other Europe with Tsipras, managing to obtain seats in the Eu-
ropean Parliament with its 4%, is the most geographically homogeneous list, 
considering its vote distribution across the various areas of the country.
To depict more completely the frame of the European elections’ results, 
I compared the result obtained by the main political parties in the 2014 EP 
elections with those obtained in the 2009 EP elections and in the general elec-
tions of 2013. Table 2 and Table 3 report both absolute vote differences, as 
well as percentage variations, presented by geographical area. Between 2009 
and 2014, the Italian party system is affected by deep changes: new politi-
cal actors enter the political scene, primarily the M5S; others have changed 
their name while others still originated from party splits; and so on and so 
forth. For instance, a split with the People of Freedom (PdL, after renamed 
with the previous “Forza Italia”) has created the NCD led by Alfano. This new 
party has presented its list in an electoral alliance with the UdC. To produce 
a meaningful comparison, it has been thus decided to aggregate some politi-
cal parties belonging to the same political block (Chiaramonte, 2007) taking 
into account the electoral supply at the 2014 EP elections. Hence, the votes re-
ceived by FI at the recent EP elections have been summed to the ones collected 
by the NCD-UdC: in this manner, it becomes possible to compare the votes 
of the wider political area of FI with those obtained in the past by the PdL 
and the UdC.3A similar procedure has been considered for European Choice 
(Scelta Europea), namely, an electoral cartel supporting the ALDE candidate 
at the EU Commission Guy Verhofstadt and formed by the Democratic Cent-
er (Centro Democratico), Stop the Decline (Fare per Fermare il Declino), and 
3 In particular, for the 2009 EP elections, it has been considered the sum of the votes 
for PdL and UdC, for the 2013 general elections the sum of the votes for the PdL, UdC, 
Grande Sud, and the MIR (the latter two political parties have included their candidates 
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Civic Choice (Scelta Civica). Therefore, the votes for European Choice have 
been compared to the sum of the votes obtained in 2013 by the parties that 
have joined this electoral cartel (adding also the votes for Future and Freedom 
for Italy (FLI), Mr. Monti’s ally in 2013). Finally, another political block is the 
one formed by the parties on the left of the PD, including the votes for the 
Other Europe with Tsipras, the Greens, and the IdV.4
The turnout level at the past year general elections has been 75.2%. As for 
the 2014 European ones, the turnout remained slightly below 60%. Almost 
6.5 million voters decided to stay at home. Notwithstanding, Renzi’s PD has 
improved its past electoral performance not only in percentage terms, passing 
from the 25.4% to the 40.8%, but also in absolute terms as it collected 2.5 mil-
lion votes more. Considering the marked reduction in turnout, it would have 
been sufficient for Renzi to collect the same votes gained by Bersani to attain 
a greater vote share. Instead, he managed to increase that number. Hence, 
the PD’s success can be deem “historical,” also considering that the distance 
with the party ranked second (the M5S) results of about 20 percentage points. 
Compared to the votes obtained at the general elections, the PD has enlarged 
its electorate by 29.3%. The geographical area in which the PD has experi-
enced the most significant expansion is the North-East where the Renzi’s par-
ty has increased the general elections’ result by 36.3%. Once again, it has to 
be acknowledged the unprecedented electoral success obtained by the PD in 
the most productive area of the country where in the past, the left had never 
accomplished electoral successes. In the South, the registered electoral expan-
sion was 21.9%, smaller than in the other areas of the country. Considering 
the 2009 EP elections as basis for the comparison, the improvement of the PD 
becomes even clearer, with an increase of about three million votes (+40%). 
Also, in this case, the North-East stands out as the area with the most sizable 
increase in the vote share collected by the PD, +66.7%. 
The M5S has lost about three million votes compared to the 2013 general 
elections, namely, -33.3%. The North-West represents the area in which the 
electoral loss of the M5S has been more pronounced: in this area, 308,937 
voters have abandoned Grillo’s party, namely, 44.3% of those who had previ-
ously decided to support the Five Star Movement in this area of the coun-
try. Smaller electoral losses have been registered in the South of the country 
(-31.6%). The political block of FI (FI + NCD-UdC) has lost almost two and a 
4 For the 2009 EP elections, this block corresponds to the votes for the Communist Re-
foundation Party (PRC), the Italian Communists’ Party (PdCI), Left and Freedom (SEL), 




half million votes, namely, 29% of its votes in 2009. The most sizable shrink-
age can be observed in the South where the decrease in the number of votes 
equals 32.1%. Therefore, the South represents the area in which the centre-
right political block reports the best electoral performance but also the area 
in which the losses with respect to the previous general elections are more 
pronounced. Considering the 2009 EP elections as basis for the comparison, 
the loss becomes even neater with a reduction of almost seven million votes 
(-54.5%). Overall, the most sizable electoral shrinkage reported by the centre-
right block is registered in the Red Belt, given by -62%. 
Among the other parties, the Northern League is the only one to report sat-
isfying results. It has increased its votes both in percentage and absolute terms, 
respectively, by 2.1 percentage points and 300,000 more votes. This implies an 
increase by 21.3% compared to the 2013 elections’ result. In particular, sizable 
increases are registered in the Center (+109.1%) and in the South (+306.3%) 
although the vote shares in these areas remain quite low. Notwithstanding, 
this could represent how the Northern League campaigned against the Euro 
to extend its traditional areas of support, adopting an issue proven to be sensi-
tive at the national level further than at the regional one. Fratelli d’Italia-AN 
(Brothers of Italy-National Alliance) led by Giorgia Meloni have campaigned 
on Eurosceptic positions as well, but they were unable to reach the entrance 
threshold of 4% (they reported only 3.7%). However, they were able to increase 
their votes compared to the 2013 general elections (+50.7%), with the greater 
increase registered in the North-East (+68.9%) and in the Red Belt (+63.7%). 
Among the other political parties, the heavier loss has been experienced by 
European Choice. It has obtained only 200,000 votes, which means a loss of 
about three million of votes—namely, -94.4%—and a complete debacle in the 
North-West. The radical left block has lost 17.6% of its previous 2013 general 
elections’ votes, registering more sizable losses in the South (-35.9%), while it 
has slightly increased its votes in the North-West (+2.7%). Compared to the 
2009 EP elections, the electoral loss experienced by this political block be-
comes more evident with three million votes less (-65.5%). 
Figure 1 reports the electoral gains and losses for the various political par-
ties between the political and EP elections in absolute terms to help the reader. 
The success of the PD results even more evident. Moreover, this success was 
achieved in an electoral context unfavourable for the PD. In fact, the EP elec-
tions represent second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), in which the 
stake is smaller than in the national elections, where the national government 
is at stake. Under such circumstances, voters feel more autonomous in their 
political choices and may decide to punish mainstream parties in case of un-
derperforming political actions. Following this perspective, the EP elections 
represent an electoral arena particularly favourable to opposition and protest 
parties. Governing parties (like the PD) are usually disadvantaged based on 
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the theory of the electoral cycle (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Van der Eijk and 
Franklin, 1996) unless the EP elections are held during the honeymoon pe-
riod between the government and the electorate, close to the previous general 
elections. On the one hand, it is true that the Renzi’s government has taken 
charge about two months ago, and thus, it is still highly trusted by the public, 
but on the other, this government was formed without any popular legitima-
tion, especially in times of economic crisis and high unemployment. In the 
rest of Europe, the theory of second-order elections has been confirmed, con-
sidering that governing parties performed badly (with the partial exceptions 
of Orbán’s Fidesz and Merkel’s CDU). In Italy, the opposite was true. The PD 
did not only win but it also increased its votes with respect to the general elec-
tions, thus becoming the first party in terms of seats within the socialist group 
in the EP (31 seats out of 191, namely, 16% of the European reference party) 
and the first party in Europe in absolute values. The Italian paradox is repre-
sented by the fact that the M5S—who received three million votes less than in 
the general elections in a potentially favourable electoral arena as suggested 
by the second-order elections’ theory for the EP elections—still represents the 
first antiestablishment party in Europe. Italy thus represent an interesting and 
peculiar case in the European context. The uncontestable and historic elec-
toral success for the PD represents a strong legitimation for the government 
led by Renzi, who managed to lead the PD to a result beyond expectations. 
This does not mean that the PD has settled the victory for the next general 
elections. As the last 2013 general elections have demonstrated, uncertainty 
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and electoral volatility represent the salient trait of Italian politics nowadays. 
The votes, once obtained, have to be maintained, and this will depend on the 
effectiveness of the government’s political action and its reforming ability. 
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High fidelity and new votes for Renzi
Roberto D’Alimonte
Published on “Il Sole 24 Ore,” 28 May 20141
Two factors contributed to the success of Renzi’s PD in a decisive way. The 
first one was Renzi’s ability to bring to the polls those who voted for PD in 
2013. And that was a different PD. The second was his ability to widen the 
consensus for his party even if this is a difficult task for an incumbent party 
in a period of crisis. The first factor was more relevant than the second one.
As the number of votes for parties in each polling station become available, 
it becomes clearer how things have gone in reality. Given these data, so far, 
the vote shifts among parties and from voting to nonvoting can be calculated 
for five cities. The baseline are last year’s general elections. That was clearly an 
election different from European elections, but this is not particularly relevant 
for the purpose of this analysis. It is well known that the turnout for European 
elections is lower than the turnout for general elections, and this has been the 
case also this time. However, this fact doesn’t modify the analysis on the vote 
shifts because this analysis includes also the shifts from voting to nonvoting 
and vice versa.
In the end, it is not very difficult to explain why Renzi won. In a context in 
which there were 6,500,000 voters less than in the 2013’s general elections, PD 
gained 2,500,000 votes. Turnout went down while Renzi went up: this is sim-
ple. Explaining why this has happened is more complicated. Is it due to other 
parties’ loss of votes—apart from the Northern League that gained around 
300,000 votes—and Renzi’s increase of votes? What do vote shifts in these five 
cities tell us about? Where do votes for PD come from?
These votes come primarily from PD itself, and this is the clearest finding. 
The loyalty rate of PD’s electorate in these elections is extraordinary. Almost all 
of those who voted for PD in 2013 voted for it again in 2014. This is a very ef-
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
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fective mobilisation, and it is even more surprising since these were European 
and not general elections. Even if we take into account the fact that PD’s elec-
torate has a higher propensity to vote also at European elections, such a high 
loyalty rate is unusual. This is Renzi’s first credit and the principal reason for 
his success. Indeed, bringing your voters to the polls is the first—and most im-
portant—rule for winning. Renzi was able to do this while the others were not.
In Florence, PD gained the votes of an astonishing 95% of his previous 
electorate—and, incidentally, this result explains the extraordinary success 
of Dario Nardella, the just elected mayor of Florence. The lowest loyalty rate 
has been registered in Palermo—and this is not a surprise—but still is 71%. 
The comparison with the other parties is pitiless. In Venice, PDL lost 58% of 
its electorate towards abstention and 61% in Palermo. Things are better—so to 
say—in Turin with a loss of 35% and in Florence with a loss of 20%, but only 
because in these cases, the previous consensus was lower. A similar thing has 
happened to the M5S. In Venice, 25% of those who voted for this party in 2013 
didn’t go to vote for it again. In Florence, they were 38%, in Palermo 45%, and 
so on.
This phenomenon goes under the label of “asymmetric abstention.” Ren-
zi would have won even with this phenomenon only. However, he has won 
even better because of an additional mechanism. In order to win—or to win 
“well”—you need to conquer new voters and not only to keep the old ones. 
And here, the results of the prime minister’s ability to attract voters are evi-
dent. As already mentioned yesterday, and as it becomes clear in today’s data 
from the five cities, PD has picked up voters from almost all other rival parties’ 
electorate in different degrees. And among all these vote shifts, there is one 
that is particularly significant and is the one coming from Scelta Civica. The 
old Mario Monti’s party has almost disappeared. A relevant part of its previ-
ous voters switched to PD, but many of them didn’t turn out at the elections. 
In Turin, 60% of its 2013’s voters switched to PD while 15% went to the party 
lead by Alfano. In this city, the shift towards abstention is minimum. Almost 
the same thing happened in Florence while something different happened in 
Palermo. In this case, in addition to voters switching to PD and NCD, there is 
also a vote shift towards Forza Italia (11%) and towards abstention (14%). So, 
thanks to Scelta Civica, a share of moderate voters has been gradually brought 
to the centre left, firstly to Monti, then to PD. But this wouldn’t have happened 
without Renzi.
Vote shifts towards PD don’t stop here. In addition to Scelta Civica’s voters, 
there are also M5S and FI voters. In this case, it seems that the vote shift is less 
relevant, but every vote counts. On the whole, it seems that Grillo’s movement 
has been “more generous” towards Renzi’s party. In Florence, 17% of those 
who voted M5S chose PD while 12% of previous PDL voters did the same 
thing. In Turin, the figures are respectively 12% and 9%. Even some voters of 
101
High fidelity and new votes for Renzi




Lega have “betrayed” the party and contributed to increase PD’s share: 12% 
in Turin, even 36% in Venice, and 14% in Parma. All these tributaries have 
allowed Renzi to reach a historical 40.8%.
These elections were a difficult and delicate transition for Renzi, who want-
ed to face them without even putting his name on the election ballot. Euro-
pean elections are risky elections for big parties and especially for incumbent 
parties. Apart from the case of Germany—in which Merkel actually gained 
fewer votes compared to the previous general elections—it is clear what has 
happened in almost all countries of the European Union.
Consolidating this success now represents Renzi’s challenge. If he suc-
ceeds, we will remember these elections as a historical landmark towards 
building around PD a new social and electoral coalition that will tend to be a 
majority. Time also plays on Renzi’s side. Until 2018, there won’t be another 
national election. Once upon a time, there were regional elections—who has 
forgotten D’Alema’s resignation after the bad result for the centre left at the 
2000’s regional elections?—but by that time, almost all regions went to vote 
the same day. Next year, it won’t be so since there are nine regions where 
there won’t be elections due to early resignations of the regional governments. 
This time frame represents a big chance to carry on a mid-term government 
program without electoral distractions. In a country where governing is very 
difficult, this helps too.
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Vote shifts in Rome and Milan confirm the 
frame of Renzi’s victory
Aldo Paparo and Matteo Cataldi
13 June 20141
On the basis of electoral data for some regional capitals that were already 
made  available a few hours after the end of the ballots, in a previous article, 
we have tried to reconstruct the movements of voting occurred between the 
European elections of May 25 and the general elections of February 2013 
(D’Alimonte, 2014). With this article, we extend the same type of analysis 
to Rome and Milan, the two largest Italian cities. Together, the two “capi-
tals” of Italy—the financial and political—sum up to approximately 7% of 
Italian voters. These two cities are different on various aspects, especially 
in terms of their electoral history. Milan—since 1994—has been the capital 
of the phenomenon that Berselli (2007) called “forzaleghismo” that (used 
to) bring together politically and electorally the Northern League (LN) and 
Forza Italia (Go Italy, FI). And Rome has more often exhibited a situation 
of greater balance between the two political sides and where the tradition-
al right-wing represented for many years by National Alliance (AN) had 
greater weight compared to the capital of Lombardy as represented by the 
candidature of Fini and its access to the second round against Rutelli in 
1993. Also, to remain in more recent years, it is sufficient to remind Ale-
manno’s victory in 2008. 
Between 2013 (House of Deputies) and 2014 (European Parliament), the 
Democratic Party (PD) is the only one (along with FDI) to increase its votes 
in absolute terms in both cities. In terms of percentages, Renzi’s party—who 
started with the same share of votes in both capitals—ends up reporting two 
additional percentage points in Milan. 
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
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A significant difference that is found between the two capitals can be de-
tected instead in the votes that have converged on the Five Star Movement 
(M5S) and (of course) on the Northern League. In Italy’s capital, the party led 
by Grillo and Casaleggio has been voted by one voter out of four (24.9%). This 
confirms its second rank behind the Democratic Party. In Milan, the M5S 
reaches 15%, almost 11 percentage points less than in Rome, outvoted also 
by Forza Italia. In fact, it should be kept in mind that—with the exception 
of Trentino Alto Adige—Lombardy had been the Italian region in which the 
M5S had already got fewer votes in the general elections of 2013. Since then, 
it further loses 40,000 votes passing from 17% to 14.2%. In Rome, the decline 
in percentage points compared to 2013 is roughly in line with that of Milan. 
As for FI, we have said that in Milan, it gets the second place; this is not 
only due to the weakness of the M5S but also to the better result registered in 
Rome (+3 points). 
The left, united in support of Tsipras as the candidate to the Commission, 
get good results in both cities reaching over 6%. Finally, it is interesting to note 
that the New Centre-Right (NCD) led by Alfano exceed 5% in Milan while in 
Rome, it achieves a much more modest result (3.7%) outperformed by Fratelli 
d’Italia (Brothers of Italy, FDI), with their 5.3% in the capital. 
Turning now in detail to the analysis of vote shifts, we first show how the 
structure of the movements of voters occurred in the two cities between 2013 
and 2014 appears very similar. 
The first thing that you notice is the high loyalty of the Democratic Party’s 
voters. As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, the rate of those who confirmed their 
vote for the PD is about four out of five voters in both cities. Both in Milan 
and Rome, we note the same defections, all rather small but still significant: 
towards the Tsipras list, towards abstention, and also towards the M5S. This 
first element, i.e., the significantly higher loyalty of the voters of the Demo-
cratic Party, is in line with what was observed in the other cities for which we 
have presented the vote shifts as the rate varies between 70% and 90%. 
Still referring to the centre-left coalition—and always in continuity with 
other cases already analysed—it looks like voters of Left, Freedom and Ecol-
ogy (SEL) have chosen the list of Tsipras much more than the PD while a share 
even more significant has taken refuge in the abstention. 
The differences between the two cities are also minimal as for the M5S. 
Grillo’s voters in 2013 are split quite evenly: about half confirmed his 2013 
voting decision while the remaining decided instead to abstain. The lack of 
any significant electoral shift towards the other political forces, even towards 
the real winner of these European elections, i.e., the Democratic Party, should 
be emphasised. Only in Milan can we observe a barely significant vote shift 
from the Movement towards the Northern League. As regards to the Grillo’s 
party, the vote shifts in the two major Italian cities confirm what has been pre-
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viously observed: loyalty rates between 40% and 50% of the voters in 2013 and 
sizable loss towards the abstention (30%–45%). In some cities, such as Flor-
ence and Turin, the Movement has also succumbed to the Democratic Party. 
Here is a difference with respect to Milan and Rome where the electorate of 
the M5S was particularly recalcitrant to Renzi’s pledges. 
Regarding the Berlusconi’s 2013 political coalition, the loyalty rate is really 
low. In Milan, about four out of 10 voters have chosen FI in 2014, in Rome, 
only one out of three. In the latter case, the larger group of centre-right voters 
decided to abstain in 2014: 42%. In Milan, “only” 30% of 2013 Berlusconi’s 
voters decided to abstain. In addition, both cities register significant losses 
towards the Democratic Party of Renzi, as well as towards the NCD of Alfano 
(that has led the scission with FI), and also towards the League in Milan. Even 
in this case, Milan and Rome are in line with the rest of the vote shifts present-
ed. Loyalty is always between 30% and 45% of the vote in 2013. We observe 
a greater variability in the coefficients towards abstention: between 20% and 
60%. Milan and Rome are consistent also on this aspect, given the significant 
difference observed. Finally, even spills of votes toward the Democratic Party 
had already been found almost everywhere: between 6% and 17% of the vote 
for Berlusconi in 2013. 
Voters who had chosen at the general elections the area amalgamated 
around the candidacy of former Prime Minister Mario Monti have moved in 
majority (more than half) towards the party of Matteo Renzi. Both in Rome 
and Milan, the second largest group—following the one that voted for the 
Democratic Party—is the one of those who abstained although with signifi-
cant differences: in Milan, about one out of four voters, in Rome one out of 
seven. A very small proportion of these 2013 voters—between 10% and 13%—
has chosen in 2014 the NCD of Alfano. It has to be kept in mind that this 
party presented himself together with the UDC, one of the members of the 
Monti’s coalition in 2013. Also, with regard to the behavior of Monti’s voters, 
Milan and Rome report the same phenomena already observed in the previ-
ous analyses. The only city in which less than 40% of this group has converged 
towards the Democratic Party is Florence where the largest group chose FI.
Let’s now look at the sources—expressed in terms of 2013 electorates—of 
the various parties’ electorates for the European elections (Tables 3 and 4). As 
can be seen—and easily expectable at the light of the polls’ results—between 
the three main parties, the Democratic Party is the one that has been better 
able to go beyond its original 2013 pool of voters. In both cities, approximately 
one-third of this sub-electorate is not constituted by voters for the Bersani 
coalition last year. The more sizable inflows were recorded from the Monti 
coalition, which are estimated between one-sixth and one-fifth of the Demo-
cratic Party in 2014. Approximately one voter of the Democratic Party out of 
15 had voted for the Berlusconi’s coalition in 2013. 
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Votes for Forza Italia for more than three-quarters proceed from those of the 
centre-right coalition in 2013. The “new” Berlusconi’s party has not proved able 
to break in through other parties’ constituencies even though in both cities is 
Table 1 – Vote shifts in Rome: Destinations of the electorates of the 2013 general elec-




RC SEL PD¹ Monti PDL² M5S Others Nonvote
Tsipras 24% 43% 4% 4% 0% 0% 1% 0%
PD 12% 14% 77% 52% 10% 1% 6% 1%
NCD 3% 1% 1% 13% 4% 0% 1% 0%
FI 3% 2% 3% 4% 32% 0% 5% 2%
FDI 4% 2% 2% 8% 7% 2% 6% 0%
M5S 17% 5% 6% 1% 3% 50% 14% 2%
Others 9% 5% 1% 4% 2% 1% 7% 0%
Nonvote 28% 29% 6% 14% 42% 46% 59% 94%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
¹ PD included also the 2013 votes for Democratic Center.
²PDL included also the votes for the other components of the coalition: Northern League, FDI, 
The Right, Big South-Mpa, Mir, and the List of Retired.
Table 2 – Vote shifts in Milan: Destinations of the electorates of the 2013 general elec-





RC SEL PD¹ Monti PDL² LN M5S Others Nonvote
Tsipras 31% 35% 7% 2% 0% 3% 2% 5% 0%
PD 2% 10% 81% 53% 7% 10% 2% 12% 0%
NCD 1% 2% 0% 10% 8% 6% 0% 5% 0%
FI 2% 0% 2% 3% 43% 18% 0% 2% 2%
FDI 2% 1% 1% 2% 4% 4% 1% 2% 0%
LN 7% 1% 1% 0% 6% 46% 5% 1% 1%
M5S 30% 7% 4% 1% 3% 6% 43% 2% 2%
Altri 7% 5% 1% 3% 1% 0% 1% 5% 0%
Nonvote 17% 40% 2% 26% 28% 7% 47% 66% 94%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
¹PD included also the 2013 votes for Democratic Center.
²PDL included also the votes for the other components of the coalition: Northern League, FDI, 
The Right, Big South-Mpa, Mir, and the List of Retired.
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registered a small but significant incoming flow from the 2013 vote for the Dem-
ocratic Party, approximately estimated between 5% and 10% of the votes of FI.
The same applies to the M5S in Rome: three-quarters of the votes in 2014 
derive from its 2013 pool. In Milan, however, is registered a deep turnover 
Table 3 – Vote shifts in Rome: Sources from the electorates of the 2013 general elec-





RC SEL PD¹ Monti PDL² M5S Others Nonvote
Tsipras 15% 45% 29% 8% 1% 1% 1% 1% 100%
PD 1% 2% 71% 16% 7% 1% 1% 1% 100%
NCD 3% 2% 5% 47% 37% 0% 2% 3% 100%
FI 1% 1% 9% 4% 78% 0% 2% 6% 100%
FDI 3% 2% 16% 20% 40% 13% 5% 2% 100%
M5S 3% 1% 10% 1% 3% 76% 2% 4% 100%
Others 11% 9% 14% 17% 23% 12% 9% 4% 100%
Nonvote 1% 2% 3% 2% 17% 21% 3% 51% 100%
¹PD included also the 2013 votes for Democratic Center.
²PDL included also the votes for the other components of the coalition: Northern League, FDI, 
The Right, Big South-Mpa, Mir, and the List of Retired.
Table 4 – Vote shifts in Milan: Sources from the electorates of the 2013 general elec-





RC SEL PD¹ Monti PDL² LN M5S Others Nonvote
Tsipras 12% 30% 41% 5% 0% 4% 6% 4% 0% 100%
PD 0% 1% 68% 22% 5% 2% 1% 1% 0% 100%
NCD 1% 2% 4% 36% 44% 9% 0% 4% 0% 100%
FI 0% 0% 6% 3% 76% 9% 0% 0% 6% 100%
FDI 1% 2% 11% 16% 44% 12% 10% 3% 0% 100%
LN 2% 1% 5% 0% 22% 49% 13% 1% 7% 100%
M5S 5% 3% 9% 1% 7% 4% 65% 1% 6% 100%
Others 6% 10% 23% 27% 12% 2% 6% 10% 5% 100%
Nonvote 1% 3% 1% 7% 12% 1% 15% 5% 56% 100%
¹PD included also the 2013 votes for Democratic Center.
²PDL included also the votes for the other components of the coalition: Northern League, FDI, 
The Right, Big South-Mpa, Mir, and the List of Retired.
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within the Grillo’s electorate. In the capital of Lombardy, in fact, over a third 
of the votes for the M5S do not originate from those who had already voted the 
Movement in 2013. These inflows derive from all the other pools of 2013 votes 
but the most numerically important ones derive from PD (approximately one-
tenth of the 2014 votes for the M5S); followed by those coming from the centre 
right and from abstainers, each weighing one-fifteenth of the votes in 2014. 
Also in Milan, we emphasise the Northern League’s result. More than half 
of its votes derive from those who had not voted for this party a year ago. In 
particular, over a quarter of its votes come from voters of the PDL and other 
centre-right parties in 2013 and one out of eight from the M5S 2013.
In conclusion, we can emphasise that the framework of moving voters 
that we have described with reference to the two most populous cities in 
Italy appear in line with the one previously shown deriving from five other 
major cities of our country, variously characterised from the point of view 
of their geography and of their electoral traditions. The key points that are 
common to all the cities analysed can be briefly summarised as follows. The 
success of the Democratic Party led by Renzi derives from two elements. On 
the one hand, the loyalty of 2013 voters: the PD records indeed very high loy-
alty rates even considering the significant decrease in turnout levels (Ema-
nuele, 2014). On the other hand, it has to be signalled its ability to intercept 
votes outflowing from all the other political fronts. Table 5 shows the rela-
tive weigh, in various cities, on the electorate of the Democratic Party at the 
European elections, of the various electoral constituencies in 2013. As you 
can see, about a third of those who voted for Renzi’s Democratic Party had 
not voted Bersani a year ago. The only exception is Florence where, however, 
one-fifth of the votes for the party led by Renzi are new for the party. The 
most sizable inflow comes from Monti’s coalition, whose voters have heavily 
moved toward the Democratic Party: so, in the various cities, between one-
tenth and one-fifth of the electorate that has voted for the Democrats today 
had previously voted for Monti’s coalition. Also, electoral shifts toward the 
PD are recorded from the Berlusconi’s centre right although to a lesser ex-
tent. The Northern League in all the cases analysed gives at least one-tenth 
of its electorate to Renzi’s party, but PDL also—with a few exceptions—does 
record significant direct outflows. In the various cases, an amount varying 
between 5% and 7% of the total votes for the PD comes from Berlusconi’s 
coalition of 2013. Instead, in contrast with what was observed in other cities, 
in Rome and Milan, a very little share of votes comes from M5S: however, 
these are the only two cases in which this coefficient is smaller than 1% of 
voters. The electorate of the M5S proves in fact the less uniform in its flows 
among the various cities: its contribution for the total votes in favour of the 
Democratic Party is virtually nil in Milan and Rome but is about 10% in Tu-
rin, Venice, and Palermo. As easily predictable considering the low turnout, 
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there were no recoveries from the pool of abstainers. It is very interesting, 
however, to notice how almost none of the votes for the Democratic Party 
comes from SEL or Civil Revolution (RC): in Palermo, only one out of 20 
of 2014 Democrats had voted for one out of the two left-wing parties at the 
General elections 2013.
Methodological Note
The analyses of vote shifts shown here were obtained by applying the Good-
man model correct by the Ras algorithm to the election results of 2,600 elec-
toral districts in Rome and over 1,200 in Milan. As for Rome, 10 matrices of 
data considering homogeneous units have been constructed, taking into ac-
count aggregations of smaller local units, and then aggregated—after proper 
weighing—in the city-level matrices reported. In Milan has been followed an 
analogous procedure constructing six separated matrices taking into account 
the single-member district for the Senate identified by the old Mattarella elec-
toral law. 
The VR coefficient was found to be always satisfying in all the units of anal-
ysis of the two cities, with a mean of 10.4 and 10.8 respectively in Rome and 
Milan.
Table 5 – Sources from the 2013 electorates of the votes for the PD at the 2014 Euro-
pean elections in various cities
General elections 2013
RC SEL PD¹ Monti PDL² LN M5S Others Non-vote
Turin 0% 2% 63% 21% 5% 1% 8% 1% 0% 100%
Milan 0% 1% 68% 22% 5% 2% 1% 1% 0% 100%
Venice 0% 0% 65% 16% 0% 5% 11% 3% 0% 100%
Parma 0% 1% 72% 14% 4% 1% 5% 3% 0% 100%
Florence 0% 0% 81% 9% 4% 6% 0% 0% 100%
Rome 1% 2% 71% 16% 7% 1% 1% 1% 100%
Palermo 2% 3% 65% 16% 4%   9% 1% 0% 100%
¹PD included also the 2013 votes for Democratic Center.
²PDL included also the votes for the other components of the coalition: Northern League, FDI, 
The Right, Big South-Mpa, Mir, and the List of Retired.
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The Italian party system between change and 
stabilisation on new basis
Alessandro Chiaramonte and Vincenzo Emanuele
29 May 20141
The Italian party system since few years has entered into a state of fast 
deinstitutionalization2 (Chiaramonte and Emanuele, 2014) characterised by 
the dealignment between parties and voters and thus by a high volatility of 
voting behaviour (and of nonvoting). Striking evidence for this was provided 
at the 2013 general elections. The Five Stars Movement (M5S) has outnum-
bered the mainstream parties collecting eight million and a half new voters. 
We have received further confirms for this trend at the 2014 European elec-
tions, which are undoubtedly deeply affected by domestic political dynamics, 
although they are clearly not general elections. 
After the crushing electoral result of 2013, it could have been expected a 
consolidation of the electoral results or a return to the previous status quo. The 
first hypothesis would have foreshadowed a sort of “re-institutionalisation” of 
the party system on different basis with respect to the past and therefore far 
from the typical bipolar structure of the Second Republic. The second hypoth-
esis would have instead characterised the 2013 results as a sporadic, as a kind 
of temporary deviation from an established political track. None of the two 
hypotheses hold at the empirical test even taking into account the different 
stakes, the different turnout levels, and the different electoral system between 
the European and the national elections. In fact, the electoral strength of the 
main political parties has been newly and profoundly affected although it did 
not reverse to the pre-2013 status quo condition.  The M5S has indeed seen its 
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
2 See Huntington (1968) on the concept of deinstitutionalization. For a specific reference 
to deinstitutionalization of party systems, see Casal Bertoa (2014).
112
Alessandro Chiaramonte and Vincenzo Emanuele
electoral support slightly reduced, but collecting 21% of the votes, it has reaf-
firmed its considerable role in the Italian party system. The centre right has 
managed to preserve about the same share of votes obtained the previous year, 
although divided and lacking a common political perspective, especially be-
cause of the criteria of proportional representation in the European electoral 
system. The Democratic Party (PD) has considerably increased its electoral 
support both in absolute terms (2.5 million votes more) and in percentage 
terms (+15.4%). Therefore, it was able to overcome the 40% threshold previ-
ously achieved only by three political parties in the national elections (Chris-
tian Democracy in 1948, 1953, and 1958). Conversely, Mr. Monti’s European 
Choice has fallen below the 1% starting from the 10% registered at the last 
2013 general elections. 
A set of indicators will be employed to emphasise the features of the new 
party system and to measure the extent of the change compared to the past. 
The first element to be considered is clearly the index of volatility, measuring 
the net aggregate change in the votes between two successive elections (Ped-
ersen, 1979; Bartolini, 1986). This index can be measured by summing the 
percentage differences of the vote shares obtained by political parties between 
one election and the following one. Volatility is thus a measure of stability 
(and instability) of a political system. In the last 20 years, the value of the 
index of volatility has followed a swaying pattern, reaching for two times in 
critical elections3 impressive values (1994 and 2013), to decrease in the central 
phase (1996–2008) of restructuring of the party system it has emerged after 
1994. Table 1 shows the values for the index of total volatility computed from 
the comparison of the 2013 national elections and the 2014 European ones 
and then between the latter and the 2009 European elections. The value of net 
aggregate change that is produced by comparing the two European elections 
is extraordinary high (35.2) reproducing the record value registered between 
the 2008 and the 2013 general elections.4 Between 2009 and 2014, our sys-
tem has changed considerably for at least three reasons: the appearance of the 
M5S, the process of fragmentation involving the Italian right and specifically 
the People Freedom’s Party (PDL), and the opposite process of concentration 
of the votes on the PD (with the disappearance of the IDV). The most sig-
nificant evidence is provided by the volatility index from the comparison be-
tween 2013 and 2014: in only one year, the change in volatility has been 18.2%. 
This value would be deemed explosive in other political systems. Compared to 
the “electoral earthquake” (Chiaramonte and De Sio, 2014) produced one year 
3 On the concept of “critical elections,” see Key (1955).
4 On this point, see Chiaramonte and Emanuele (2013, 99).
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ago, the most significant change involved the expansion of the PD and the 
simultaneous shrinkage of the centre political pole. In fact, the high value of 
the index of block volatility (15.7%) shows that almost the whole change in the 
vote shares depends on the shifts between blocks rather than among parties 
within them. CISE has performed an analysis of electoral flows in various cit-
ies confirming that the two processes are in fact connected: Renzi managed to 
acquire the electorate previously supporting Mario Monti without losing the 
support from the left (Tsipras, Greens, and Idv hold the same amount of votes 
obtained by Left and Freedom and Civic Revolution in 2013, namely, remain-
ing in a marginal political position) and thus bringing the PD towards the 
centre of the political system. The PD is now a centre-left party that can poten-
tially dominate the system (although it might be too early to advance such an 
interpretation). To be safe, its two oppositions (Grillo and Berlusconi) cannot 
find a common ground, and even within the right wing, it looks quite unlikely 
the aggregation of the various political areas (Northern League, Brothers of 
Italy, Forza Italia, and the NCD-UdC). 
A further indicator signals the level of “de-structuring” beyond the ex-
tremely high values of electoral volatility. This is represented by the rate of 
innovation in political parties, measuring the vote shares obtained by new 
political parties, or electoral lists associated with symbols and denominations 
not available for the previous elections. This second aspect relates to the vola-
tility on the political supply side, and it is quite commonly observable in the 
Italian case. The instability in the system is thus produced by this volatility of 
the supply joint with the volatility of the demand side (voters’ electoral choic-
es). In 2014, the vote share for “new” political parties has been 31.4% higher 
than in 2013 while the increase compared to 2009 reaches even the 52.5%, 
especially due to the contribute of the M5S. In other words, political parties 
older than five years collect less than the half of total votes. 
If the volatility index and the rate of political innovation confirm the his-
torical change, other indicators show a reversal in the trend with respect to 
the recent past. The unprecedented success of the PD brings back the index of 
bipolarism to the values registered in 2009 (62%), following the plunge to 51% 
in 2013. More than six out of 10 votes flowed to the two major parties, a value 
that is comparable to those observed for the other European democracies. 
Conversely political fragmentation, a historical malaise afflicting the Italian 
party system, results quite moderate. The effective number of parties (Laakso 
and Taagepera, 1979) provides us a synthetic measure of the number of parties 
in the electoral arena. The indicator is particularly effective to provide a count 
of the political parties while taking into account their electoral strength. For 
instance, in a perfect two-party system and the two lists obtaining both 50% 
of the votes, the index would assume value 2. In 2014, the index equalled 4, 
with a sharp decrease with respect to the 5.3 reported in 2013 (and much 
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smaller than the record value of 7.6 reached in 1994). Contemporaneously, the 
number of electorally relevant lists (> 1%) decreases to 7, with respect to the 9 
presented in 2009 and the 10 in 2013. 
The last indicator that has been taken into account to analyse the charac-
teristics of the Italian party system is the level of territorial homogeneity in 
the political support for the various parties. The aim is to understand whether 
political parties are able to represent the interests and the preferences of vot-
ers throughout the nation or rather if their action tends to be constrained 
within smaller territorial units, thus favouring a geographically differentiated 
electoral competition.
To evaluate this aspect, it is useful to make reference to the concept of 
nationalisation of the vote. This element can be defined as the degree of ho-
mogeneity characterising the electoral support for political parties across dif-
ferent geographical units. It can be measured through the standardised Party 
System Nationalization Score (sPSNS) developed by Bochsler (2010). The in-
dex ranges between 0 and 1. Higher values represent a situation of greater 
territorial homogeneity of vote choices. At the bottom of Table 1 have been 
Table 1 – Indicators of the party system: comparing 2009, 2013, and 2014 elections
Indicators of party system
Total volatility 2014-2013 18.2
2014-2009 35.2
Block volatility 2014-2013 15.7
Rate of political innovation 2014-2013 31.4
2014-2009 52.5
Index of two-party system 2009 62.4
2013 51.0
2014 62.0
Effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) 2009 4.5
2013 5.3
2014 4.0
Number of lists with at least 1% vote share 2009 9.0
2013 10.0
2014 7.0
Index of vote nationalisation (sPSNS) 2009 0.829
2013 0.859
2014 0.868
Source: Authors’ elaboration on official data.
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reported the values of the index for 2009, 2013, and 2014. It can be acknowl-
edged a clear trend of homogenisation of electoral support. In 2009, the Ital-
ian party system appeared particularly regionalised, especially due to the 
presence of the Northern League, contributing to the decrease of the territo-
rial homogeneity of the index with its 10.2% of vote share. In 2013, the sPSNS 
increases especially for the effect of the M5S, emerging as a big national party 
receiving electoral support nationwide. Its nationalisation value is extremely 
high (0.912) while the main local party—the Northern League—fall to 4.1% 
of the votes. Notwithstanding the fact that the Forza Italia (0.877 vs. 0.916 
reported by the PDL in 2009) and the M5S (0.895) are especially capitalising 
on Southern votes, the index has further increased for the present elections. 
The reasons underlying this pattern are essentially two. In the first place, the 
PD exhibits an extraordinary degree of territorial homogeneity. This is par-
ticularly true if we consider that the main party of the left has traditionally 
concentrated its electoral support in the area formerly known as the Red Belt 
while it was particularly weak in the other areas of the country (particularly 
in Sicily and the North-East). The 0.919 value reported by the PD (with respect 
to the 0.878 registered five years ago) has only two precedents in the Second 
Republic (Forza Italia and the post-Christian Democratic Party La Margher-
ita in 2001). The second reason explaining the high level of nationalisation of 
the European vote is the decreasing local character of the electoral support for 
the Northern League. The main Italian regionalist party has in fact presented 
its electoral lists in all the Italian electoral districts, reporting a moderate suc-
cess also outside of its traditional Northern areas (2.1% in the Center and 1% 
in the Southern Islands). The party led by Matteo Salvini is characterised by a 
value of 0.524, markedly greater to the 0.403 in 2013.
In conclusion, the 2014 European elections provide us contrasting evidence 
about the rugged path undertaken by the Italian party system in the last years. 
On the one hand, a reducing fragmentation and an increasing nationalisation 
lead us to the consideration that a further deinstitutionalisation of the party 
system linked to the atomisation of its constitutive elements and the centrifu-
gal territorialisation of the electoral support seems unlikely. On the other, the 
enduring volatility in voting behaviours leads us to exclude the hypothesis of 
a (incipient) reinstitutionalisation. The process of change undertaken by the 
party system is thus still ongoing and in a state that does not allow to foresee 
its outcome. 
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Where does Renzi’s victory come from?
Lorenzo De Sio
3 June 20141
Where does Renzi’s victory come from? Most analyses presented in the af-
termath of the elections have essentially focused on the description of Demo-
cratic Party’s success: dealing with its cross-class character, with its ability to 
increase its support in the Northern areas of the country (and especially in the 
North-East, so far the Achilles’ heel of PD), and so on and so forth. Nothing 
has been hypothesised about a possible explanation of this success. How has it 
been possible, for a party achieving 25% of vote share only last year, to reach 
more than 40% of the votes in the EP elections, traditionally favouring anti-
establishment parties? It is true that its renewed leadership played a role. But 
what is crucial among the various elements differentiating Renzi’s PD from 
the one led by Bersani?
Two possible strategies
My effort here aims at advancing an explanatory hypothesis grounded on 
few theoretical considerations and some piece of data: in particular, data from 
the “Issues, leaders and priorities” survey conducted by the CISE (through 
CAWI methodology2) in the first week of May 2014. 
The theoretical argument is straightforward: parties and leaders can at-
tempt to undertake two different strategies in order to aim at electoral success.
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
2  The sample collected in the survey consists of 1,600 respondents’ representative of the 
Italian voting age population by gender, age, and geographical area. Weighing is per-
formed by sociodemographic and political variables. The interviews have been collected 
between the 29th of April and the 9th of May 2014.
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1. The first strategy consists of focusing on divisive issues. The choice may fall 
on issues like same-sex marriages or tax cuts (which imply welfare cuts). 
Such issues usually divide public opinion between supporters and oppo-
nents. On such divisive issues, parties typically adopt positional strategies: 
they give prominence to that issue, by advertising their position, if they 
assess that they have a favourable position on the issue. In general, parties 
will choose issues satisfying three conditions: a) party supporters more 
or less agree on the party’s position; b) a large number of voters outside 
the party base also share that position, thus creating a potential electoral 
gain; and c) other important parties do not play on that same issue (De 
Sio, 2010; De Sio and Weber, 2011). Based on this model, it is possible to 
identify the most favourable issues for each party. For instance, based on 
our survey, the issues satisfying these criteria for a party like the Northern 
League (LN) are restrictions on immigration and the introduction of wel-
fare restrictions for immigrants; for the Five Star Movement (M5S) they 
are budget cuts for F-35 fighters, and the adoption of a different model of 
economic development; for the Democratic Party (PD), key issues are the 
permanence in the Euro area, and the redistribution of wealth favouring 
the poorer; and for Forza Italia (FI), a key issue is the principle that tax cuts 
should precede a harsh fight of tax evasion.
2. There is an alternative strategy. It is to focus on issues that almost unify the 
electorate and that are thus essentially considered as problems to be fixed. 
Typical examples are to promote economic growth and the creation of new 
jobs, to renew the political class and to cut the costs of public administra-
tion, and to defend more effectively the Italian interests at the EU level. On 
these issues, all political parties essentially have the same position (who 
might disagree?): notwithstanding, parties do not share the same credibil-
ity in dealing with them. These issues, technically known as valence issues 
(Stokes, 1963; Stokes, 1992) trigger a different kind of competition where 
parties focus only on issues where they are perceived as more credible than 
other parties (De Sio, 2011). Obviously, this strategy can be pursued only 
insofar as the political party is considered more credible than the others on 
at least one issue. 
The data: which strategies were possible?
Taking the two strategies into account, we can now analyse what potential 
the various political parties had at the beginning of the electoral campaign, 
by looking at our data. As for the positional issues strategy (strategy 1), we 
can argue that there were no striking differences among parties, as for all of 
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them, some key issue was available: these are represented by those issues listed 
above in this article. The only party in a disadvantaged position seemed Forza 
Italia, with the tax cuts as the only issue potentially effective. With reference to 
the second strategy (problem-solving credibility on valence issues), we already 
anticipated (in a CISE blog post published on May 9) that our respondents’ 
evaluations about the credibility of political parties were strongly favouring 
the Democratic Party. For each of 17 shared goals that are relevant for Italy 
today, we asked respondents to report which party was deemed most credible. 
In 10 out of 17 cases, the Democratic Party resulted neatly more credible than 
the other ones (outperforming the second most credible party by 10 percentage 
points). The M5S resulted the most credible party in only three goals, but also 
in these cases, the Democratic Party followed at a short distance in the ratings. 
However, the key aspect involved those issues considered by respondents 
as most important: economy and jobs (these were deemed the most important 
problems by 61% of respondents while only 26% considered a priority to cut 
the costs of the political class). On both of these economic issues, the M5S 
ranked even third, after FI; and the distance between PD and FI was 14% 
(“creation of new jobs”) or even 19% (“boost Italian economy”). As a conse-
quence, the PD resulted particularly advantaged in terms of credibility and for 
the cross-cutting nature of such credibility advantage. 
How is credibility built?
This is a key point, especially when considering that several commentators 
have pointed out the problems caused to the M5S by a too aggressive cam-
paign. The data show quite clearly that the reputation of better credibility for 
the PD was already present before the start of the electoral campaign. The rea-
son is straightforward: it is widely recognised that the campaign is essentially 
permanent (Blumenthal, 1980); all actions performed in the political realm 
contribute to the creation of a reputation of credibility and efficacy.
 From this perspective, the weak credibility of the M5S in dealing with the 
country’s problems may originate from the start of the legislature. In fact, in 
this phase, the strongly noncooperative attitudes towards the other political 
groups in the parliament and towards a potential government with Bersani 
suggested that the M5S’s priority was more electoral success and ideological 
purity rather than facing the problems of the country. An ideological attitude 
on some key issues (even refusing Renzi’s proposal to overcome the bicameral 
legislature—a typical M5S issue—essentially only because it was proposed by 
Renzi); finally, the almost exclusive attention paid to the fight against the po-
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ing in the background (and without convincing proposals) employment and 
economic issues.
On the other side, it is easy to understand Renzi’s frantic, hectic activism—
e.g., widely advertising the anticipation of his first PD staff meeting at 7:30 
in the morning—as it was oriented since the very first days as the PD leader, 
and then as prime minister, to show Renzi’s ability to make a difference with 
concrete actions, as a first example, by building a feasible agreement to change 
the electoral law and the Senate or by performing an income redistribution 
effort towards the poorer (a measure reducing taxes for low-medium-income 
employees by 80€). Finally, by paying attention to the issue of gender discrimi-
nation in the formation of the government (Renzi is the first Italian govern-
ment with a 50% gender balance among ministers) and in the electoral lists. It 
is not surprising that on this specific issue, the PD is in fact 25% more credible 
in the score than the M5S. Such effort—as we will observe shortly—has paid 
off in electoral terms.
Does credibility really matter for the vote?
Of course, a focus on this strategy would not work if voters do not take 
into account credibility for their political decisions, i.e., vote ideologically or 
decide on other reasons. As a consequence, we need to assess to what extent 
credibility-related considerations have affected vote decisions. This implies the 
estimation of various linear regression models, whose results are concisely re-
ported in Table 2. In a nutshell, this analysis enables us to evaluate the relative 
weight of various aspects on the propensity to vote for a certain political party.
In short, Table 2 shows that credibility evaluations had a (surprisingly) 
high importance. The first column reports the general model, considering es-
timates for all the political parties (including the smaller ones). In this case, 
the set of variables included in the analysis allows to “explain” about half 
(49%) of the variance in propensities to vote each political party reported by 
each respondents.3 The key points are quite simple:
1. Sociodemographic characteristics play only a very limited role (about 3% 
of the variance), confirming what is already known in the literature.
2. Voters’ long-term political predispositions (left-right self-placement; close-
ness to a political party) still represent the most important factor (30%).
3 Respondents are asked—for each party—how likely it is that “he/she will ever vote in 
the future for that party” (on a scale ranging from 0 to 10). Considering that these are 
individual scores, 49% of explained variance is quite a good result. 
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3. The fundamental finding is that—quite surprisingly for Italy—credibility 
evaluations explain a 16% of variance, namely, more than half of long-term 
political predispositions. This is undoubtedly an unprecedented fact for a 
country that after the fall of the Berlin Wall has been still ideologically 
polarised by Berlusconi’s ability to revive the fear of communists.
4. Attitudes towards specific issues—linked to strategy 1 previously ex-
posed—appear to have played only a marginal role.
The results produced separately for the three main political parties are 
even more interesting: credibility becomes even more important to explain 
individual vote propensities—higher or lower than the average—for the PD 
and the M5S (respectively 22% and 21% of the explained variance) while FI 
clearly corresponds to a more ideological profile: scores assigned to this party 
are driven essentially by previous political predispositions, with an extremely 
marginal relevance of credibility (or lack of credibility) attributed to FI in 
dealing with specific problems. 
Table 2 – Weight of various explanatory factor on the propensity to vote respectively 
for a party in general and for specific parties
 







cal area, town size, gender, age, educational 
attainment, and occupational status)
3% 4% 6% 3%
Ideology (self-placement on the left-right conti-
nuum) and closeness to a political party 30% 32% 31% 49%
Credibility evaluation for dealing with problems 16% 22% 21% 9%
Positioning on specific issues 1%   4% 2% 3%
Total variance “explained” by the model 49% 61% 60% 63%
Note 1: The model estimates the effect of credibility evaluations in a conservative way as it as-
sumes that the closeness to a political party is causally antecedent with respect to the evalua-
tion of credibility while further—omitted—statistical tests suggests the relationship might work 
the other way around. 
Note 2: The dependent variable is a Propensity-to-Vote measure for each political party 
(PTV) ranging from 0 to 10; the percentages reported in Table 2 represent the differences in 
the R-squared values between each model and the model including only the previous blocks 
of—causally antecedent—variables.
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Concluding remarks
Ultimately, credibility did matter a lot and in an unprecedented way. On 
the one hand, this gives us a reason to explain Renzi’s success (as well as the 
M5S’s neat loss).4 On the other hand, these results suggest the limited impact 
of the electoral campaign: reputations of credibility are built mainly through 
facts, and as a consequence, they are harder to change during the campaign. 
Following this perspective, the determination of Renzi to provide tangible ev-
idence of his governing activity—e.g., the €80 tax cut and the formation of a 
gender-balanced government—appear to have made a difference. Differently, 
the harsh electoral campaigning by the M5S appears to have reinforced the 
previous perceptions of the M5S’s lack of credibility, if any. 
At the same time, the evidence presented here allows to better identify 
Renzi’s challenges and problems. He was successful in transmitting the idea 
that economic and political choices are not necessarily constrained but re-
quire choices, effort, and determination: this has induced voters to carefully 
consider the criterion of credibility in problem-solving.5
 The problem yet is that credibility can be volatile; it has to be systemati-
cally and continuously consolidated with facts and results. Therefore, if Renzi 
will not maintain his pledges of discontinuity and effectiveness by the next 
general elections, his political support would be seriously undermined. A par-
tial solution to his problem might be represented by a future consolidation of 
his electoral result through the construction of an ideological and political 
profile of the Democratic Party, in a way that would secure ideological sup-
port even in case of a crisis of credibility. But this is another story.
References
Blumenthal, S. (1980). The permanent campaign: Inside the world of elite political op-
eratives. Beacon Press Boston. http://www.getcited.org/pub/101983365
4 Even neater if we take into account the fact that this was a second-order election in 
which political parties similar to the M5S should be favoured as suggested by previous 
international research (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). 
5 This is not self-evident. For instance, in those countries who have signed deals with 
international financial institutions to release financial aids, the room for manoeuvre in 
economic policies has vanished to the point that economic issues (thus including the 




De Sio, L. (2010).  Beyond “position” and “valence.” A unified framework for the anal-
ysis of political issues. Working Paper. http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/14814 
–––––––  (2011). Competizione e spazio politico. Le elezioni si vincono davvero al cen-
tro? Bologna: Il Mulino.
De Sio, L., and Weber, T. (2011). Issue yield: a general model of issue saliency based on 
party competition strategies, with an application to the 2009 EP Elections. St. Gal-
len, ECPR Joint Session Of Workshop.
Magalhães, P. C. (2014). Introduction–Financial Crisis, Austerity, and Electoral Poli-
tics. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, vol. 24 (2), pp. 125–33. doi:1
0.1080/17457289.2014.887090
Reif, K., and Schmitt H. (1980). Nine Second-Order National Elections-A Conceptual 
Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of 
Political Research, vol. 8 (1), pp. 3–44.
Stokes, D. E. (1992). Valence Politics, in D. Kavanagh (ed.), Electoral Politics, pp. 141–
62. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Stokes, D. E. (1963). Spatial Models of Party Competition. American Political Science 
Review, vol. 57, pp. 368–77.
Part 3 
The results across Europe

De Sio L., Emanuele V. and Maggini N. (eds), The European Parliament Elections of 
2014, CISE, Rome, 2014
ISBN (print) 978-88-98012-15-2 / ISBN (online) 978-88-98012-16-9
Austria: No one loses, all win?
Carolina Plescia and Sylvia Kritzinger
5 June 2014
Introduction
Austria went to the polls on Sunday, May 25 to elect 18 members of the Eu-
ropean Parliament, one fewer than in 2009 due to the European Union (EU) 
membership of Croatia. The electoral system used for the European elections 
is the same as for the national elections, but instead of 39 constituencies there 
is only a single national constituency. The electoral system is a proportional 
system with a threshold of 4% and the possibility for the voters to express a 
preference vote for a single candidate, a possibility that has been rarely used 
by Austrians (Müller et al., 2001). Finally, Austria is still the only country in 
Europe where citizens can vote at the age of 16 in nationwide elections.
The election campaign
Besides the two main parties that have dominated Austrian politics over 
the last decades, the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the Aus-
trian People’s Party (ÖVP), both currently forming a grand coalition, voters 
found three other well-known parties on the electoral ballot: two Eurosceptic 
parties, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the Alliance of the Future of 
Austria (BZÖ) and the pro-European party, The Greens (Grüne). Alongside 
these parties, four new parties contested the European elections for the first 
time: the pro-European The New Austria (NEOS) and three Eurosceptic par-
ties, Another Europe (Europe-Anders), The Reform Conservatives (REKOS) 
and the EU-Stop. The big winner of the European elections in 2004 and 2009, 
the EU-critical List Hans-Peter Martin (List HPM), decided not to run in this 
election and in fact disappeared from the Austrian political scene. Another 
notable absent is the Team Stronach, which ran for the first time in national 
elections in September 2013, gaining 5.7% of the vote share.
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While it was quite clear before the election that only the parties current-
ly represented in the Austrian Parliament (SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ, Grüne, NEOS) 
would get enough votes to send their representatives to Strasbourg, a series of 
political scandals that hit the two government parties, SPÖ and ÖVP, made 
the election outcome less predictable. Generally speaking, the electoral cam-
paign was characterised by a pervasive sense of disappointment with how the 
EU has addressed the financial and economic crisis without taking into ac-
count the social repercussions of the austerity policies; with the increasing 
inflation attributed to the euro, the alleged excessive bureaucratisation of the 
apparatus in Brussels and immigration. The anti-European campaign of the 
FPÖ focused exactly on this sense of disappointment with the EU. Meanwhile, 
the other parties focused their campaigns more on policies they will pursue in 
the European Parliament, if elected.
The results
Of nearly 6.5 million voters, less than half turned out to vote: approxi-
mately 45.4% against 46.0% in 2009; this is a rather low percentage when con-
sidering that the turnout in national elections in Austria is generally very high 
(75% in 2013), although it has been decreasing in recent years.
Preelectoral expectations about the electoral results have been all con-
firmed: only parties represented today in the Austrian Parliament have man-
aged to overcome the 4% threshold. In addition, the two ruling parties, the 
SPÖ and ÖVP, were able again to retain the majority of the votes, although 
narrowly.
The ÖVP defended its electoral record confirming itself as the first party 
in European elections with 27% of the votes; however, the party loses 3 per-
centage points and one seat compared with the previous European elections. 
Despite this small loss, the ÖVP claimed victory, having actually gained 3 per-
centage points compared with the national elections in September 2013. The 
SPÖ gained 24.1% of the vote, improving slightly its performance compared 
with the last European elections when it obtained 23.7% of the votes.
The FPÖ earns many votes compared with what they had in 2009 (19.7% of 
the vote, + 7 percentage points), doubling its seats (2–4 seats) The FPÖ secured 
the 19.7% of the votes, 7 percentage points more than the previous European 
election, doubling its seats (from 2 to 4 seats). Notwithstanding this, the FPÖ 
failed to match, albeit slightly, the result of the last national elections when 
this party got 20.5% of the vote share.
The Greens party confirmed itself fourth party in Austria, increasing its 
vote share by 4.6 percentage points when compared to the previous European 
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elections. The very good performance of the Greens is surprising in light of 
the fact that pre-election polls gave the Greens only a tiny advantage over the 
NEOS. Instead, the Greens surpass the NEOS by 6 percentage points. Mean-
while, the NEOS party, which has contested the European elections for the 
first time, obtained a remarkable 8% of the vote and an important seat in the 
European Parliament. This result helps the NEOS to establish itself as a strong 
and viable party.
No other party was able to obtain seats. It should be noted in this regard 
that the BZÖ is almost disappearing from the Austrian political scene; the 
party lost 3 percentage points when compared with the last national election 
and 4.1 percentage points since the last European elections in 2009. The re-
placement of the well-known leading candidate—the daughter of the famous 
Jörg Haider, Ulrike Haider-Quercia—with a little-known candidate during 
the election campaign certainly did not help the BZÖ. Also, the other Euro-
sceptic parties were not able to pass the 4% electoral threshold. Despite this, 












Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) EPP 27.0 5 −3.0 −1
Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) S&D 24.1 5 +0.4 +0
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) NI 19.7 4 +7.0 +2
The Greens (Grüne) G-EFA 14.5 3 +4.6 +1
Alliance of the Future of Austria (BZÖ) NI 0.5 0 −4.1 −1
The New Austria (NEOS) ALDE 8.1 1 - -
The Reform Conservatives (REKOS) NI 1.2 0 - -
Another Europe (ANDERS) NI 2.1 0 - -
EU-STOP 2.8 0 - -
Others 0.0 0 - -
Total 100 18
Turnout (%) 45.4 –0.6
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%)   4%        
Source: http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_wahlen/europawahl/2014/Wahlkarten.asx
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
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the performance of the EU-Stop party deserves to be mentioned: the party, in 
fact, obtained a significant 2.8% of the vote share. It called for a referendum to 
leave the EU, a return to the Austrian former currency, the Schilling, and the 
introduction of a Swiss-style direct democracy.
Discussion of the results
Two considerations deserve attention. First, the pro-European parties have 
won the 2014 European elections in Austria. These parties have in fact ob-
tained almost 75% of the total vote share. Second, despite the fact that all 
parties consider themselves winners of these European elections, their perfor-
mances appear less impressive if one takes into account that 18% of the votes 
of the List HPM were ‘freely available’ on the electoral market.
The two mainstream parties were able to stop, to a certain extent, the elec-
toral losses they continuously experienced over the last years. However, the 
result of the SPÖ hides that the party leaders have chosen the wrong leading 
candidate: Eugen Freund is a famous TV journalist but with no experience 
in politics and, moreover, not a party member of the SPÖ. This choice had 
repercussions on the electoral campaign at the local level with party members 
not canvassing as strongly as necessary for their party. The party leadership 
was also more concerned with national issues, such as the budget for the next 
two years, rather than the electoral campaign. Concerning the ÖVP, its lead-
ing candidate, Otmar Karas, was probably the reason why the party did not 
lose more votes and remained the strongest party in the European elections. 
Karas’ long experience and competence at the EU level surely paid off at the 
polls, with the national party contributing very little to his success.
The Eurosceptic party FPÖ rightly claims victory, but its alleged success 
is below expectations if one considers that some pre-election polls predicted 
that the FPÖ would become the first party in Austria, surpassing both the 
SPÖ and the ÖVP, a result that however, it failed to achieve. In addition, con-
sidering that the EU-critical list HPM did not run for the 2014 elections, the 
success of the FPÖ is even much less obvious. It appears as if the FPÖ failed to 
mobilise Eurosceptical voters in general and the Euro-critical list HPM voters 
in particular.
Thus, in the end, only the success of the Greens and NEOS can be labelled 
as clear electoral victories: these two parties were particularly successful 
amongst the young, urban and well-educated voters with a strong pro-Euro-
pean attitude. These two parties focused their electoral campaign on Euro-
pean issues that appear to be increasingly important to Austrian citizens, at 
least to those who turned out to vote.
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Finally, with regard to the Austrian experience with the European elec-
tions considering the level of turnout, the country surely follows the model of 
the second-order national elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980): the participation 
rate is always much lower than the national average. Still, the performances of 
the two government parties, the ÖVP and the SPÖ, and the opposition par-
ties do not follow unambiguously the second-order elections model. In detail, 
while the SPÖ is often punished by voters in the European elections (except in 
the 2014 election), the ÖVP almost always performs better during the Euro-
pean elections. Opposition parties have never gained vote shares when com-
pared with national elections, but the 2014 European elections indicate that 
this trend might be reversing.
Conclusions
Broadly speaking, one of the central issues of these European elections 
in Austria has been whether and to what extent the two mainstream parties 
would have been able to gain yet again an absolute majority of the votes. In 
fact, many wondered if there would have been a massive shift of the votes to-
wards the FPÖ. The two ruling parties were able to hold, and these European 
elections send a strong message to all pro-EU parties. Despite this, consider-
ing that many Eurosceptic voters seem to have remained at home this time, 
only the next election will determine whether Europe is considered by Austri-
ans the future or a threat.
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Estonia
The third European Parliament (EP) elections in Estonia were considered 
a preview of upcoming general elections in spring 2015, above all providing 
insight to power relations in domestic political scenery. Implementing open 
party lists as opposed to the 2009 elections enabled the heavy artillery of Es-
tonian politics to go against each other in competing for the title of the most 
popular politician in the country. Amid the low overall turnout (36.4%), the 
proportion of e-voters notably increased compared with that in 2009, reach-
ing to 11.45% of those eligible to vote and to 31% of actual voters (in 2009, 
6.5% and 14.7%, respectively). Estonia introduced electronic voting in 2007 
when it held the world’s first general elections with the possibility to cast the 
vote over the Internet and has since then successfully used e-voting in parlia-
mentary, local, as well as EP elections.
During the otherwise drab and eventless electoral campaign, the opposi-
tion Center Party attempted to undermine the trust in the Estonian e-voting 
system by initiating a media attack against it only a few days prior to the elec-
tions. The team of international experts, brought in by Center, criticised the 
“serious security vulnerabilities” of the system, with the party then request-
ing its immediate cancellation. These accusations were publicly announced 
unconstructive and politically loaded, and the voting procedure went on to 
take place as planned. The social liberal Center Party has been long known 
to oppose e-voting, claiming that using it leads to politically biased results 
by structurally favouring some parties over the others. No scientific evidence 
has been found to support this claim (Vassil, 2014). Ultimately, the campaign 
against e-voting failed and roughly twice as many people as in previous EP 
elections voted electronically, showing their support towards the system.
Somewhat unexpectedly, the winner of the elections was the ruling Reform 
Party, gaining 24.3% of total votes and claiming two of six seats allocated to Es-
tonia in the EP. The centre-right Prime Ministerial party profited from recent 
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changes in the government, having replaced their longtime coalition partner 
centre-right The Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL) with the ideologi-
cal rival social democrats just two months prior to the EP elections. Although 
most preelection public opinion polls predicted the victory to the opposition 
Center Party, the latter seems to have failed to mobilise their voters. Tradition-
ally known to be more popular among the Russian minority, Center is further 
reinforcing its image as a party for Russian speakers. The only Member of the 
European Parliament (MEP) elected from the Center Party, an ethnic Russian, 
Yana Toom, has previously evoked wide public reaction with her radical state-
ments towards Estonia. To the surprise of many, the longtime leader of Center, 
Edgar Savisaar, did not get elected. The largest opposition party seems to be 
losing touch with its Estonian voters, which has likely to do with ethnic divide 
among the electorate following the Ukraine crisis.
Various opinion polls indicate that voting in Estonia is typically more 
candidate- than party-oriented. Support can be found from the fact that the 
second popular politician right after the recently resigned Prime Minister 
Andrus Ansip is the independent candidate Indrek Tarand. Despite a more 












Estonian Reform Party (ERe) ALDE 24.3 2 +9.0 +1
Estonian Center Party (EK) ALDE 22.4 1 −3.8 −1
The Pro Patria and Res Publica Union 
(IRL) EPP 13.9 1 +1.7 +0
Social Democratic Party (SDE) S&D 13.6 1 +4.9 +0
Indrek Tarand (independent candidate) G-EFA 13.2 1 −12.6 +0
Others 12.6 0
Total   100 6     0
Turnout (%) 36.4% +7.5
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) none
Candidates are elected using PR system in one national electoral district. Seats are allocated 
using the d’Hondt formula. As opposed to 2009, the EP elections in 2014 in Estonia were 
held using the open party lists.
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
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modest result than in the 2009 election, 13.2% of votes firmly ensured Tarand 
a seat in the EP. Large support for independent candidates is generally not a 
widespread phenomenon in party-centred Europe but has been considered 
voting for an “informal opposition” in Estonia. Although many other coun-
tries face protest voting through the rise of right- or left-wing extremes or 
Eurosceptics, it has been argued that Estonian voters rather punish the in-
cumbent by voting independent in second-order elections (Ehin and Solvak, 
2012). While the relative victory this time was gained by the incumbent, vot-
ers’ strong support for independent candidates does indicate an ongoing frus-
tration with party politics.
Latvia
The overall election results in Latvia signal widespread support to incum-
bent government parties and satisfaction with government policies, despite 
persisting difficulties in the aftermath of financial crisis. Very low election 
turnout (30.04%), however, is a serious cause for concern and sends out a clear 
message that Latvian voters consider EU-level issues a distant second to do-
mestic politics.
The firm winner of the elections is the centre-right Prime Ministerial party 
Unity, receiving 46.2% of all votes and yielding four of eight seats in the EP. 
The overall vote share of Unity rose by approximately 15% compared with 
that in the 2009 elections, although because of the formula by which MEP 
mandates are allocated in Latvia, this did not result in more seats. Keeping 
in mind the low turnout, it must still be stressed that Unity kept but did not 
gain a lot more votes compared with what they had in 2009 when looking at 
absolute numbers. Unity’s electoral campaign was run on the basis of eco-
nomic growth. Party leadership has emphasised the necessity to continue the 
present-day governmental policies of austerity and fiscal discipline, underlin-
ing this as the best way to preserve economic growth and reduce unemploy-
ment. Similar with Estonia, in Latvia as well, the popularity of party leaders is 
considered one of the reasons for its success.
Unity’s coalition partner, National Alliance, remained a distant runner-
up, receiving just over 14% of votes and getting one seat in the EP. Just like 
Unity’s, the vote share of National Alliance has increased since 2009 but did 
not result in more mandates. With only 6% support predicted in most pree-
lection polls, the overall performance of National Alliance comes as a bit of 
a surprise. The reason behind the success might be the prevailing anxiety in 
Baltic states over the events in Ukraine. The right-wing National Alliance has 
earned a reputation as always taking a hard stance against Russia and has 
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based their electoral campaign on a wide array of security issues, ranging 
from energy security (i.e., the need for the European Union [EU] to have a 
unified energy policy) to tougher foreign policy and the need to strengthen 
the EU’s Russia sanctions over the annexation of Crimea. The Latvian party 
system is characterised by ongoing friction between ethnic Latvians and Lat-
vian Russian speakers (Pabriks and Stokenberga, 2006), and National Alli-
ance seems to have managed to turn the security issues into electoral gain. 
The third partner in Latvian incumbent coalition government, the agrarian 
Union of Greens and Farmers, received 8.3% of the votes and is entering the 
EP for the first time.
The main losers of the elections in Latvia were the parties supported by the 
Russian minority. The largest party for Russian speakers and currently also 
the largest party in the national parliament, Harmony Center, received just 
over 13% of the votes (6 points less than that in 2009) and Latvian Russian 
Union 6.4% (3 percentage points less than that in 2009), both ending up with 
one seat in the EP. The result is even more unexpected since the leftist Har-
mony Center was predicted high numbers in the preelection polls, now leav-
ing the party wondering why it failed to mobilise its electorate. Many experts 












Unity (V) EPP 46.2 4 +15.4 +0
National Alience (NA) ECR 14.3 1 +6.8 +0
Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS) N/A 8.3 1 +4.5 +1
Harmony Center (SC) S&D 13.0 1 −6.5 +0
Latvian Russian Union (LKS) G-EFA 6.4 1 −3.2 +0
Others 11.8 0
Total   100 8     0
Turnout (%) 30.04% −23.4
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) none
Candidates are elected using PR system in one national electoral district. Seats are allocated 
using the highest averages (d’Hondt) formula.
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
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attribute Harmony Center’s failure to the dominance of the topic of Ukraine 
crisis in Latvian domestic political debate.
Lithuania
In Lithuania, the EP elections were somewhat overshadowed by the second 
round of presidential elections taking place on the same day. This prompted 
a notably higher electoral turnout than in other two Baltic states (44.91%). 
Although the largest proportion of votes and 6 of 11 MEP positions went to 
incumbent coalition parties, the actual winner of the elections by a narrow 
margin was a conservative Homeland Union, currently in opposition in the 
national parliament. Receiving 17.4% of the votes ensured the opposition par-
ty two seats in the EP. Coming in a close second was the Prime Ministerial 
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party with 17.27% of the votes and two seats. 
These two were followed by the Liberal Movement (16.5%) and right-wing Or-
der and Justice Party (14.3%), receiving two mandates each. The remaining 
three seats were divided between the leftist-populist Labor Party, Coalition—
the party representing local Russian and Polish minorities—and the agrarian 
Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (12.8%, 8.1% and 6.6%, respectively). 
The latter is entering the EP for the first time.
Prior to the elections, the incumbent coalition parties ran rather similar 
campaigns on the basis of more socially responsible policy, ending auster-
ity measures imposed by the previous government and vowing to get more 
EU structural funding to Lithuania. Order and Justice demanded a popular 
referendum on whether or not Lithuania should adopt euro (Lithuania will 
join the Eurozone on the January 1, 2015), whereas the party Coalition em-
phasised issues related to ethnic minorities. The ethnicity question, however, 
is not nearly as polarising in Lithuania as it is in Latvia or Estonia due to dif-
ferent national composition, broad citizenship opportunities and favourable 
legal framework (Jurkynas, 2004).
The relative proximity of coalition parties’ platforms resulted in the fact 
that during the second round of the presidential elections, incumbent par-
ties rallied behind Zigmantas Balcytis, a presidential candidate of the ruling 
Social Democratic Party and also a number one candidate on the party’s EP 
elections list. The opposition parties Liberal Movement and Homeland Un-
ion supported the incumbent president Dalia Grybauskaite, who, in turn, 
expressed her indirect support for these parties in the EP elections. The rela-
tive success of the two opposition parties in the EP elections came as a bit 
of a surprise but Grybauskaite’s victory in presidential elections with a fair 
margin would allow speculating that a substantial share of her electorate also 
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expressed their support for the opposition candidates who had backed her 
presidential bid. Furthermore, the general tendency in Baltic States in these 
EP elections points to the fact that centre-right parties have managed to mo-
bilise their electoral base better than their competitors on the left side of the 
political spectrum.
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Homeland Union (TS-LKD) EPP 17.4 2 −8.3 −2
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party 
(LSDP) S&D 17.3 2 +1.3 −1
Lithuanian Liberal Movement (LRLS) ALDE 16.5 2 +9.1 +1
Order and Justice (TT) EFD 14.3 2 +2.0 +0
Labor Party (DP) ALDE 12.8 1 +4.0 +0
Coalition (K) ECR 8.1 1 −0.3 +0
Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union 
(LVZS) N/A 6.6 1   +4.8 +1
Others 7.0 0
Total 100 11 −1
Turnout (%) 44.91 +26.3
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) none
Mandates are allocated proportionally in one national electoral district, to all the lists that 
received more than 5% of the votes using the method of largest remainders (Hare method).
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
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Belgium: Far beyond second order
Tom Verthé
30 May 2014
In Belgium, the elections for the European Parliament (EP) have in the 
past always been held together with the regional elections. Because of this 
particularity, the European elections have long since been considered second-
order elections in Belgium (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Van Aelst and Lefevere, 
2012). Because of the split in the party system since the ’70s, the regional elec-
tions in Belgium are clearly a first-order election since, for the larger part, 
there is no difference in terms of voting population and party offer between 
the regional and federal elections (Russo and Deschouwer, 2014). Federal (and 
even European) elections in Belgium are—at least from an institutional and 
organisational perspective—almost entirely regional (see the additional note 
under Table 1 for a more detailed description of the electoral system used 
for the European election). Another reason for its first-order character is the 
absence of a link between the regional elections and the federal government 
formation (Schakel and Jeffery, 2013).
The campaign
All of this holds for the period up to 2014. On May 25, however, Belgium 
went to the polls for three elections instead of two. As a result of the sixth state 
reform by the Di Rupo government, the federal, regional and European elec-
tions will from now on always be held on the same day. For this reason, the 
federal elections will be held every five years, instead of every four, to match 
the European election cycle. In case the federal government is prematurely 
toppled, new national elections can be held, but the resulting government can 
only stay on until the next European election and will then automatically have 
to resign.
Belgians thus voted not only for the European and regional parliaments 
but also for the federal one. This is an extremely important difference know-
ing that the last federal elections took place when the government fell in 2010 
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and the resulting coalition negotiations took no less than 541 days, an abso-
lute world record.
In the 2012 municipal elections, the Flemish nationalists of the New Flem-
ish Alliance (N-VA) scored big in Flanders (the northern, Dutch-speaking 
part), and the preelection polls showed that they would easily become the big-
gest party in Flanders this time around as well and even continue to grow 
bigger. The incredible rise of N-VA has raised serious concerns for the feasibil-
ity of the next federal coalition formation. It was feared that their continued 
success would test the limits of the Belgian federal construction. The entire 
campaign was thus dominated by the federal election and what would happen 
with the postelection coalition negotiations, overshadowing even the regional 
elections. The European one came third in line, and at quite a distance. Stat-
ing that the European election served as a third-rate election (Irwin, 1995) is 
not an exaggeration. Europe was almost completely absent from the run-up to 
the elections. Apart from the obligatory television debate, Europe was not an 
issue in the campaign.
This might sound strange for a country that was a founding member of the 
European Union (EU) and is the host of the Commission and the EP (for three 
quarters of the time at least). Belgium also provides the president of the Euro-
pean Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and unlike the vast majority of the EU 
member states, it also had one of the official candidates for the Commission 
presidency: former Belgian prime minister Guy Verhofstadt of the Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe.
Yet, despite all that, Europe never surfaced as a full-fledged campaign 
item. Media mostly focused on the national issues, and when they did turn 
their eyes to the EU, it was mostly to assess the chances of Guy Verhofstadt 
becoming president of the Commission.
An additional reason for the absence of the EU in the electoral campaign 
can be found in the lack of anti-European parties. The only anti-European 
party that cleared the threshold is the extreme-right Flemish Interest (Vlaams 
Belang). They want to get rid of the EU because it infringes upon the right of 
individual countries to regulate (i.e., restrict) immigration and uphold their 
borders. They promote the idea of a confederation of nation-states as an al-
ternative for the EU, rather than moulding the EU into a more federal frame-
work. In 2009, there was another Belgian Eurosceptic party that got into the 
EP, List Dedecker (LDD). The party was only popular for a short while and the 
polls showed they would have great difficulty conquering a single seat in the 
federal or Flemish parliament this time around. The party president therefore 
decided to stand in just one province for the federal election, which was re-
garded as the best strategic choice. Its EP seat was thus vacated before the elec-
tions even took place. None of the other parties could profit from this though, 
since Belgium (and more specifically the Dutch-speaking electoral college) 
143
Belgium: Far beyond second order
lost one seat by default in the reshuffling because of the EU expansion and the 
new cap on the number of MEPs.
The results
As you can see from the results, there was one very clear winner. The New 
Flemish Alliance gained almost 17 percentage points and conquered one third 
of the seats in the Dutch-speaking electoral college. This is completely thanks 
to its success at the federal and regional level. N-VA’s views on Europe are 
quite blurry. On the one hand, they question whether the EU should keep 
all of the competences it currently owns, but on the other hand they claim 
that Flemish independence—their core issue—will only be possible within the 
context of a stronger EU. The EU thus only served (marginally) as an abut for 
its nationalist agenda and not as a separate campaign item. It suffices to say 
that rallying voters around a European theme does not drive their current 
success. During the campaign, they also made it clear they want to leave the 
Greens—European Free Alliance party group—but refused to say which other 
party group they would be joining after the election.
The traditional parties that made up the outgoing federal government—so-
cial democrats, Christian democrats and liberals—largely managed to stand 
their ground, which is quite remarkable in the current political climate. Apart 
from a small loss for the Flemish Christian democrats (CD&V), it seems it was 
mostly the extreme-right Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang) that paid for the 
victory of N-VA. On election night, it was even unclear for a while whether 
they would still be represented in the EP at all. In the end, it turns out they 
will, but it was a close call.
Another remarkable decline is that of the French-speaking ecologists 
(ECOLO), especially when compared with the fact that their Dutch-speaking 
sister party gained almost 3 percentage points (even though this did not result 
in an extra seat). These results also mimic the federal and regional ones. Some 
have stated that a green party that scored over 22% in the 2009 EP elections 
had no way to go but down. A probable explanation could also be found in 
the fact that they—at least in part—paid for the rise of the communist left 
(PTB-go!) in Wallonia and Brussels. These allegations will have to be verified 
by other means, but it is quite clear that the answers should not be sought at 
the European level.
The single EP seat in the German-speaking electoral college (with a popu-
lation of roughly 77,000) has been held by the Christian Social Party (CSP) 
since 1994 and remains quite firmly in their possession.
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Open Flemish Liberals & Democrats 
(OPEN VLD) ALDE 20.4 3 −0.16 =
New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) G-EFA 26.67 4 16.79 +3
Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V) EPP 19.96 2 −3.30 −1
Greens (GROEN) G-EFA 10.62 1 2.72 =
Socialist Party Different (SP.A) S&D 13.18 1 −0.05 −1
Flemish Interest (VLAAMS BELANG) NI 6.76 1 −9.11 −1
Labour Party (PVDA+) − 2.4 0 1.42 =
List Dedecker (LDD) ECR − 0 −7.28 −1
French-speaking electoral college
Socialist Party (PS) S&D 29.29 3 0.19 =
Reform Movement (MR) ALDE 27.1 3 1.05 +1
Ecologists (ECOLO) G-EFA 11.69 1 −11.19 −1
Christian Democrats & Humanists (CDH) EPP 11.36 1 −1.98 =
Popular Party (PP) − 5.98 0 5.98 =
Belgian Workers’ Party (PTB-go!) − 5.48 0 4.32 =
Others 9.11 0
German-speaking electoral college
Christian Social Party (CSP) EPP 30.34 1 −1.91 =
Ecologists (ECOLO) G-EFA 16.66 0 1.08 =
Party for Freedom & Prosperity (PFF) ALDE 16.06 0 −4.31 =
Socialist Party (SP) S&D 15.12 0 0.49 =
Pro German-speaking Community (PRO 
DG) − 13.23 0 3.15 =
Others 8.6 0
Total 100 21 −1
Turnout (%) 89.7 –0.70
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%)   none        
Note: The 21 Belgian MEPs are elected in three separate electoral colleges: the Dutch-speak-
ing (12), French-speaking (8) and German-speaking (1) electoral colleges. These colleges 
145
Belgium: Far beyond second order
Conclusion
There have been quite some shifts at the last European elections in Belgium. 
The traditional parties making up the outgoing federal government managed 
to hold more or less steady. The bigger shifts can be found a bit more left and 
right on the ideological spectrum. Unlike for other European countries, it 
would, however, be a mistake to interpret this in the light of some anti- or pro-
European sentiments. In Belgium, the elections for the EP were never part of 
parties’ campaigns, nor were they a hot topic during any of the debates in any 
of the media. The most important cause of this is probably the coincidence of 
federal, regional and European elections. The federal and regional elections 
took precedence over the European one, which comes at no surprise given 
the recent Belgian political history. The question as to what caused these vote 
fluctuations obviously needs to be further investigated on the basis of election 
data, voter surveys,  and others, and it is possible that some part of the popu-
lation did indeed cast its vote for the EP with European motives in mind. But 
most of the answers will for sure not have to be sought at the European level. 
And if from now on the regional, federal and European elections will be held 
on the same day—as has been agreed upon—chances are the EP election will 
have a very hard time moving up from its third-rate status in Belgium.
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Bulgaria: To support or not to support the 
government in power, this is the dilemma
Sorina Soare
9 June 2014
Bulgaria, which formerly belonged to the Communist bloc, entered the 
European Union (EU) in 2007. Nevertheless, compared with the other coun-
tries of the former Warsaw Pact, the Bulgarian process of European integra-
tion was carried out with three years of delay; as emphasised by Noucheva 
and Bechev (2008), the reasons Bulgaria as well as Romania lagged behind in 
meeting the EU accession criteria had to do with a set of domestic factors, a 
tortuous democratisation process, with relevant veto players and institutional 
structures that obstructed democratic and market reforms for almost a dec-
ade. Despite the acceleration of political and economic reforms beginning in 
the 2000s, the 2005 Accession Treaty signed with Bulgaria contained a num-
ber of safeguard clauses as well as specific post-accession benchmarks and 
the monitoring system under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 
(CVM) for Bulgaria and Romania with biannual progress reports upon acces-
sion to the EU (Gateva, 2010, Trauner, 2009, Spendzharova and Vachudova, 
2012, Bechev, 2013). Seven years after obtaining the status of a member state, 
Bulgaria held its third European elections with 15 political parties, 6 coali-
tions, and 6 independent candidates competing for the 17 seats available. The 
competition involves two main actors (Rashkova, 2013): on the one hand, the 
heir of the former communist party, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), and 
on the other hand, the representative of the centre-right, the Citizens for Eu-
ropean Development of Bulgaria (GERB) party.
The results
As in all postcommunist countries, the specter of a high level of absten-
tion was hovering over the Bulgarian European elections; the adoption of a 
proportional system through preferential voting for national lists was sup-
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posed to give voters more power over which party candidates win office and 
increase voter turnout. Significantly, since the beginning of the campaign, the 
outcome of 2014 has been predicted in reference to GERB’s ability to mobilise 
voters, where the BSP electoral results seemed to be favoured in the case of 
low participation. In the end, with a higher level than the initial estimate, the 
electoral participation was 36.15%, slightly lower than that in 2009 (−1.34%) 
and definitely inferior to the EU average. The preference was expressed by 
approximately 25% of the voters, not without some confusion, as in the case 
of the BSP: the socialists’ voters ticked not only the 15th list corresponding to 
the party, but also the candidate with the 15th position in the list, the young 
Momchil Nekov, who eventually displaced the party leader Sergei Stanishev 
from the top position on the ballot.1 In the case of the Reformist Coalition, 
the preferential vote sends to the European Parliament (EP) the second name 
on the list, Svetoslav Malinov, replacing the list’s leader, former commissioner 
Meglena Kuneva, for the only EP seat the coalition won.
All in all, the centre-right party, GERB, got six seats in the EP, thereby de-
feating the current ruling BSP who only obtained four seats (-11.46% votes in 
comparison with the GERB). The remaining seven seats were divided as such: 
four seats for the BSP coalition partners from the Turkish-ethnic Movement 
for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), two seats for the recently created party led by 
the journalist-turned-politician Nikolai Barekov—Bulgaria Without Censure 
(BBT)—and one seat for the centre-right coalition of the Reformist Bloc (RB).2 
The biggest Bulgarian delegation joins the European People’s Party (EPP) (six 
GERB Members of the European Parliament [MEPs]), the four BSP MEPs join 
the S&D alliance, and the DPS mandates reinforce the ALDE group. The re-
cently created BBT still has to define the EP affiliation. Most probably, the RB 
will affiliate with the EPP.
Election campaign and the main political parties
A simple glance at the election campaign allows us to see that beyond the 
billboards with EU logos and images, the election debate was mainly framed by 
domestic issues—in particular, the performance of the 2013 born rainbow coali-
tion government, formed by the socialist BSP (within the Coalition for Bulgaria 
1  “25% of Bulgarian Voters Cast Preferential Ballot in the EU Elections”, Sofia News 
Agency, May 27, 2014.
2  Central Election Commission: Final results of Bulgaria’s May 2014 European Parlia-
ment elections”, May 28, 2014.
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with other smaller parties) and Turkish-ethic minority representatives (DPS), a 
coalition without a parliamentary majority and hence forced to rely on the radi-
cal nationalist party Ataka’s support. The lack of a clear parliamentary majority 
and the highly criticised alliance with Ataka were somehow overshadowed by 
the protesters storming the streets after the appointment of the shady Delyan 
Peevski (DPS) as the head of the State Agency for National Security. Protest-
ers called for the resignation of Peevski and the government. Antigovernment 
protesters complained about poverty, corruption and organised crime. In this 
context, the European elections appeared to be a test for the government from 










Citizens for European Development of 
Bulgaria (GERB) EPP 30.4 6 +6.04 1
Coalition for Bulgaria (KB) S&D 18.9 4 +0.4 0
Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
(DSP) ALDE 17.3 4 +3.1 1
Coalition Bulgaria without Censorship 
(BBT) NI 10.7 2    
Reformist Block (RB) EPP 6.5 1    
Alternative for Bulgarian Renaissance 
(ABV) 4.0 0    
National Union Attack (Ataka) NI 3.0 0 −9.0 −2
Others   9.2  
Total 100 17
Turnout (%) 36.15 −1.34
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) Implicit threshold – the national quota
Additional notes on the electoral system Proportional system through preferential voting for national lists in a single multimember constituency
Source: Central Electoral Commission Source: Idea Voter Turnout Data, Central Electoral 
Commission
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens– 
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
* Probably ECR (Mudde 2014)
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the very beginning. Moreover, the president of the socialists declared that if the 
coalition government had received fewer votes than the opposition, then the gov-
ernment would resign and new elections would be held by the end of 2014. In 
light of the May 2014 results, a weakened BSP seems to open the gate for a new 
period of political instability, although according to the latest statements of the 
socialists’ leader Sergey Stanishev, there is no intention to hold early elections.3
In brief, as in 2007 and 2009, national issues shaped the themes covered by 
the electoral campaign (Bechev, 2013), recalling Reif and Schmitt’s (1980) ob-
servations concerning simultaneous national elections held in each of the EU 
member nations without institutionally binding consequences on government 
or opposition policies. More specifically, for Reif and Schmitt, EU elections 
have appeared to be second-order elections from the very beginning where vot-
ers tend to cast their votes on the basis of the main political arena dynamics in-
stead of in relation to the specific context of these elections (EU-related topics). 
The Bulgarian 2014 European election shares striking features with this as-
sumption that are congruent with their lower level of participation, the brighter 
prospects for new political parties and alliances, as well as the penalisation of 
the government parties. Through the lenses of this assumption, the outcome of 
the May 25 elections was mainly crafted by a socioeconomic cleavage concern-
ing the pace of the economic management opposing the centre-right (repre-
sented primarily by the former prime minister Boyko Borisov’s party—GERB) 
to the centre-left (represented by the leading governmental party, the BSP). 
For the BSP, the May 2014 electoral competition was also a personal challenge 
for its leader—Sergey Stanishev—elected in 2012 for president of the PES. The 
BSP’s position in the head-to-head race with the GERB was weakened not only 
by its position in government but also by the challenge of a separate alternative 
left-wing ballot launched by the former socialist president Georgi Parvanov, 
Alternative for Bulgarian Renaissance Movement (ABV), whose lists were led 
by MEP Ivaylo Kalfin, Bulgaria’s Former Minister of Foreign Affairs (2005–
2009) and leader of the Bulgarian socialist delegation in the EP in 2009–2014. 
Note that Kalfio was known to be strongly critical of the BSP alliance with the 
radical nationalists of Ataka. Last but not least, circumstantial elements have to 
be taken into account such as the vote-buying scandal in the Bobov Dol mine 
(votes in exchange for investments and better working conditions).4 In the end, 
the BSP was a distant second to the GERB opposition party, whereas the ABV 
3  A. Bivol, “European elections 2014: Bulgarian socialists refuse to admit failure”, Sofia 
Globe, May 26, 2014.
4  “Bulgaria’s Prosecution Launches Probe into Bobov Dol Vote Affair”, Sofia News Agen-
cy, May 21, 2014.
151
Bulgaria: To support or not to support the government in power, this is the dilemma
failed to pass the implicit electoral threshold. As such, the undisputed winner 
of the May 25 election was the GERB, who already came in first in the Euro-
pean elections of 2007 and was the ruling party from 2009 to 2013. In line with 
these results, in the statement issued after the publication of the first official 
results, Borisov saluted the victory and boasted about the outcome of a ‘heroic 
party’ that not only had severely defeated its main domestic competitor, the 
BSP, but also its European counterpart, the PSE. Ironically, Borisov invoked 
God in order to maintain Stanishev as BSP’s leader for many more years in 
order to easily win in the next round of elections.5
Although initially estimated as making up 8% of the vote, the Reformist 
Block (RB) registered a rather fragile success, weakened not only by the head-to-
head race between the BPS and the GERB but also by the choice to let Meglena 
Kuneva to top the coalition’s lists.6 This constellation of five small conservative 
political factions is supposed to join the EPP delegation as well (one seat). Note 
that due to the electoral system, voters’ preferences replaced list leader Meglena 
Kuneva with the runner-up Svetoslav Malinov. Considering the electoral results, 
the project of a centre-right alternative seems to have an unpromising future.
Confirming the permeability of the Bulgarian party system to newly creat-
ed parties (Spirova and Rashkova, 2012), there are several new faces promoted 
by these European elections, including Bulgaria Without Censorship (BBT)—
a party created by the television journalist, Nikolai Barekov, whose main po-
litical tribune was settled by the protests against the government’s policies 
after June 2013. He uses a populist rhetoric that combines a critique of the es-
tablishment and the fight against corruption in the name of a vaguely defined 
‘capitalism and a market economy with a human face’.7 The BBT took part 
in elections in alliance with other smaller parties. Under these conditions, 
the electoral market of the nationalist parties became particularly competitive 
and the biggest loser of the elections seems to be Volen Siderov’s Ataka with a 
Russophile and Europhobic discourse.
The Bulgarian delegation in the EP also includes the four representatives of 
the Turkish minority, whose success lies primarily in the characteristics of its 
constituencies, linked to the ethnoreligious minority in Turkey.
5  “Bulgaria’s GERB to Request EPP Deputy Chair Seat—Boyko Borisov May 26, 2014”.
6  Kuneva entered Bulgarian politics in 2001 and was appointed as Minister of European 
Affairs in two consecutive governments – first under the National Movement for Stability 
and Progress (NDSV) with Prime Minister Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha from 2002 to 
2005 and then under the BSP that eventually nominated her to be the EU Commissioner 
in the end of October 2006. 




After all that has been said, in an electoral campaign monopolised by the 
head-to-head race between the BSP and the GERB and, in particular, the 
clash between their leaders, the main conclusion stresses that the interest of 
the Bulgarian voters for EU elections remains relatively low. The domestic is-
sues prevail over the EU ones. Plagued with political instability, polarisation 
and incertitude (Rashkova, 2013_b), Bulgarian politics seem to be a perfect 
breeding ground for new parties and sparkling political entrepreneurs such 
as Nikolai Barekov, who succeeded in assembling a party and sending it to 
Strasbourg in less than a year.
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European parliament (EP) elections in Croatia took place only a year after 
the special EP elections held in 2013 just before Croatia’s accession to the Eu-
ropean Union (EU). Croatian entry into the EU, unlike the accession of other 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 and 2007, was not an event 
market by palpable enthusiasm and high expectations, but rather, it was a 
market with subdued optimism or indifference. It was seen by the public both 
as a chance to change the direction of the stagnant economy and improve the 
functioning of institutions and as an inevitable development with uncertain 
prospect for the country that might not be fully prepared to take the benefits 
of membership. The first year of membership in the EU was marked by Croa-
tia’s relatively peripheral position in most important developments in the EU 
related to dealing with the fallout of the euro crisis. While affected by the Eu-
rozone crisis, Croatia is not a member of the Eurozone and its economic prob-
lems started well before the accession and are unrelated to the EU. Therefore, 
Croatia was mainly an observer in debates about response to crisis and fu-
ture directions of the EU economic governance. Furthermore, the first several 
months of membership were characterised by the dispute that the Croatian 
government had with the EU over the implementation of the European arrest 
warrant, which resulted in government humbling if not humiliating climb-
down after six months of argument with the European Commission. But in 
general, the Croatian public was neither sufficiently informed about current 
developments in the EU, nor was it informed about the debates regarding the 
future direction of the EU. As a result, EU and European questions in general 
featured very little in public debates before the EP elections.
The context
In the year after the accession, Croatian politics was characterised by per-
sistent attempts of the opposition coalition led by Croatian Democratic Union 
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(HDZ) to challenge the government and mobilise their political base through 
heavy emphasis on symbolic politics and identity issues. Leader of HDZ Tomis-
lav Karamarko relied heavily on radical nationalist rhetoric aimed at delegiti-
mising the government led by the Social Democrat Party (SDP) as ‘people who 
never wanted and never loved Croatia’ and stating that government policies are 
undermining independence of the country. Radicalisation was fuelled by the 
dispute over the introduction of the Cyrillic script, mandated by the Constitu-
tional Law on the Rights of the National Minorities, in the city of Vukovar, a 
place that is heavily symbolically loaded, being besieged and destroyed by the 
Yugoslav Army in 1991. An organisation called Headquarters for the Defence 
of the Croatian Vukovar challenged government authority and repeatedly dis-
rupted the implementation of the law, receiving substantial support from HDZ 
leadership in the process and for their attempts to collect signatures to over-
turn the provision mandating the introduction of the minority language in the 
city if the minority population reaches one-third share in the city. Radicalisa-
tion was further supported also by the referendum on the constitutional defini-
tion of marriage, which took place in December of 2013.
While main opposition parties attempted a radicalisation strategy, the gov-
ernment parties were beset by conflicts and internal division taking place in 
SDP and the second strongest member of the government coalition Croatian 
People’s Party–Liberal Democrats (HNS-LD). At times, it appeared as if SDP 
leader and prime minister Zoran Milanović is more preoccupied with fighting 
his critics and opponents within the party rather than running the govern-
ment, at times even undermining ministers in his own government. This led 
to a general perception that the government is ineffectual and directionless 
with no discernable long-term policies. In this context, a dynamic figure of 
SDP minister of finance Slavko Linić dominated the government agenda with 
his focus on fiscal discipline, until he was forced out of office by the prime 
minister just a week before the European elections. The work of other govern-
ment ministers was more or less characterised by apparent lack of coordina-
tion, fixed policy priorities and clear policy measures.
Despite aggressive attacks on the government and radicalisation strategy 
used by HDZ and its minor coalition partners, the government maintained 
slight advantage in the polls for most of the preceding year. However, com-
bined support for both government coalition led by SDP and opposition coa-
lition led by HDZ slowly declined to approximately 50%. At the same time, 
a number of new parties contesting political space out of the main left-right 
division emerged based on identity and symbolic issues. Slow decline of sup-
port for the government and persistent weak support for the opposition, as 
well as rising support for new political parties and coalitions indicated that a 
significant share of Croatian citizens cannot be still electorally mobilised with 
symbolic and identity issues based on divisions formed in the Second World 
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War and after, attitudes towards history, religion and views about the role of 
Croatia in wider political unions, which dominated Croatian politics since 
first democratic elections. This does not necessarily mean that old political 
identities based on these factors are losing their strength and the ability to 
shape political identity of citizens. But the decline of support for the left and 
the right bloc in opinion polls indicates the possibility that for a large share of 
the electorate party, choice is separated from dominant political identities of 
the left and the right, or at least that political identities are not anymore iden-
tified with parties of the left and the right coalitions so clearly.
The campaign
Before the elections, opinion polls predicted that the left and the right co-
alitions will fight for electoral support with four other parties and electoral 
coalition groups. The oldest of these emerging in 2011 parliamentary elections 
is the Labour Party. Characterised by strong left-wing rhetoric and criticism 
of past and present government policies as implementation of neoliberal eco-
nomic model, the Labour Party had close to 10% of support in opinion polls. 
The second group is a centrist group formed from a newly emerged National 
Forum Party formed by successful businessmen and medical doctors on the 
platform calling for government of experts, and what is left from the Croatian 
Social Liberal Party (HSLS), which for most of 1990s was the main opposition 
to HDZ government and which tried to establish itself as an alternative to left 
and right in previous parliamentary elections. The third group is Alliance for 
Croatia formed from Croatian Democratic Assembly of Slavonia and Baranja 
(HDSSB), a regional party that split from HDZ in 2005, taking most of HDZ 
support in the eastern region of Slavonia, and several smaller conservative 
and nationalist parties. The alliance was formed most likely with a rationale 
of increasing the likelihood for HDSSB to win a seat in the EP by aggregating 
votes from small parties on the nationalist and conservative right nationally, or 
out of its regional base. The fourth group formed just before the elections was 
ORAH (Sustainable Development of Croatia), a party of left and green orienta-
tion, formed by a former SDP environment minister Mirela Holy after she was 
expelled from the party a year ago after a conflict with the prime minister. A 
party identified by voters mostly for its leader, ORAH gained support quite 
quickly, offering disgruntled voters of the left coalition led by SDP a credible 
alternative on the left. Support for this new party grew very quickly, reaching 
more than 10% in national opinion polls just before the European elections. 
The position of the left government before the elections was further com-
plicated by the developments in SDP after Prime Minister Zoran Milanović 
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initiated a conflict with finance minister Slavko Linić and forced his resigna-
tion from the government just a week before the elections, which could only 
damage the electoral prospects of the left coalition. The position of the opposi-
tion in the preelectoral period was supported by an apparent unity of HDZ and 
its coalition partners, by the abandonment of the radicalisation strategy a few 
months before the European elections, and by the greater shift on economic 
issues in the campaign and its political discourse. Although the campaign 
was relatively subdued, hampered by strict campaign finance regulation and 
lack of resources all parties face, HDZ was mostly able to focus their messages 
on the relative failure of the government to absorb structural funds and on 
economic issues. HDZ could also rely on efficient party organisation capable 
of mobilising a large number of activists. European issues were largely absent 
from the campaign, and domestic issues dominated campaign and electoral 
behaviour of Croatian voters. Four challengers to the left and the right coali-
tions tried to mobilise support by criticising established parties and trying to 
establish themselves as alternatives to old political actors. The already-sub-
dued campaign was suspended after the floods hit east of the country and 
11,000 people were evacuated from the affected area. At the same time, the 
focus of media shifted to floods and its consequences while parties pledged to 
stop campaigning and donate remaining funds to flood relief. Thus, in the last 
week before the elections, there was virtually no campaigning.
The results
Elections for EP in Croatia are conducted with proportional (PR) system 
where 11 seats are allocated between party lists. Voters can also indicate a 
preference for a particular candidate, but this affects the order of candidates 
only if 10% of the voters of a particular list indicate a preference for an indi-
vidual candidate.
The turnout in 2014 EP elections in Croatia was approximately 25%, were 
more than 950,000 of 3.7 million voters turned out to vote. This represents a 
significant increase from 20% turnout (780,000 voters) in special EP elections 
in 2013. While the difference in support of HDZ and SDP electoral lists in 
2013 elections was less than 6,000 votes, this time, increased turnout mostly 
benefited HDZ. Since HDZ has far stronger party organisation than other 
parties capable of more effectively mobilising its voters and it is more stable 
and has a loyal electoral base, it was in any case more likely to benefit from 
lower turnout. This result may also indicate that new party leadership after a 
significant period of turbulence and lacklustre performance managed to con-
solidate party organisation and give it a renewed sense of purpose. HDZ-led 
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coalition won more than 100,000 more votes than SDP-led coalition, ending 
with six Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to four MEPs of SDP-
led coalition. Furthermore, the SDP leader and the prime minister suffered a 
personal rebuke from voters when 48% of SDP voters cast a preferential vote 
for an SDP MEP Tonino Picula, initially placed by the party leader on the fifth 
place on the party list, propelling him to the top of SDP list of elected MEPs. 
Given that Tonino Picula is in a low-level conflict with the party leader and 
presents a calm and competent image in opposition to arrogant and combat-
ive, but not particularly effective, prime minister, this was interpreted as a 
vote of censure for the prime minister. The final Croatian MEP was won by 
ORAH, which won more than 85,000 votes and of which party leader Mirela 
Holy won more than 60,000 preferential votes. Given that Mirela Holy was 
expelled from SDP after a conflict with the prime minister after being forced 
to resign as an environment minister, the good result of ORAH and its party 
leader personally was also considered as a sign of criticism of Prime Minister 
Zoran Milanović.
The big loser of these elections is Labour Party, which failed to gain more 
voters than in previous EP elections and lost their only MEP. Alliance for 
Croatia gained close to 7% of the vote and came very close to gaining one 
MEP, whereas the coalition of National Forum and HSLS failed to gain suf-
ficient support despite strong showing in the polls and is most likely heading 
into political oblivion. The support for Labour Party, being the oldest of the 
new parties, suffered most likely because their voters did not find sufficient 
motivation to vote in elections, which were clearly not considered important 
in the national context and since they support a party that is already estab-
lished as an alternative to the left and the right in national parliament. Simi-
larly, ORAH benefited from the surge of support from voters who wanted to 
register their support for this new alternative on the left.
In conclusion
The results of the EP elections in Croatia led to a swift resignation of the 
Labour Party leader Dragutin Lesar. Given that Lesar was an efficient and en-
ergetic parliamentary performer, his resignation might have an effect on party 
support and reception of it as a credible alternative to the left and the right 
bloc. However, since he stays in parliament, Labour Party might recover their 
fortune by next elections. The elections stabilised HDZ and its support and 
gave it a new sense of confidence for parliamentary elections due in late 2015. 
Given that results were interpreted as a failure of the SDP leader and prime 
minister Zoran Milanović, and as a success of his critics, relatively weak result 
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of SDP, which after coalition partners won two MEPs, down from five won in 
2013, is likely to further tension in SDP and may even turn into a full-blown 
conflict, in which case the stability of government majority might come into 
question and new elections might take place. 
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Croatian Democratic Union Alliance 





41.4 6 +8.6 0
Social Democrat Party Alliance (SDP, 
HNS-LD, IDS, HSU) S&D 29.9 4 −2.1 −1
Sustainable Development of Croatia 
(ORAH) G-EFA 9.4 1 +9.4 1
Alliance for Croatia (Savez za Hrvat-
sku—HDSSB, HRAST, HSP…) 6.9 0 +3.9 0
Labour Party (Hrvatski laburisti – stran-
ka rada)
GUE-N-
GL 3.4 0 −2.4 −1
Others 9.0 0
Total 100 11 −1
Turnout (%) 25.3
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%)   5%        
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
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Cyprus: Disapproval through abstention in the 
European Union’s remotest ‘outpost’
Konstantinos Athanasiadis
30 May 2014
Abstention ruled supreme in the European elections held on the divided 
island of Cyprus (divided between the Republic of Cyprus and the so-called 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus recognised only by Turkey). Accord-
ing to the Ministry of the Interior, more than half of the electorate (56%) 
(Ministry of the Interior, 2014) opted for abstention from the electoral pro-
cess as a token of growing discomfort against the political system and the 
austerity measures put forward since last year. Paradoxically though, the 
high abstention rate provided a crucial lifeline to the political system of Cy-
prus as it enhanced the rather meagre results of almost all political forma-
tions on the island.
The results
In particular, the governing centre-right party of the Democratic Rally 
(DISY) managed to hold its ground despite the unpopular reform package 
implemented as part of the rescue plan between Cyprus and the European 
Union (EU). Thus, the party of the currently serving president of the Re-
public of Cyprus (Cyprus has a presidential system), Nicos Anastasiades, 
gained 37.8% of the votes, increasing by 1.8% its share in comparison with 
the last European elections of 2009. Interestingly, this figure reflects the 
highest score achieved in the European elections for the party of the Cyp-
riot centre-right.
Yet, it should be noted that DISY was joined in this campaign by the Euro-
pean Party (EVROKO), which in the last 2009 elections received 4.2% of the 
Cypriot vote. Interestingly, EVROKO has actually ‘repatriated’ since it seced-
ed from DISY in 2004, due to the latter’s support for the island’s reunification 
plan sponsored by the then-serving UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (2004).
164
Konstantinos Athanasiadis
The former Communists of the Progressive Party of the Working People 
(AKEL) came at the second place, attaining 27% of the votes, which repre-
sented a diminution of 8 percentage points of its political influence since 
2009. Both DISY and AKEL won two seats of six that Cyprus is allotted in the 
European Parliament. Moreover, the centre-left leaning Democratic Party 
(DIKO) also saw its forces slightly diminishing in comparison with the 2009 
elections for the European Parliament (−1.5  points) as in the meantime it 
struggled to overcome internal frictions that reflected differences of opinion 
related to its participation in a coalition government with DISY (it won one 
seat). The social democratic party of EDEK secured the last seat, whilst losing 
3.8% of its 2009 share (Table 1). Finally, Symmachia Politon (Citizens’ Alli-
ance) led by Giorgos Lillikas—former foreign minister and candidate in the 
last presidential elections (2013)—failed to elect any representative gaining 
6.8% of the votes.
Ironically, the face-saving value of abstention is mirrored clearly if the 
electoral results are translated into absolute terms (number of votes gained in 
2009 elections). The conservative ruling party of DISY loses 14% of the popu-
lar vote, AKEL 35.5%, DIKO 25% and EDEK43% (Persianis, 2014).












Democratic Rally (DISY) EPP 37.8 2 +1.8 +0
Progressive Party of the Working Pe-
ople (AKEL)
GUE-N-
GL 27.0 2 −8.4 +0
Democratic Party (DIKO) S&D 10.8 1 −1.5 +0
Movement for Social Democracy 
EDEK–Green Party (KS/EDEK) S&D 7.7 1 −3.8 +0
Citizens’ Alliance (Symmachia Politon) 6.8 0 +6.8
Others 9.9
Total 100 6 _
Turnout (%) 44.0 −15.7
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%)   none        
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD=Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
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The campaign
Public discussions in the period that preceded the elections were dom-
inated by the so-called national issue—that is, the renewed effort towards 
reunification—and the struggle to overcome the effects of the financial crisis. 
Related to attempts of economic recovery is the endeavour by the govern-
ment of Cyprus to turn the country into a transit point of energy networks 
that bind together the Middle East and the EU in consistency with the latter’s 
policy of energy diversification. Hence, public discourse was captured to a 
great extent by the endeavour to extract natural gas from the Cypriot con-
tinental shelf that aims exactly at underlining the island’s geostrategic value 
for the EU. The official visit paid by US Vice President John Biden in Cyprus 
just a few days before the European elections and the results ensuing from 
it did contribute further to ‘displace’ discourse on the EU elections to the 
fringes of public dialogue.
Equally preponderant to the discussions on energy security is the impact 
of the financial crisis that badly hit the island’s thriving services’ sector. Cy-
prus has signed in March 2013 a bailout agreement with the Eurogroup, the 
European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Found (IMF) that entailed a €10 billion funding package in ex-
change for significant reforms in the banking sector, increased scrutiny over 
money laundering and privatisations that endangered the country’s status as a 
tax haven. Therefore, the debate on the role of the EU was framed also in con-
nection to the ramifications of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
and the consequences associated to it such as the rising unemployment, the 
deconstruction of the welfare state and reduced salaries.
It is against this background that the low turnout should be interpreted. 
Cypriots chose to demonstrate their disapprobation to the political system by 
turning their backs to the elections for the European Parliament. Low turnout 
should also be evaluated as a sense of dissatisfaction and injustice committed 
against the citizens of Cyprus as reflected in the painful bailout plan.
It is noteworthy that according to the latest Eurobarometer, Cypriots show 
an immense distrust to their political parties (91%), thus revealing a raging 
latent institutional crisis. Pessimism regarding the prospects of the nation-
al economy is also pervasive since Cypriots evaluate as ‘bad’ the state of the 
national economy (97%) coming second after the Greeks. Regarding the EU, 
Cypriots feel that it is responsible for the austerity (77%), whilst the vast ma-
jority (86%) expresses its reluctance whether Brussels takes into serious con-




In conclusion, the conservative Democratic Rally shines as one of the few 
examples of ruling parties that managed to increase their share in the Euro-
pean elections. Although its share in absolute numbers followed the general 
decreasing trend as mentioned above, its gains in proportional terms must be 
appraised as an indication of support for reforms and recovery by a significant 
segment of the electorate. Besides, the opposition leftist AKEL is undergoing 
a process of reorganisation that followed its defeat in the 2013 presidential 
elections, which is to be attributed partially to the controversial management 
of the national economy by the then serving leftist president of the republic, 
Demetris Christofias.
Therefore, the results of the European elections in Cyprus do not imply 
an earthquake of the magnitude observed elsewhere. Yet abstention confirms 
that Cypriots feel disillusioned with the EU, and ultimately with their political 
system. Moreover, abstention rings the bell of a looming social crisis, which 
for the time being remains latent as the Republic of Cyprus tries to tackle the 
challenges of reunification, economic recovery and energy security.
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Twenty-one Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) representing 
the Czech Republic (one MEP less in comparison with the 2009 European 
Parliament [EP] election) were elected on 23–24 May. An electoral system of 
proportional representation with closed lists, one nationwide electoral district 
and 5% threshold is applied in the Czech Republic. The D’Hondt divisor is 
used for the allocation of seats amongst political parties (Chytilek et al., 2009).
Electoral campaign
The term invisible is perhaps the best descriptor for the campaign that pre-
ceded the election. It does not mean that the political parties (and the media) 
ignored the election at all but the intensity of electoral campaign (in terms of 
number of party billboards, posters and media coverage) was much lower in 
comparison with the early general election that had taken place in October 
2013. Another important feature of the campaign was its Europeanisation. 
For the first time since the Czech Republic entered the European Union (EU), 
the vast majority of political parties focused on European issues and did not 
use the EP election as just another arena of national political contestation and 
an opportunity to attack the national government (as it was the case of the 
2004 EP election in particular). This may have been related to the fact that 
the last general election was held just seven months before the European elec-
1 The chapter has been written as a part of research project “Europe 2020: A Horizon of 
Change of the Relevant Political Actors of the Political System of the Czech Republic” 
(GA13-24657S) funded by the Czech Science Foundation.
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tion and the national government consisting of ČSSD, ANO and KDU-ČSL 
was formed not earlier than in the end of January. Having been in the office 
just a few months, the government did not pass any controversial measures 
(actually hardly any at all). Therefore, there was only limited space for protest 
voting, which is usually seen as an important motivation for voting in so-
called second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). Therefore, it is hardly 
surprising that according to an opinion poll conducted just before the elec-
tion, the EP election was perceived as ‘meaningless’ by 50% of voters (Česká 
televize, 2014). Moreover, the presence of European issues in the campaign 
did not mean that the political parties presented complex and detailed visions 
of the European integration process.
ANO, a new successful populist party founded by the billionaire Andrej 
Babiš, the latter winner of the EP election, published a manifesto full of gen-
eral valence statements best expressed by the main electoral slogan of the 
movement: ‘For Our Children to Have a Chance in Europe’. Similarly, the 
title of the ČSSD election manifesto in which the party emphasised especially 
social issues, was ‘Together in Europe’. In addition, the party wanted ‘to play 
the first fiddle in Europe’. KDU-ČSL, the old Christian democratic party, 
with the motto ‘We Protect the Czech Interests’, did not fall behind the other 
parties in this respect. Conservative TOP 09 tried to present themselves as a 
clearly pro-European party (a slogan ‘I am an European’ under the picture of 
the chairman of the party Karel Schwarzenberg clearly expresses the positive 
attitude of the party towards the EU) and persuaded the voters about the im-
portance of the EU with the slogan ‘Don’t give up on Europe’. What got sub-
stantial media attention (even abroad) was the anti-immigration campaign 
ran by The Dawn of Direct Democracy, a populist political party chaired by a 
Czech Japanese businessman, Tomio Okamura. The party ‘borrowed’ a well-
known sheep poster first used by the Swiss People’s Party. The Eurosceptic 
camp included liberal-conservative ODS and The Free. The main issue of the 
ODS campaign was the rejection of the entrance of the Czech Republic to the 
European Monetary Union. The party organised a petition against the euro 
during the campaign and managed to collect more than 40,000 signatures. 
The campaign of the libertarian Free party was also based on criticism of—in 
their words ‘Euro-nonsenses’ including not only the euro but also, for exam-
ple, the regulation of bulbs or flushing of toiletes; KSČM, usually labeled as a 
Eurosceptic party (Kopecký, 2004; Havlík, 2011), did not invest much effort 
and money into the campaign and relied on its usually very disciplined vot-
ers (Linek, 2006). All in all, the campaign preceding the election was hardly 
visible, lacking any contentious issues.
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The results
The low intensity of the campaign and its unusually high level of Europe-
anisation may have been the main reasons for the lowest turnout in the his-
tory of the EP elections in the Czech Republic. The turnout record of 18.2% 
was more than 10 percentage points lower than that in 2009, which made the 
Czech Republic the country with the second lowest electoral turnout amongst 
all member states (see Table 1; for a detailed comparison with the 2009 EP 
election, see Hloušek and Kaniok, 2009).












ANO 2011 (ANO) ALDE 16.1 4 +16.1 +4
Coalition of TOP 09 and Mayors 
(TOP 09) EPP 16 4 +16.0 +4
Czech Social Democratic Party 
(ČSSD) S&D 14.2 4 −8.2 −3
Communist Party of Bohemia and Mo-
ravia (KSČM)
GUE-N-
GL 11 3 −3.2 −1
Christian and Democratic Union 
– Czechoslovak People’s Party 
(KDU-ČSL)
EPP 10 3 +2.3 +1
Civic Democratic Party (ODS) ECR 7.7 2 −23.8 −7
Party of Free Citizens (The Free) 5.2 1 +3.9 +1
Tomio Okamura’s Dawn of Direct De-
mocracy (The Dawn) EFDD 3.1 0 +3.1 0
Others   16.7 0      
Total 100 21 −1
Turnout (%) 18.2 −10.1
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs 
(%) 5%
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of So-
cialists and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The 
Greens–European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, 




The election brought a narrow victory for ANO with Pavel Telička, a former 
member of the EU Commission, on the top of the party list. TOP 09, led by a 
former vice governor of the Czech National Bank, Luděk Niedermayer, ended as 
the runner-up. Having taken into consideration the traditionally low discipline 
of social democratic voters, 14.2% of votes (and four seats) can be interpreted 
as a success for ČSSD led by a sociologist, Jan Keller. KSČM, with MP Kateřina 
Konečná as the leader of the party list, ended on the fourth place, closely fol-
lowed by KDU-ČSL. Both the parties will be represented by three MEPs. Only 
7.7% of voters cast their votes far ODS led by MEP Jan Zahradil, which meant 
a decrease of support of the party by more than 20 percentage points since the 
2009 EP election. The Free, with 5.2% of votes and one seat for the leader of the 
party, Petr Mach, was the last political party that managed to pass the threshold. 
The Dawn did not win any seat in the EP and ended with 3.1% of votes.
Interpretation
The low electoral turnout made any substantial interpretation of the results 
hardly possible. Nevertheless, several subtle comments can be made. The result 
of just a little bit more than 16% of votes showed that the populist ANO was 
able to mobilise voters even after it entered the government. On the other hand, 
the result was disappointing for ANO, which was predicted to win up to 30% of 
votes. The pro-European campaign of TOP 09 may have played an important 
role in the success of the party, which may have been attractive to the mostly 
pro-European right-centre voters who did not agree with the Eurosceptic atti-
tudes of ODS. Nevertheless, one should mention that the success of TOP 09 was 
probably also driven by the candidacy of Jiří Pospíšil, a former ODS minister of 
justice who joined TOP 09 just few months before the election. With more than 
77,000 of preferential votes, Pospíšil became the most successful candidate in 
this respect. Almost 10% of votes and three seats for KDU-ČSL seem to be a 
big victory for the Christian Democrats. However, taking into account the level 
of turnout and traditionally high discipline of the KDU-ČSL voters, the result 
of the party could have been even better. After the fall of the cabinet led by the 
former chairman of ODS Petr Nečas in 2013, which was caused by Nečas’s and 
his wife’s corruption allegation, and after a huge slump of popularity of the 
party, almost 8% of votes for ODS signals that the party still has a small but 
stable electoral base. On the other hand, the success of the Free, who present 
themselves not only as a Eurosceptic party but also a subject “purifying” the 
right side of the Czech political space, limited the electoral renaissance of ODS. 
The success of the Free may be seen as another piece of puzzle of the undergo-
ing transformation of the right-centre part of political space in the Czech Re-
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public. The worst result of KSČM since the 2004 EP election means that even 
the communists should not take their electoral support for granted.
Conclusion
The lowest electoral turnout since 2004 was perhaps the most important 
part of the story of the 2014 election in the Czech Republic. The lack of ad-
ditional stimulus to vote with the newly formed government limiting the pos-
sibility to cast protest votes and an almost invisible campaign full of valence 
“European” statements issued by almost all political parties were probably the 
most important reasons for the fact that less than one fifth of voters finally 
participated in the election. Therefore, one can make only a few basic observa-
tions concerning the results of political parties: the populist ANO was able to 
mobilise voters even after it entered the government, and ODS retained some 
‘hard-core’ voters. ČSSD, usually having problems to mobilise voters in the 
EP elections, recorded an average result. A significant share of voters decided 
to vote for a more pro-European right-centre party (TOP 09) and also for a 
purifying right-centre Eurosceptic alternative (The Free). KSČM was not able 
to attract as many voters as it had in the past, and KDU-ČSL did not use the 
potential of a disciplined voter base.
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Denmark and Finland: (not always) a success 
for the far-right
Nina Liljeqvist and Kristian Voss
30 May 2014
Finland
Populist and European Union (EU)–critical Finns Party (PS) was expected 
to pose a serious challenge to the established parties in the Finnish election to 
the European Parliament last Sunday. Having achieved tremendous success 
in the national elections in 2011 and continuing to ride high on the Euro-
sceptic sentiments this spring, the PS aimed to increase their number of seats 
in the European Parliament from one to three, with polls having predicted 
that the party would receive as much as 21% of the votes. However, the Euro-
sceptic sensation never happened in Finland. This may be partly explained by 
the fact that the party did not have a prominent top candidate, or rather, by 
the fact that this top candidate was not charismatic party leader Timo Soini, 
who has decided to focus on domestic politics instead. PS did increase their 
support compared with the 2009 election, scoring 12.9% and consequently 
gaining one seat, but this result is obviously far from what they were hoping 
for. Instead, the Finnish electorate favoured established parties in this year’s 
European election. The liberal conservative National Coalition Party (KOK), 
which is the party of current prime minister Jyrki Katainen, kept its grip on 
the electorate with 22.6% of the votes, thereby securing the three seats it cur-
rently has in the parliament. One explanation for this success is the vote mag-
net Alexander Stubb, current minister for European affairs and foreign trade, 
who single-handedly got the party 8.6% of the vote share. Although Finnish 
elections to the European Parliament do tend to become candidate centred 
due to the use of open party lists, Stubb’s achievement is nonetheless remark-
able. As a former Member of the European Parliament (MEP) with a PhD in 
international politics and a previous career as an EU civil servant, KOK top 
candidate Stubb has added expertise and know-how to the campaign without 
making the party overly pro-European. Vis-à-vis European equivalents on 
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the centre-right, the KOK is rather less pro-Europe, including preferring a 
freer internal market from bureaucratic red tape and opposing debt sharing 
and the transformation of the EU into a military alliance.
The four coalition partners of KOK had less of a successful election. The 
biggest disappointment might be the Social Democrats (SDP), having failed 
terribly at mobilising its voters, despite taking a pragmatic position insisting 
on improvements to the EU, including the continuation of free and fair trade 
and opposing joint liability of cross-country debts, in addition to typical so-
cial democratic positions. Expecting to increase its share of votes thanks to a 
revamped party leadership, the SDP instead lost over 5 percentage points to 
garner only 12.3%, a disappointing result for a party that averaged 20% of the 
votes in the 1990s. Despite this, the party managed to secure two seats in par-
liament. The other coalition party that self-reportedly sits on the centre of the 
political spectrum, the Green League, also lost several percentage points since 
2009, and now enjoys only 9% of the vote share, thereby losing one of its two 
seats. The situation looks better for the liberal-centrist coalition partner, the 
Swedish People’s Party, which is intensely pro-Europe. Despite low polls this 
spring, the party managed to hold on to their one seat in the Parliament by se-
curing just under 7% of the votes. The other coalition partner on the right, the 
Christian Democrats, suffered a bittersweet election as it lost its one seat in the 
parliament despite increasing its vote share by one percentage point to 5.2%.
The situation is not bleak for all parties of the political centre. Opposition 
party the Centre (KESK) had an impressive election as it received 19.7% of 
the votes, thereby easily surpassing both the PS and the SDP. Suffering from 
internal divisions on the issues of European integration, the party offers 
voters a homespun mix of pro- and anti-Europe policies. On the one hand, 
it favours a more practical and pragmatic cooperation with subsidiarity as 
an important principle, especially for the issue of agriculture. On the other 
hand, KESK advocates returning the EU to more of its supposed original role 
as promoting free trade and peace, which is also the rhetoric of many parties 
expressing elements of Euroscepticism. With this combination of messages, 
KESK managed to keep up the positive wave the party has been riding lately, 
as it came fourth in the 2011 general election, third in the recent local elec-
tion, and now emerges as the second largest Finnish party represented in the 
European Parliament. In addition, the Left Alliance (V), which left the ‘six-
pack’ cabinet in March, had a remarkable election as it won back votes lost 
in the 2009 election. With an increase by 3 percentage points, the party now 
enjoys over 9% of the vote share and one seat in the parliament. Although 
V leader Merja Kyllönen regrets that the success of the left has happened at 
the expense of the SDP, as was indeed the case in large parts of Europe, she 
is satisfied about the party’s comeback in the political arena in Finland, as in 
Europe at large.
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Cannibalism on the left flank aside, it may be said that the Finnish elec-
tion contains few political sensations. Despite an absolute loss of votes, the 
five-party cabinet is performing surprisingly well in a context where the po-
litical elite has received a severe bashing from the public. In neighbouring EU 
member states Sweden and Denmark, government parties performed much 
worse, and while the left camp in Finland did not do as well as its Swedish col-
leagues, the real underperformer was the nationalist PS. It is underperform-
ing as three major tendencies in Finnish politics theoretically should have 

















Party (KOK) EPP 22.6 3 −0.6 +0   23.2 3
Centre Party (KESK) ALDE 19.7 3 +0.7 +0 19 3
Finns Party (PS) EFD 12.9 2 +3.1 +1 9.8 1
Social Democratic Par-
ty (SDP) S&P 12.3 2 −5.2 +0 17.5 2
Green League (VIHR) G-EFA 9.3 1 −3.1 −1 12.4 2
Left Alliance (V) GUE-N-GL 9.3 1 +3.4 +1 5.9 0
Swedish People’s Party 
(SFP) ALDE 6.7 1 +0.6 +0 6.1 1
Christian Democrats 
(KD) EPP 5.2 0 +1.0 −1 4.2 1
Others n/a 2 0 +0.1 +0 1.9 0
Total 98.0 13 – 100
Turnout (%) 40.9 +0.6
Legal threshold for 
obtaining MEPs (%)   none              
Note: The 13 seats are distributed in proportional elections, using the open list d’Hondt 
method, where voters vote for an individual, but the individual’s vote is counted primarily for 
the party and secondarily for the candidate. The entire country is a single electoral constitu-
ency without legal threshold.
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
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worked in its favour. First of all, there is a strong Eurosceptic trend in Europe, 
as indeed in Finland. With six extraparliamentary parties fighting for seats 
in the European Parliament on the basis of EU critiques, several flavours of 
Euroscepticism were on the menu. Second, compared with PS’s previous elec-
tion results in the national election in 2011 in which the party experienced a 
significant success, many expected the PS to maintain this momentum. With 
national elections usually focused on national issues and not the EU, it did 
not appear far-fetched to expect the PS to improve in this arena. In addition, 
the PS campaign has been absent of any overt blunders. Third, the presence 
of the euro(crisis) should play in their hands. One might therefore think that 
it would be in Finland that the far-right will advance and not in the Nordic 
neighbours in the west. Instead, Finnish voters defied this trend and rewarded 
parties on the centre-right and far-left.
Denmark
This stands in particular stark contrast to the election results in Denmark, 
where the far-right Danish People’s Party (DF) undoubtedly secured an over-
whelming victory to almost double its vote share. With 26.6% of the votes 
and four of Denmark’s 13 seats, DF emerges as the largest Danish party in 
the European Parliament. Morten Messerschmidt, DF’s top candidate and the 
Danish politician to receive the most personal votes in history, interpreted the 
victory as follows: ‘I see it as a clear indication that the Danes want the EU 
back on track . . . Around Europe we are some democratic, civilised but EU 
critical parties . . . who now try to steer back the EU to what it is all about.’ For 
the DF, as for the Swedish Sweden Democrats, the EU is all about the inner 
market, which they both favour and wish to have full access to. However, the 
European project becomes uncomfortable when it starts regulating issues that 
they see as national. Hence, the anti-immigration and pro–law and order DF 
laments the decline of Danish sovereignty, or the increase in the power of the 
EU regarding foreign policy, social welfare, or immigration, and particularly 
views open borders as having led to a significant increase in crime committed 
by EU citizens from Central and Eastern Europe.
The second largest party is the Social Democrats, party of Prime Minis-
ter Helle Thorning Schmidt, and comparably received 19.1% of the votes and 
three seats, which is a decrease by 2%. This is a disappointing result, but not 
as disappointing as that of the Liberals, the party of government from 2001 
to 2011 that suffered a relatively humiliating decline to 16.7% of the votes and 
two seats, prompting a lot of soul searching. The Conservative People’s Party 
and Socialist People’s Party both presumably lost votes to the DF, respectively 
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declining in support to 11% and 9.1% of the votes and one seat each. The only 
other successful parties included the left-of-centre and government party the 
Social Liberals and right-of-centre Liberal Alliance, as both increased their 
vote shares by over 2%. Yet this was only enough for the former to reenter the 
European Parliament for the first time since the 2004 election. Finally, cross-
political People’s Movement against the EU managed to maintain its support 
of over 8% and one seat, although this result pales in comparison with the 
great successes achieved in elections in the 1980s, as the far-right has taken 
control of Euroscepticism.
In other words, while established parties are overrun by the far-right in 
relatively well-off Denmark, we see a different picture in euro crisis–stricken 
Finland. With a closer look at these cases, however, it is not very surprising. 
In Denmark, as in probably most European countries, the socioeconomic 
left-right dimension is increasingly overshadowed by a different dimension, 
namely, that of the international versus the national. Either you consider Eu-












Danish People’s Party (DF) EFD 26.6 4   +11.3 +2
Social Democrats (S) S&D 19.1 3   −2.4 −1
Liberals (V) ALDE 16.7 2   −3.5 −1
Socialist People’s Party (SF) G-EFA 11 1   −4.9 −1
Conservative People’s Party (K) EPP 9.1 1   −3.6 +0
People’s Movement against the EU (N) GUE-N-GL 8.1 1   +0.9 +0
Radical Liberals (RV) ALDE 6.5 1   +2.2 +1
Liberal Alliance (LA) NI 2.9 0   +2.3 +0
Total   100 13     –
Turnout (%)   56.4     −1.3  
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) none        
Note: The d’Hondt method of proportional representation is used. The country is one single 
constituency.
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
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rope as a possibility or you consider it as a threat. Danish People’s Party mas-
ters the art of capitalising on this development, whereas traditional parties do 
not. To this, there is a related evolution regarding how parties cater to voters’ 
Eurosceptic sentiments. There is considerable movement across the left-right 
spectrum here. In the 1970s, 80s and even 90s, it was the left, or centre-left, 
in Denmark that provided voters with an EU critical alternative to the pro-
European centre and centre-right. The first MEP of the Progress Party, which 
the Danish People’s Party split from in 1995, was Mogens Camre, who was an 
Member of Parliament (MP) for the Social democrats in the early 1970s and 
voted against European Community (EC) membership along with several 
other social democrats. As the European project shifted, however, bringing 
about change that appealed to the left camp, the opposition against the EU 
shifted. And voters, and indeed partisans as Camre, followed it over there. 
With the decline of cross-party People’s Movement against the EU, which co-
operates with any party on the left-right apart from the far-right, the DF is 
consequently the most easily perceived alternative for Eurosceptics. But (and 
that is a big but) here, Euroscepticism is nested in a far-right ideology.
Conclusion
The comparison of the Danish and Finnish cases tells us that the success 
of the far-right may be explained by economic factors, noneconomic Euro-
scepticism, how well the far-right party campaigns, as well as the response of 
other parties to their presence. Essentially, how mainstream parties answer 
to the challenge of the far-right plays an important role. In Denmark, other 
parties have not effectively replied sufficiently to the Eurosceptic views of vot-
ers, neither by offering policy options nor by addressing the debate, so the DF 
remains as either the more genuine or the more distinct regarding Euroscepti-
cism. In Finland, a quite different development has taken place over the last 
few years. Cognisant of the appeal of the PS and Euroscepticism, the Finnish 
government has hardened their stance on EU negotiations, such as demand-
ing unanimity for decision making of the European Stability Mechanism and 
blocking the entry of Rumania and Bulgaria into the Schengen area. That is, 
as voters’ Euroscepticism became clear for anyone to see due to the success 
of the PS in 2011 national election, the government parties have shifted their 
stance in national EU policies. It is too early to say if this marks the beginning 
of a fundamental change in Finnish integration policy, but at least it seems as 
if this shift towards the EU has absorbed some of the Eurosceptic sentiments, 
which only three years ago seemed so profuse. Again, this goes to show that 
the success of Euroscepticism and far-right parties is partially explained by 
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the nature and degree to which the established parties on the centre-left and 
centre-right respond. Traditionally thought of as a very homogenous group 
of countries, this story also indicates how different the political landscapes in 
the Nordic corner(s) of Europe actually are.
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France went to the polls on Sunday, May 25.1 France elected 74 Members 
of the European Parliament (MEPs) (two more than in 2009) using a propor-
tional system with a 5% electoral threshold and closed lists.2 Political parties 
establish the order of candidates on the lists; voters can only cast a vote for 
the list and not for individual candidates. Seats are thus attributed according 
to the order in which the candidates are presented on the list. The national 
territory is divided up into eight constituencies (including one for all of the 
overseas territories).
The election campaign
In France, as in several other European countries (e.g., the Netherlands, 
UK or Italy), the electoral campaign has been influenced by the strong pres-
ence of a Eurosceptic party—Front National (FN)—the extreme-right party 
headed by Marine Le Pen. Beforehand, the preelection polls already captured 
the unprecedented result FN was heading for, estimating (correctly) that FN 
would become the largest party in France.
The fervently anti-European FN campaign was supported on the national 
level by the strong economic crunch that heavily affected President François 
Hollande’s popularity (which went from 61% in March 2012 to 18% at the be-
1  With the exception of the overseas departments that started voting on Saturday, May 
24.
2  The closed-list system for the European elections is used in France, Germany, Hungary, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom (except Northern Ireland).
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ginning of May 20143) and that of his party, the Parti Socialiste (PS), in power 
since 2012.
FN did not meet strong opposition, not even on the right, even though the 
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP, the main conservative party) gave 
it a try by reintroducing ex-president Nicolas Sarkozy into the political fray and 
in turn launching an unequivocally anti-European campaign by using slogans 
that talked about the suspension of the Schengen treaty and the transfer of half 
of the European Union’s (EU) competences back to member states.
In general, it was FN that dictated the terms and issues of the campaign 
to the two large moderate parties, who did not succeed in imposing a differ-
ent agenda nor managed to sufficiently mobilise voters. In fact, according to 
the preelection polls, abstention would reach a new record high, beating the 
already historical level of the 2009 European elections (59.9%).
Besides the issues, the tone of the campaign was way calmer compared 
with that of other countries. Marine Le Pen conducted a campaign void of 
shouting matches, merely pointing to the simple nature of its program and the 
clarity of its message: no Europe, more France, exit from the Euro and aboli-
tion of the Schengen treaty.
The results
Forecasts did not lie: according to official results, FN confirmed expecta-
tions by becoming the largest party in France, with a whopping 25%, whereas 
the two big moderate parties (PS and UMP) underwent a substantial erosion 
of their popular mandate compared with the 2009 European elections, as il-
lustrated in Table 1.
As far as the PS is concerned, the loss is dramatic, especially when com-
pared with the results of the 2012 presidential elections in which Hollande 
won the second round with 58.5% of the votes (in the first round, he scored 
35.4%). The day after the election, the prime minister of the current socialist 
government, Manuel Valls, described the 2014 electoral results as being ‘an 
earthquake’, declared that the government will not change its course, but that 
they already scheduled a tax reduction.4
3  Baromètre OpinionWay: http://www.opinion-way.com/pdf/opinionway_-_le_barome-
tre_clai_metro_lci_du_changement_dans_l_action_politique_mai_2014.pdf
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Also for the UMP, the comparison with the presidential elections shows 
a net decline: in 2012, Sarkozy got 26.1% of the votes in the first round and 
41.5% in the second one. FN not only quadrupled its vote share in comparison 
with the 2009 European elections, but they also gained 15 percentage points 
compared with the 2012 presidential one in which they got 10.1%.
Among the other parties, the centre-right party Alternative (a union of 
the two centre parties: the Union des democrats et independents founded by 
Jean-Luis Borloo in 2012 and the Mouvement Démocrate of the centrist leader 
François Bayrou) is the only one that—together with FN—managed to in-
crease its vote share compared with that in 2009. The good result of Alterna-
tive and the hard loss suffered by its natural ally UMP could lead to a readjust-
ment of the power balance within the centre-right. We also see a net decline 












National Front (FN) NI 25.0 24 +18.6 +21
Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) EPP 20.8 20 −7.1 −9
Socialist Party (PS)/Radical Leftist Par-
ty (PRG) S&D 14.0 13 −2.5 −1
Alternative (Alt) ALDE 9.9 7 +1.4 +1
Ecology Europe–The Greens (EELV) G-EFA 8.9 6 −7.4 −8
Leftist Front (FG) GUE-N-GL 6.3 3 −0.1 −1
Different Left (DVG) NI 1
Others   15.1 –      
Total 100 74 +2
Turnout (%) 43.5 +2.9
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) 5%
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
Note: Vote totals have been calculated, as is customary in France, by taking into account 
metropolitan France (thus excluding the overseas departments)





for Europe Écologie Les Verts (EELV—the left-wing, ecologist party) that goes 
from 14 MEPs to 6. At the 2009 European elections, it scored exceptionally 
well (16.3%) under the leadership of the famous French-German writer Daniel 
Marc Cohn-Bendit (who officially withdrew from politics in April 2014).
Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of Front de Gauche (FG), which hoped to 
clear the 10% threshold but instead stayed level compared with 2009, declared 
they were disappointed by the results.5 Finally, one seat also went to the can-
didate of Divers Gauche, who got elected by the overseas departments. Divers 
Gauche is not a party per se, but rather a group that includes left-wing candi-
dates that are members of minor parties or do not belong to any party.
An interpretation
The main result of the election, however, remains the fact that FN for the 
first time in its 30-year existence managed to become the largest party at the 
national level, beating its eternal rival UMP. For the European level, it is also 
worth remembering that FN presented itself to the voters not being part of 
any EU party group. When asked which party group they would join after the 
elections, Marine Le Pen answered that she wants to found a new party group.
Apart from being the largest party in France, FN is also the largest ex-
treme-right party in all Europe in which the expansion of the right-wing Eu-
rosceptics is undisputable6: the Eurosceptics now hold 142 seats compared 
with 64 in 2009.
Concerning the levels of participation, contrary to the predictions of a new 
abstention record, the level of abstention actually even diminished slightly: 
56.5% compared with 59.5% in 2009.
Several scholars have underlined the second-order nature of the European 
elections, which means that instead of being an expression of preferences con-
cerning European issues, it tends to assume the role of a referendum on the 
national government in power (see, for instance, Reif and Schmitt, 1980). In 
this sense, considering the low levels of appreciation for the current socialist 
president François Hollande, a good result for the opposition should not have 
5  Le Nouvel Observateur: Européennes : le Front de gauche échoue à capter les mécon-
tents et finit 6e http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/elections-europeennes-2014/20140526.
OBS8461/europeenne-le-front-de-gauche-echoue-a-capter-les-mecontents-et-finit-6e.
html
6  Results of the extreme-right parties at the 2014 European elections: France 25%; Den-
mark 23%, United Kingdom 22%; Austria 20%; Hungary 15%; Finland 13%; Greece 12%.
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come as a big surprise—if it would not be for the fact that traditionally this 
result should have been achieved by the moderate, conservative UMP party 
and not, as has been the case, the extreme-right.
Notwithstanding the fact that the victory of FN was largely forecasted, the 
width of the gap between FN and the centre-right UMP remains an impres-
sive result. If we look at the result of the 2009 European elections, in five years, 
the balance of power on the right-hand side of the French political spectrum 
has radically changed and the roles have been reversed: looking at the 6% FN 
vote share in 2009, it has practically quadrupled its support (24%), whereas 
UMP lost 7 percentage points and got 21% (down from 28%) and has thus 
become the second right-wing party in the country instead of the leading one.
The PS debacle (and to a lesser extent that of the UMP as well) and the 
success of FN become even more evident when we look at the geographical 
distribution of the votes. Figure 1 shows the largest political party in each of 
the eight electoral constituencies for the European elections.
Figure 1: Largest political party by constituency
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The map of the votes shows the picture of a country that is skewed to the 
right. FN is the largest party in five of the constituencies. In the other ones, 
the UMP leads the way.
When we take a look at the role of age groups, FN—differently from PS or 
UMP—is characterised by a young electorate. According to Ipsos-Steria, FN 
scores best among voters younger than 35 years (approximately 30%), while 
with the electorate, older than 60 years, the results are below the national 
median (21%).
On the contrary, the UMP is remarkably more popular among those old-
er than 60 years, with a vote share of 25%, which is approximately 4% more 
than the national median. Also the PS cannot claim it was successful amongst 
young voters: only 15% of voters younger than 30 years chose PS.
Finally, it is interesting to note that it is amongst lower social strata that FN 
gets its best scores: in the last European elections, 43% of the workers voted 
FN, whereas only 8% voted PS.7
In conclusion
European Parliament elections are not general elections, which is why we 
should be very careful in interpreting these shifts in popular support at the 
polls. It has in fact been remarked that because it is in the very nature of Eu-
ropean elections that they do not have a direct national effect and that voters 
therefore tend to express their votes free from considerations on government 
formation and favour smaller parties (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). However, the 
French result clearly carries weight on the European level, but especially on 
the national one. It suffices to refer to the fact that it were in fact the 1984 Eu-
ropean elections that marked the historical rise of FN in the first place (Hains-
worth, 2004).
Interpreting the victory of FN solely as an anti-European vote would defi-
nitely be a mistake. The European elections in France were held in a con-
text of economic crisis, high unemployment levels and low support levels for 
President Hollande. These elements could have played an important role in 
reinforcing the tendency to use the European elections as an opportunity to 
voice protest (Pertusot and Rittelmeyer, 2014). This interpretation appears to 
be plausible in the light of some results recently put forward by the Pew Re-
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search Center (2014) according to which the majority of French is in favour of 
the European Union and supports the common currency (i.e., the euro).
References
Hainsworth, P. (2004). The extreme right in France: The rise and rise of Jean-Marie 
Le Pen’s Front National. Representation, vol. 40(22), pp. 101–114.
Pertusot, V., and Rittelmeyer, Y. (2014). The European elections in France: The para-
dox of a more European yet more Eurosceptic campaign. EPIN Commentary No. 
16 / 6 February. 
Pew Research Center (2014). A fragile rebound for EU image on eve of Euro-
pean Parliament elections. EU favorability rises, but Majorities say this Voice 
Is Not Heard in Brussels. Consulatbile Online: http://www.pewglobal.org/
files/2014/05/2014-05-12_Pew-Global-Attitudes-European-Union.pdf 
Reif, K., and Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second Order National Elections: A Concep-
tual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal 
of Political Research, vol. 8(1), pp. 3–44.

De Sio L., Emanuele V. and Maggini N. (eds), The European Parliament Elections of 
2014, CISE, Rome, 2014
ISBN (print) 978-88-98012-15-2 / ISBN (online) 978-88-98012-16-9
Germany: Merkel does not stand out but holds
Carolina Plescia and David Johann
5 June 2014
Introduction
Germany went to the polls on Sunday, May 25 to elect 96 members of the 
European Parliament, by far the country in Europe that elects most delegates. 
The 96 members were elected by a pure proportional electoral system, a real 
novelty for nationwide elections in Germany, where the minimum threshold 
has always been 5% for the national elections and 3% for the European elec-
tions. This change was the result of Constitutional Court’s decision last Febru-
ary to eliminate the electoral threshold.
The election campaign
Despite Germany’s leading role in Europe and the importance of Europe 
for Germany, only a quarter of German voters said that they were inter-
ested in the European elections during the campaign (http://www.thelocal.
de/20140523). The main reasons for voters’ apathy are to be found in a very 
sober election campaign and the lack of disagreement among mainstream 
parties. The Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), 
headed by Angela Merkel and Horst Seehofer, respectively, and the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), headed by Sigmar Gabriel, govern together in a grand 
coalition, and although both major parties indicated and supported their own 
candidates, these were not able to mobilise the electorate. Both candidates for 
the position of the president of the European Commission, the candidate pre-
ferred by the CDU/CSU, Jean-Claude Juncker of the European People’s Party 
(EPP), and the candidate preferred by the SPD, Martin Schulz of the Alliance 
of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), found it extremely difficult to find topics 
on which they disagreed.
This lack of debate and disagreement between the two major parties could 
have offered a great opportunity to opposition parties to mobilise the electorate. 
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In addition, the Constitutional Court’s decision to switch to a pure proportional 
system could have given to all the supporters of smaller parties, who did not 
want to ‘waste’ their vote (Cox, 1997) during the national elections due to the 5% 
threshold, the incentive to vote for their preferred party. In fact the legal change 
translates even less than 1% of votes into one seat. Despite all this however, the 
expectations for the performance of small extreme right and extreme left parties 
remained very low during the election campaign. The Alternative for Germany 
(AfD) party was the exception, perhaps the only real novelty of this low-profile 
European election in Germany. Indeed, it was expected that the AfD, standing 
for the dissolution of the common currency, would perform better than the last 
national elections in 2013 but not as strong as first polls had predicted.
The results
The turnout for the elections was 48.1%, almost 5 percentage points  more 
than that in 2009 but far lower than the last national elections when the turn-
out has been 71.5%. The results confirmed Angela Merkel’s party (the CDU) 
as first party in Germany almost equaling the 2009 result (−0.6 points) but 
losing approximately 4 percentage points when compared with the national 
elections in 2013. The CDU thus obtained only 29 seats, 5 less than the last 
European elections. Taking into account all the European elections, the joint 
performance of CDU and CSU on May 25 was the worst ever. The CSU, which 
operates exclusively in Bavaria, received only 5.3% of the votes and lost con-
siderably when compared with the last national elections (−2.1 points) and 
with the previous European elections (−1.9 points).
The SPD obtained 27.3% of the votes, improving by as much as 6.5 percent-
age points from the last European elections and greatly reducing the distance 
from the CDU/CSU, its current partner in government. The Greens lost 1.4 
percentage points and as many as three seats when compared with the last 
European elections; the party gained 10.7% of the votes and 11 seats in total. 
The far-left party (Die Linke) lost slightly in comparison with the previous 
national and European elections and it got 7.4% of the votes and seven seats.
The AfD, who contested the European elections for the first time 2014, got 
as much as 7% of the vote and seven seats, which is an increase of 2.3 points 
compared with its share of votes at the last national elections in 2013. The Free 
Democratic Party (FDP), which adopted quite pro-European positions dur-
ing the election campaign, obtained only 3.4% of the votes. This is a decline 
of 7.6 percentage points compared with the last European election in 2009. 
One might thus conclude that the demise that has already loomed at the last 
national election in 2013, when the FDP achieved the worst result ever after 
World War II, continues.
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In this first German nationwide election without electoral threshold, also 
some small parties that until now had been excluded from the national par-
liament (Bundestag) were able to get seats. However, they did not stand out. 
Germany will send a total of seven delegates to Strasbourg, representing seven 












Christian Democratic Union of Ger-
many (CDU) EPP 30.0 29 −0.6 −5
Christian Social Union (CSU) EPP 5.3 5 −1.9 −3
Social Democratic Party of Germany 
(SPD) S&D 27.3 27 +6.5 +4
Alliance ’90/The Greens (Grüne) G-EFA 10.7 11 −1.4 −3
The Left (Die Linke) GUE-N-GL 7.4 7 −0.1 −1
Alternative for Germany (AfD) (forse ECR) 7 7 – +7
Free Democratic Party (FDP) ALDE 3.4 3 −7.6 −5
Free Voters (FREIE WÄHLER) 1.5 1 −0.2 +1
Pirates G-EFA 1.4 1 +0.6 +1
The Animal Protection Party 
(Tierschutzpartei) 1.2 1 +0.1 +1
Family Party of Germany (FAMILIE) 0.7 1 −0.3 +1
National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) 1 1 – –
The Party (Die PARTEI) 0.6 1 − +1
Ecological Democratic Party (ÖDP) 0.6 1 – +1
Others 1.9 0    
Total 100 96 –
Turnout (%) 48.1 +4.8
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) none
Source: http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/europawahlen/EU_BUND_14/ergebnisse/
bundesergebnisse/
Abbreviations for EP groups: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The 
Greens–European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, 
European United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, 
Non-Inscrits.
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different political parties that have all obtained approximately 1% of the vote. 
In particular, Germany will send one deputy for the Pirates, one for the far-
right party NPD, one for the Party, one for the Animal Protection Party, one 
for the Ecological Democratic Party, one for the Free Voters, and one for the 
Family Party of Germany.
Discussion of the results
The AfD is undoubtedly the winner of these European elections in Germa-
ny. The Eurosceptic party led by Professor Bernd Lucke during the campaign 
declared itself against the euro. Professor Lucke in fact has repeatedly stated 
that they do not want to be part of the Eurosceptic group in Strasbourg but in-
stead they will seek dialogue with the conservative parties. Despite this how-
ever, the 7% of the votes cast for the AfD makes a stir in Germany. The result 
of the AfD clearly indicates to the two mainstream parties, the SPD and the 
CDU/CSU, that they can no longer ignore the AfD, which might well be able 
to enter the German parliament in the next elections scheduled to take place 
in 2017. The AfD has reached the impressive figure of 14.5% in its stronghold, 
in Pforzheim, Baden-Württemberg. It seems that the AfD managed to obtain 
the support of disappointed voters of the FDP. In fact, in Pforzheim in 2009, 
the FDP had collected almost 16% of the votes, but during the latest elec-
tion the party scored a catastrophic 4.6%. The AfD has probably benefited not 
only from the weakness of the FDP but also from the bad economic condi-
tions in some areas of the country. In regions such as Brandenburg, where the 
unemployment rate is comparably high, the AfD has obtained far above the 
national average of votes.
Merkel’s union, the CDU/CSU, obtained 35.3% of the votes, and it remains 
the largest delegation of Germany in Strasbourg. This delegation is, however, 
much smaller than it was in 2009, and domestically, this result counts as a 
setback (or nearly so). A great deal of the losses of Merkel’s union can be as-
cribed to the bad result of the CSU in Bavaria. Here, the CSU recorded a stir-
ring decline of votes going from 48.1% to 40.5%. A good portion of the former 
CDU/CSU voters seems to have been gained by the SPD and the AfD. Horst 
Seehofer, the CSU leader, speaks of “great disappointment” in the aftermath of 
the elections, but he argues that the meager result of the CSU derives mainly 
from the low turnout (http://wahl.tagesschau.de/wahlen/2014-05-25-EP-DE/
analyse-wanderung.shtml).
The SPD obtained a good election result compared with the 2009. The in-
crease of 6.5 percentage points has been the largest ever in nationwide elec-
tions for the SPD. During the election campaign, the SPD had repeatedly 
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stressed that a strong result of the SPD would have increased the chances of 
having a German president of the European Commission (referring to Martin 
Schulz), and perhaps this has contributed to the good performance of the SPD 
in this election. Meanwhile, both mainstream parties, the CDU/CSU and the 
SPD, will have to deal with the result of the AfD.
The loser of the 2014 elections is, yet again, the FDP. The FDP continues its 
decline, and it might be that the FDP disappears almost completely from the 
German political scene in the near future.
Conclusion
Despite Germany’s leading role in Europe and the importance of Europe 
for Germany, few voters were interested in this European election. In addi-
tion, the results of the elections in Germany were not characterised by any 
political earthquake or shock that have instead occurred in many other Eu-
ropean countries, France and Britain at the forefront. Indeed, the results in 
Germany, if on the one hand provide some rumblings of change (a small vote 
loss for the CDU/CSU, a small comeback of the SPD and new parties entering 
the political scene), on the other hand, they suggest that the real changes will 
not happen for several more years.
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Greece: Historic change or alarm bell?
Konstantinos Athanasiadis 
30 May 2014
The elections of May 25 in Greece were realised amidst pronounced polari-
sation, deep fragmentation and collapse of partisan identities. Interestingly, 
the elections coincided with the 40th anniversary of the collapse of the mili-
tary junta that ruled Greece for seven years (1967–1974) and the subsequent 
consolidation of democracy as inculcated in the era of Metapolitefsi (change 
of regime / new ethos in the conduct of politics).
The 2014 European elections hallmark a historic victory for the Greek 
Left, since for the first time a party residing in the left fringes of the political 
spectrum, the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)—whose leader Alexis 
Tsipras ran also as a candidate for the presidency of the European Commis-
sion for the European Left—won an election. Simultaneously, the 2014 Euro-
pean elections will be evoked for the continuous rise of the neo-Nazi party 
of Golden Dawn (GD). Finally, the results nurture conflicting interpretations 
regarding their exact meaning: is it the Left that will drive the ship of Greece 
far from the murky waters of austerity and the memoranda? Or is it rather a 
ringing bell of frustration by the Greeks to the ruling coalition of New De-
mocracy (centre-right/ND) and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) 
with an eye to the upcoming legislative elections (formally 2016)?
The results
Greece marches since 2009 (bipolarity’s last stand given the emergence of 
the pro- and anti-memorandum cleavage) towards party system transforma-
tion (Mair, 1997) in the form of polarised pluralism (Sartori, 1976), expressed 
in terms of intense ideological polarisation and a fragmented parliament (seven 
effective parties). This transformation is coupled with a deep institutional crisis 
(Verney, 2014), albeit latent before 2010 (adoption of the first Memorandum of 
Understanding), which was articulated as anger and distrust vis-à-vis the po-
litical system at large under the catalysing pressure of the austerity measures.
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In this context, serious contradictions became embedded in the political 
and social landscape that emerged also in the period that preceded and fol-
lowed the European elections. First, 42 lists competed for the 21 seats Greece 
is allotted in the European Parliament, which is translated into 1299 candi-
dates (News.gr 2014). Greece is thus first in the per capita number of candi-
dates in the European Union, and third in absolute numbers behind France 
(3753) and Italy (2106). Second, the closed party list, preferred until the last 
European elections, was replaced by the open one as a means to contain ab-
stention (the 3% threshold remained in place). The turnout was indeed quite 
satisfactory (60% against 53% in 2009), as Greeks voted for the runoff of the 
local elections too. Yet a significant segment of the electorate has paradoxi-
cally cast its ballot in favour of representatives of the old political class, who 
were to be found on almost all winning lists but also in favour of famous TV 
personalities (Margomenou, 2014).
The Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA—umbrella organisation for 12 
political groups of the Left) achieved a historical victory (26.58% of the votes 
and six seats in the European Parliament). This share is very close to the per-
centage gained in the June 2012 legislative elections, when SYRIZA came sec-
ond with 26.89%, whilst by far exceeding its 2009 European elections’ share 
of 4.70 percentage points. The conservative centre-right party of ND, on the 
other hand, major pillar of the coalition government since June 2012, saw its 
political influence dropping by 9.6 points since 2009 (and losing three seats), 
and by almost 7 points since the last legislative elections held two years ago.
The performance of the neo-Nazi party of GD still confirmed a shared 
fear: the party has indeed acquired a solid basis of support. Its meteoric rise 
continues (9.4% and 3 seats, 0.46% in 2009, 6.92% in 2012) against the back-
ground of an ongoing judicial investigation that likens the party to a ‘criminal 
gang’ (Kathimerini, 2014).
Moreover, the socialist party of PASOK, which ran under the rubric of the 
Olive Tree (inspired by the respective Italian scheme) together with various 
PASOK splinter groups, gained 8.02% in stark comparison with the 36.65% of 
2009 and the 12.28% of 2012. Yet, the party leadership evaluated the share as 
face-saving given the adverse conditions of the participation in the coalition 
government. The centre-left/liberal ‘To Potami’ (The River), founded some 
months before the elections, fared impressively (6.60%) as its leader, a promi-
nent journalist, speaks for a new way of conducting politics, whilst expressing 
his volition to share part of the responsibility in a future coalition government 
(Kathimerini, 2014).
The Communist Party instead, whilst slightly ameliorating its share from 
the 2012 elections (+1.5 points), lost 2.3 points in comparison with the 2009 
European elections. The rightist Independent Greeks (Anexartitoi Hellenes), 
an ND splinter group that argues against the Memoranda and the loss of na-
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tional sovereignty, whilst debuting in these European elections and secur-
ing one seat (3.46%), lost significant part of their dynamic amassed in 2012 
(7.51%). Finally, special reference should be made to relevant parties that did 
not reach the 3% threshold. The ultraconservative Popular Orthodox Rally 
(LAOS) made a significant comeback (2.70%) after it has hit rock bottom in 












Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) GUE-N-GL 26.6 6 +21.9 +5
New Democracy (ND) EPP 22.7 5 −9.6 −3
Golden Dawn (GD) 9.4 3 +8.9 +3
Elia/Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
(PASOK) S&D 8.0 2 −28.6 −6
To Potami (The River) S&D 6.6 2 +6.6 +2
Communist Party (KKE) GUE-N-GL 6.1 2 −2.3 +0
Independent Greeks (Anexartitoi 
Hellenes) ECR 3.5 1 +3.5 +1
Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) EFD 2.7 0 −4.5 −2
Greek European Citizens (Hellenes 
Evropaioi Polites) 1.4 0 +1.4 +0
Democratic Left (DIMAR)     S&D 1.2 0 +1.2 +0
Union for the Homeland and the People 
(Enosi gia tin Patrida kai to Lao) 1.0 0 +1.0 +0
Greek Hunters’ Party (Komma Hellenon 
Kinigon) 1.0 0 −0.3 +0
Green Party / Pirates (Ecologoi Prasinoi/
Peirates) G-EFA 0.9 0 −2.6 −1
Others   8.8        
Total 100 21 -
Turnout (%) 60.0 +7.4
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) 3%
Abbreviations for EP groups: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The 
Greens–European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, 




the 2012 general elections (1.58%) and its short participation in the coalition 
government of Lucas Papademos (technocrat, former vice president of the Eu-
ropean Central Bank). Moreover, the Green Party lost its unique seat although 
joining forces with the Pirates. Last but not least, the party of the Democratic 
Left (DIMAR)—splinter group of SYRIZA—which portrayed itself as the ‘Left 
of responsibility’, occupying the ground between SYRIZA (radical Left) and 
PASOK (social democracy) utterly failed (1.20% from 6.26% in the 2012 gen-
eral elections), revealing a sort of ‘existential crisis’ since DIMAR left the coa-
lition government (the party is on the verge of dissolution).
The campaign
The campaign was in line with the pattern established in the June 2012 na-
tional elections. It essentially revolved around the dominant cleavage of pro- 
and anti-memorandum, which in turn denotes a particular posture vis-à-vis 
Europe. Thus, Alexis Tsipras likened the elections to ‘a historic referendum’ 
(Ethnos, 2014) as choice between two options: change ‘that will close the book 
of Metapolitefsi’ (Antoniou 2014) or continuation of austerity.
On the other hand, the Greek prime minister, Antonis Samaras, played the 
card of stability conveyed by the coalition government, whilst posing the di-
lemma of being with Europe or against Europe (Athanasopoulos, 2014), blam-
ing SYRIZA for sheer populism. Both coalition partners, ND and PASOK, 
tried to emphasise the achievement of surplus in the national budget (Naftem-
poriki, 2014) as the first breakthrough towards recovery.
An extra point of controversy emerged a few days before the elections re-
garding a segment of the electorate that voted for GD in the first round of the 
local elections. Alexis Tsipras invited them to ‘return to the road of democra-
cy’ as being deeply convinced that ‘those people are not in their vast majority 
neo-nazis’ (Antoniou, 2014). This was in turn reciprocated by members of the 
coalition government, who characterised ‘flirting with GD’ as ‘a disgusting 
act’ (Imerisia, 2014).
Interpreting the oracle
The electoral result in Greece followed the general pattern remarked else-
where in Europe: ruling parties crumbled. Indeed, the former three parties 
(DIMAR included) of the coalition lost in absolute terms 1.2 million votes 
since 2012 (Zoulas, 2014). SYRIZA has undoubtedly achieved a historic vic-
tory at least at the symbolic level. It managed to gain almost the same re-
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sult it has scored in the first-order national elections of 2012, although losing 
140,000 votes (Ibid.).
Yet this victory will not imply a subversion of the government in the short 
and medium term as the party discourse had it. The outcome of the May 25 
elections underlined the fact that even if SYRIZA wins the next general elec-
tions, it will need coalition partners (coalition governments will be the rule of 
the day after the collapse of bipolarism). Unless the party moves to the centre, 
finding partners on the Left would require some adept brinkmanship given 
the negative stance of the Communist Party (Mailis, 2012) and the broad-
er rearrangements taking place within the Greek centre-left. On the right, 
SYRIZA and Independent Greeks have already established a front against the 
Memoranda (in.gr, 2013). The meagre results of last Sunday’s elections are not 
very promising though for the party of the populist Right.
On the other hand, the electoral result is a clear indication of frustration by 
the vast majority of the Greek electorate against the continuing policies of aus-
terity and fiscal discipline by the coalition government of ND and PASOK. The 
process of internal devaluation has hit fatally the middle class and the lower stra-
ta of the population giving rise to extreme unemployment and limited spend-
ing. Given that the much promised growth is yet to come, and the results of the 
fiscal discipline are not immediately felt, the coalition partners will attempt to 
take some initiatives in the short and medium term. First, cabinet reshuffle is to 
be expected (Terzis, 2014). Second, ND plans to endorse constitutional reform 
that among others will entail the direct election of the president of the republic 
(Ravanos, 2014). National elections will be avoided at the moment as both ND 
and PASOK interpret the result as not condemning for the coalition, whilst the 
majority of Greeks are contemptuous of a new electoral Odyssey (Express, 2014).
Finally, the worrying resilience of GD shows that the party has been 
squarely entrenched in the electorate. This implies that the vote for GD was 
intentional. Greeks have henceforth no excuse since they now know for what 
this party stands for.
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The result of the European elections of 2014 in Hungary is all but surpris-
ing. The government party Fidesz got the absolute majority of the votes, the 
left-wing opposition appears to be more and more fragmented, while the far-
right Jobbik remains fairly stable, far from the peaks of popularity obtained 
by ideologically similar parties in other European countries. However, this 
apparent calm conceals a quite discouraging political climate, from both a na-
tional and a European perspective. The turnout went down to 28.9%, 7 points 
lower than the previous European Parliament (EP) election in 2009, and about 
half of the turnout registered at the national elections in April. The electoral 
campaign kept a relatively low profile, although this was mainly due to the dif-
ficult media access for the opposition, rather than to an actual lack of conflict. 
Moreover, despite the few seats obtained by the ‘official’ Eurosceptical party 
Jobbik, as readily reported by the Economist,1 the vote to Prime Minister Vik-
tor Orbán’s Fidesz is not at all to be regarded as an ‘euroenthusiastic’ choice.
The political context
Hungarian citizens voted on May 25 to elect their 21 representatives to 
the EP. However, the important event of the year for Hungarian politics has 
been the national parliamentary elections on April 6. The closeness to the 
national appointment further accentuated the ‘second-order’ character of the 
EP elections, where strictly European issues usually play a less important role 




in respect to national issues (see Reif and Schmitt, 1980). The latter included 
direct attacks between members of different parties, with no great emphasis 
on substantive policy differences. While concepts such as ‘left’ and ‘right’ are 
quite widely used in Hungarian politics (Todosijevic, 2004), these terms are 
mostly used to address political groups in conflict to one another, rather than 
to describe substantive ideologies (Palonen, 2009). In such a context, more 
focused on the political actors than on the issues, the long campaign for the 
two elections in 2014 has not been an exception.
After a decisive victory in 2010, the right-wing Fidesz—born at the end of 
the 1980s as a libertarian student movement and turned over time into a na-
tional conservative party—obtained the control of two thirds of the Hungar-
ian national parliament.2 This result granted Viktor Orbán’s party the power 
to modify the constitution and, during the last four years, change several rules 
of the game to its own advantage.3 As a consequence, the new electoral victory 
in April led Fidesz to control two thirds of the parliament for the second time 
(see also Toka, 2014).
At the same time, the political landscape on the left went through some 
major changes, all pointing to a greater fragmentation. The defeat of the 
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) in 2010 led to the formation of other 
two brand-new left-wing parties, both starring former MSZP members. The 
first, Democratic Coalition (DK), is led by former prime minister Ferenc 
Gyurcsány, who was at the lead of the left-wing government from 2004 to 
2009. The second, Együtt-PM, is led by Gordon Bajnai, who became prime 
minister after Gyurcsány’s resignation during the last year of MSZP’s rule 
from 2009 to 2010. The three parties joined forces in April in a coalition 
led by MSZP’s leader Attila Mesterházy mainly prompted by a strongly ma-
joritarian electoral system but ran separately for the EP elections in May, 
which have been held under a proportional system (PR) with 5% threshold. 
Finally, another left-wing party worth mentioning is ‘Politics Can Be Dif-
ferent’ (LMP), more focused on environmental issues. Despite its relatively 
small size, the party managed to get enough votes to obtain parliamentary 
seats in both elections.
2  Since 1998, Fidesz runs every election in coalition with the Christian-conservative par-
ty KDNP, including the two elections of 2014. However, given the marginal importance 
of KDNP within the coalition, in this article, I will follow the rather common norm to 
refer to both parties naming only Fidesz.
3  For a detailed explanation of the new rules and how they favoured Fidesz at the parlia-
mentary elections in April, see the post in five parts by Kim Lane Scheppele on Paul Krug-
man’s blog on the New York Times’ page: http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/
hungary-an-election-in-question-part-1/ (link for the first part)
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Another important actor in the Hungarian political arena is Jobbik, a 
rather extreme right-wing and nationalist party, whose members have been 
repeatedly accused to hold antisemitic views. The first relevant result for Job-
bik was exactly five years ago, at the European elections of 2009, where the 
party obtained 14% of the valid votes. This result was followed by a 16% at 
the national elections in 2010 and by an impressive 20% at the elections last 
April. However, in mid-May, the party was involved in a political scandal, as 
one of its incumbent candidates for the European Union (EU) parliament, 
Béla Kovács, was accused to be a spy for Russia. While both the candidate 
and the party rejected the accusations, the news has been reported by several 
media and might have had an impact on Jobbik’s result on May 25. Among all 
Hungarian parties, Jobbik is the only one taking clear Eurosceptical positions.
The campaign
The campaign for the European elections in Hungary was conducted in a 
rather passive manner by most of the parties. Fidesz and MSZP did not even 
bother publishing an electoral program, as an indicator of how low was the in-
terest of the two parties for a substantive debate after the elections in April. In 
fact, the protagonist of the campaign was Viktor Orbán and his government, 
to the obvious advantage of his own party Fidesz. This has been the case to a 
large extent because of the new law on election procedures, which restricts the 
media access during the campaign for all parties, but not for the government.4
Orbán’s strategy during the campaign aimed at presenting an image of the 
government as the defender of the interests of the Hungarians against an EU 
that is unable or unwilling to understand the needs of the country. In this way, 
from its power position, Fidesz tried to appeal to the Eurosceptical electorate, 
entering in direct competition with Jobbik.
Two issues where Orbán followed this strategy have been the cuts to the 
gas and utility costs for the households,5 and the new restrictions on land 
ownership to foreign farmers, mostly coming from the neighboring Austria.6 
Both issues are rather an ‘echo’ of the national campaign, where they have 
4  See: http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/hungary-an-election-in-question- 
part-5/
5  See: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023034482045793426020382
66352




been discussed maintaining, among other things, that the EU would certainly 
oppose the government’s struggle to pursue the interest of its citizens.7
After ‘neutralizing’ the left at the elections in April, Orbán redirected his 
attacks against the Eurosceptical right-wing of Jobbik, trying to profit from 
Béla Kovács’ espionage scandal by talking about ‘treasonous activities’ of ‘a 
party that considers itself national’.8 This can in part explain Jobbik’s loss, 
compared with the result in April, and Fidesz’ success at an election where 
Eurosceptical parties obtained significant results in several other European 
countries.
The results: Stability on the right, fragmentation on the left
Orbán’s strategy seems to have paid out. Fidesz got 51.5% of the valid votes, 
approximately 5 percentage points less than in 2009, but 7 points more than 
at the national elections in April. This seems to go to Jobbik’s disadvantage, as 
the party drops from 20.5% in April to 14.7% in May, a quite similar result to 
the EP elections five years ago.
The left-wing opposition obtains a slightly better result compared with 
what they obtained in the national elections. This essentially confirms the 
suspicion that the forced cohabitation in the same coalition did not help the 
three parties, which gain in total 27.9% of the valid votes, compared with 26% 
obtained in April by the coalition (inclusive of the liberal party MLP, which 
did not run for the European elections). However, what is more interesting to 
point out is the relative similarity of the shares of the three parties. MSZP is 
still the strongest party of the trio, although its 10.9% represents a quite large 
loss after the 17.9% obtained in 2009. However, DK is only 1 percentage point 
below, on 9.8%, and Együtt-PM follows closely with 7.2% of the votes. This 
result suggests that the post-MSZP left is passing through a moment of tran-
sition characterised by a reorganisation of the supply. While the outcome of 
this process is not yet easy to foresee, it might result into a new left-wing coa-
lition leader different from MSZP. To be sure, the new electoral law, heavily 
majoritarian, was conceived by the party in government to profit exactly from 
this fragmentation, at least forcing the three parties to join unenthusiastic 
coalitions. However, the European elections might have work as an ‘internal 
7  See: http://www.politics.hu/20140525/hungarys-ruling-party-scores-majority-in-euro-
pean-parliament-vote-as-far-right-eclipses-divided-left/
8  See: http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2014/05/19/evidence-is-presented- 
in-the-jobbik-espionage-case/
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headcount’, questioning the predominant role of MSZP within the coalition 
and showing the potential of the two new parties. A case apart within the left-
wing block is LMP, which does well enough to pass the 5% threshold and send 
one candidate to Brussels. Despite the party’s efforts to propose itself as a dif-
ferent take on left-wing politics, compared with the rather traditional image 
of MSZP, left-wing Hungarians seem not to be fully convinced of its relevance.
A final remark is about the turnout, which drops 7 points since 2009, 
reaching the all-time low of 28.9%. This might be in part due to the redundant 
campaign or to the lack of interest of Hungarian voters in expressing them-
selves so soon after a so-clear result as the one in April. However, such a low 
turnout might also reflect the alienation of the electorate from the current 
political offer, in a political climate where Fidesz is likely to stay in power for 
long time.












Hungarian Civic Union / Christian-De-
mocratic People’s Party (Fidesz/KDNP) EPP 51.5 8 +5.0 +1
Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) NI 14.7 3 −0.1 +0
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) S&D 10.9 2 −6.5 −2
Democratic Coalition (DK) S&D 9.8 2 +9.8 +2
Together 2014 / Dialogue for Hungary 
(Együtt-PM) G-EFA 7.2 1 +7.2 +1
Politics Can Be Different (LMP) G-EFA 5.0 1 +2.4 +1
Others – 0.9 0
Total 100.0 21 –
Turnout (%) 28.9 −7.4
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) 5
Abbreviations for EP groups: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The 
Greens–European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, 
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Luxembourg: The first European Parliament–
only vote
Patrick Dumont and Raphaël Kies
30 May 2014 
The context
For the first time since 1979, European elections were held separately from 
national elections in Luxembourg. The simultaneity of elections decided on 
before the first direct European elections (as Luxembourgish Members of 
Parliament were already elected for a five-year mandate and that the next 
scheduled election was to be held in 1979 anyway) and government stabil-
ity made all seven previous national and European elections fall on the same 
day, with a number of consequences ensuing. For instance, as European elec-
tions are fought on a unique, nationwide constituency until 2009, all party 
heavyweights used to be present on both lists to ensure a good result for their 
European list (in Luxembourg, voters can cast a vote for a party, one or sev-
eral candidates on the same or on different lists, what is termed interparty 
panachage). As their leaders were elected on both accounts, they would sub-
sequently decide on which mandate they would choose according to the ex-
pected results of the national government formation. In 2009, it was decided 
among the main parties that there would be no more double candidacies (the 
smaller parties kept on practicing it, however). A second consequence was 
that the European election campaign was continuously eclipsed by the con-
current national one, making the election even more of a second-order type.
This context changed for the coming 2014 elections, as the Christian demo-
crat–Socialist (CSV) government led by Prime Minister Juncker (who had been 
prime minister since 1995) collapsed in July 2013—for a series of affairs con-
cerning, among others, the lack of governmental control of the national intel-
ligence—leading to the first anticipated elections since the late 1950s. Not only 
this made the elections bound to be distinct, opening for the possibility of a 
genuinely ‘European’ campaign for the May 2014 elections, but these antici-
pated elections held in October 2013 led to the formation of a coalition exclud-
ing the largest party of the country that had only been out of government for 
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five years (1974–1979) in the postwar era. The CSV electoral losses (from 26 to 
23 seats of 60) allowed for the formation of an alternative coalition made of the 
Liberals (13 seats), the Socialists who had triggered the government crisis by 
not supporting the Christian democrat PM (13 seats) and the Greens (6 seats), 
leaving Juncker the experienced and European-wide known leader (often cited 
as potential president of the European Commission and chairmain of the Euro 
group for eight years) in the opposition (Dumont, Kies: forthcomming).
The 2009 national elections had been a high for the CSV who also kept its 
three seats of six at the European Parliament (EP), for only one for the LSAP 
(Socialists), the DP (Liberals) and the Greens despite losing approximately 6 
percentage points at the EP election compared with their 2004 score (in 2004, 
Prime Minister Juncker headed the CSV list for EP election as well as the list 
of his party for the national election in the South constituency; in 2009, he 
was only candidate for the national election). In a country where there has 
never been a real cleavage amongst parties and voters on European issues, 
the main stakes of this first separate European election are (1) again the fate 
of ex–prime minister Juncker chosen by the European People’s Party as lead 
figure and potential president of the European Commission despite not being 
candidate for the EP election and (2) the electoral fate of the new coalition 
parties and whether or not one of the largest of these three (the DP or the 
LSAP) will manage to gain a second seat to the detriment of the CSV. The few 
opinion polls published since the national elections are not quite informative 
regarding the likely distribution of seats after the May 25 election. They, how-
ever, show that despite this campaign, being the first ‘Europe-only’ one,1 and 
that their previous prime minister is candidate for the presidency of the Com-
mission (more than 80% support this candidacy and his party is still, by far, 
considered to be the most credible to represent the interests of Luxembourg in 
the EU) about a third of respondents are not interested in it.
Campaign strategies
Altogether, no less than nine parties compete for the six Luxembourgish 
Memeber of the European Parliament (MEP) seats, most of which without 
1  But short, as the five main parties decided to devote only three weeks to the campaign, and 
limit their expenses to 65,000 euros each. The lower interest shown by parties themselves 
can also be seen in the size of their manifestos, which are for the most less than 50 pages 
long (a couple of the smaller and less Euro-enthusiastic parties devote some more pages 
to their electoral programme), and therefore much shorter than for the national elections.
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any hope of getting any of these but with the only ambition of displaying their 
continuous presence on the political scene after national elections where all of 
these small parties fared relatively well. This is the case for the Party for Inte-
gral Democracy (PID) that wants to reach the 2% it almost got at the October 
2013 election, the Pirate Party that had managed to reach almost 3% then, and 
the KPL (Communist Party, 1.5% at the national election). The Left (on the 
rise in 2013) and the sovereignist ADR (which always fared worse at European 
elections than in national ones and is continuously losing votes since 1999) 
cannot expect to score the double-digit result that would allow them to dream 
about being allowed to express their less Euro-enthusiastic stances in Brussels 
and Strasbourg. These five parties, that altogether make for 5 of 60 seats in 
the national parliament, are indeed the less Euro-enthusiastic: for instance, 
the Left competes under the slogan ‘Basta! Rebuild Europe’ (a critique of the 
neoliberal conduct of the current Europe), ADR under ‘Less Europe, more 
Luxembourg’ (with a Europe of sovereign nation states, stricter immigration 
policies) and the PID would want the euro to be abandoned and national cur-
rencies reintroduced. Surprisingly, for a Luxembourgish party (as it would 
lead to a move of the general secretariat from Luxembourg to Brussels), the 
Pirate Party campaigns for a single site of the EP, Brussels, and for the abol-
ishment of any form of veto rights in the council. The four larger parties see 
in a stronger Europe the possibility of a stronger Luxembourg. The CSV cam-
paigns along these lines and on its image of competence outside of the borders 
of the Grand Duchy, acquired in part by its quasipermanence at the helm 
of the national government and capacity for seeking consensus in European 
spheres under the slogan ‘For Europe, for Luxembourg’. Together with the 
Socialists, the Christian democrats want a more social and solidary Europe 
(a message brought by Juncker as well in his campaign for the presidence of 
the EU Commission, which fits with his home party message but may fit less 
with the rest of the EPP) and highlight the Community method. The DP and 
the Greens largely share the latter stance but also campaign for a more demo-
cratic and transparent Europe. The first would like a convention followed by a 
European-wide referendum held on the same day to revise the treaties and to 
give the EP a real right of legislative initiative. The Greens also want to keep 
on enlarging EP powers but also support more recourse to popular initiatives. 
Finally, a number of parties (Greens, The Left, PID, Pirate Party and KPL) op-
pose TAFTA and would cancel its negotiation (Esch-sur-Alzette, the second-
largest city of the Grand Duchy, even adopted a motion supporting this goal). 
The other parties consider that we are only at an early stage of the negotia-
tions and await for further information, while declaring that they will devote 
a great attention to its scrutiny. Viviane Reding, outgoing commissioner and 
currently on leave for the electoral campaign, declared she would suggest a 
pause of TAFTA negotiations to inform citizens and stakeholders.
212
Patrick Dumont and Raphaël Kies
Results
The CSV is by far the winner of the 2014 European elections with over 
37.6% of votes, 6.3 percentage points more than the 2009 elections, and even 
beating its record established at the 2004 election when Prime Minister Junck-
er was pulling the EP list. For the first time, it was the plurality winner in all 
municipalities of the country. This exceptional and largely unforeseen score is 
due to the participation of Juncker for the presidency of the European Com-
mission (also defined as the seventh candidate of the list), to the good personal 
score of their chief candidate and incumbent European commissioner Vivi-
ane Reding and probably as well to the frustration of some voters that the CSV 
had been excluded from the outgoing national government despite remaining 
by fact the first party of the country at the unscheduled 2013 national election.
Another surprise was the score of the LSAP, which fell to 11.8%, losing 7.8 
points over 2009, a score that corresponds to exactly half of its average result 
in the preceding seven direct EP elections (it had already lost 3.5 percentage 
points in 2009 compared with 2004, making its worst score at EP elections 
by crossing for the first time the 20% thresholds). With this score, the Lux-
embourg Socialists became only the fourth political force in the European 
elections, behind the Greens and the DP, while they had been the second force 
from 1984 to 2009. This important drop can be explained not only as a re-
action of some voters to the coalition change after the anticipated national 
election but also, and probably more essentially, by the good score of the Left 
party (5.8%; +2.4 percentage points) and the absence of strong candidates on 
the LSAP list. Their six candidates competing for the election were all indeed 
newcomers in the European arena, and their leading candidate, Mady Del-
vaux-Stehres, a well-known figure in the country, had lost in terms of popular 
appeal by undertaking a controversial reform of the national education while 
minister in the government that collapsed in 2013.
The elections were finally characterised by the fact the Green party, de-
spite also losing votes, became this time the second largest party with only 
15%, bypassing the LSAP but also the Liberals, party of the new PM, who 
lost approximately 4 percentage points. This change in rankings of the parties 
was made possible by the good personal result of their leading candidate and 
incumbent MEP Claude Turmes, and conversely the disappointing personal 
score of the liberal head of list and also MEP candidate Charles Goerens.
Overall then, the parties of the new coalition lost no less than 13 percent-
age points compared with the previous EP election, a result as explained above 
that must be read as a reaction against the composition and first months of the 
new government as well as due to the usual better result of the CSV at the EP 
election when its leader is either candidate on the list or as this time compet-
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ing to become president of the European Commission. The CSV gains do not 
however correspond to the losses of the coalition parties (and the CSV result 
is only half a percent higher than the one obtained in 2004 and was its record 
until 2014). The other winners are the smaller parties who competed for the 
EP election. With their much less Euro-enthusiatic stances, and without much 
hope of reaping one seat, these all (except the Communist KPL) gained in 
votes in 2014: the sovereignist ADR reached 7.5% (+0.1 points, still far for its 
9.0% of 1999), Déi Lénk progressed to 5.8% (+2.4 points) and the Pirate Party 
made a successful first appearance with 4.3%.
Despite these changes in the score of the parties, the distribution of MEPs’ 
seats remained the same. CSV kept its three seats, while DP, Déi Gréng and 
LSAP managed to keep their seat.












Christian Social Party (CSV) EPP 37.7 3 +6.3 +0
The Green Party (déi Gréng) G-EFA 15.0 1 −1.8 +0
The Democratic Party (DP) ALDE 14.8 1 −3.9 +0
Luxemburgish Social Worker Party 
(LSAP) S&D 11.8 1 −7.7 +0
Alternative Democratic Reform Party 
(ADR) ECR 7.5 0 +0.1 +0
The Left (Déi Lénk) GUE-N-GL 5.8 0 +2.4 +0
Pirate Party 4.2 0 +0
Party of Full Democracy (PID) 1.8 0 +0
Communist party (KPL) 1.5 0 −0.1 +0
Total   100.0 6     -
Turnout (%) 90 −0.8
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) None
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
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Introduction
On Saturday, May 24, the third European election since Malta joined the 
European Union (EU) was held. Malta elected six Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs), one more than in 2009. The electoral system is the same 
as the one used in national elections, the major difference being that the 13 
electoral districts are merged into one. It is a proportional system based on 
the single transferable vote (STV), which permits voters to enumerate as many 
preferences as the candidates listed on the ballot sheet (Katz, 1984).1 The small 
dimension of districts,2 the fact that the ‘extra’ votes obtained by party candi-
dates are not transferred to a national pool, and acute bipartisanism have pro-
duced an almost perfect two-party system that, together with other features of 
the political system, makes Malta a textbook case of majoritarian democracy 
(Lijphart, 1999). No party apart from the two main ones—the Partit Labur-
ista (PL) and the Partit Nazzjonalista (PN)—has ever obtained representation 
in the Maltese parliament since 1966, nor in the European Parliament (EP) 
since 2004, although the greens of Alternattiva Demokratika (AD) occasion-
ally came close to the objective.
1  If the candidate who got the first preference is elected, the vote is transferred to the can-
didate who was indicated as second preference, and so on until the vote is made ‘useful’, 
that is, it is assigned to a candidate who has not yet passed the election threshold.
2  Malta has a population of approximately 420,000 inhabitants and an electorate of ap-
proximately 330,000 voters. For the national elections, the territory is divided in 13 dis-
tricts, each one electing five MPs. To the total of 65 MPs, a number of seats is added to 
make reward the party that got more ‘first preferences’, and make sure that the majority 
of seats is actually conferred to the party that received more votes. Each district has an 
average of approximately 25,000 voters.
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The election campaign
The EP election took place 14 months after the 2013 national elections, 
which confirmed alternation in the government following a long period of 
Nationalist rule. The NP was in government since 1987, except for the short-
lived Labour government of 1996–’98. Preparations for the election campaign 
started in July 2013 with the opening of nominations for potential MEP can-
didates; the lists were closed on January 2014. Some controversial decisions 
taken became quite polemical during the campaign.3 The most controversial 
one was probably the PL’s decision to present its former leader and one time 
prime minister, Dr. Alfred Sant, as a candidate.
Dr Sant led the party when it won the 1996 election but also when it lost 
those of 1998, 2003 and 2008. He had actively campaigned against Malta join-
ing the EU and doggedly refused to recognise the result of the 2003 member-
ship referendum. His candidature is illustrative of a certain ambiguity in the 
PL’s EU position. The advent of a new leadership in 2008 shifted the party 
towards more pro-EU positions, which was part of a broader change in the 
party’s political platform and a rapprochement with the EU that had started 
in 2004. Notwithstanding that many Labour supporters are critical of Sant’s 
past European stance, he enjoys overwhelming support within the Europe-
an Socialist family. Sant’s popularity among Labour supporters and opinion 
polls constantly showed that he was likely to be elected first from among all 
the candidates, which was confirmed by the election results.
The short time span that separated the European election from the na-
tional election meant that political campaigning went on unabated for almost 
14 months, punctuated only by short truces. This was one of the reasons why 
European issues had only intermittent relevance. In summer, the govern-
ment’s attempt to implement a pushback of migrants at sea was criticised by 
the Opposition. Following the harsh criticism of the European Commission, 
and the launch of Mare Nostrum by Italy, the pushback policy was eventually 
dropped. In a rather Orwellian fashion, the government claimed that it has 
threatened push back only to force the EU to ‘smell the coffee’.
On November 2013, the opposition mounted a campaign against a ‘citi-
zenship scheme’ launched by the government, which saw the sale of Maltese 
passports to affluent investors. The scheme was not stopped, but the polemics 
and, again, strong criticism by European institutions forced the government 
3  The PN rejected the candidacy of a popular TV presenter in the light of a pending court 
case, whereas the PL approved a candidate who also had pending judicial issues, which 
later forced him to retire from the race, much to the embarrassment of his party.
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to introduce major amendments on at least four occasions. The scheme was 
the avant propos of the main European campaign—whose pace really started 
picking up in April 2014.
With the intensification of the campaign and with the official opening two 
months before the elections, national issues regained full centrality. The PN 
openly and repeatedly appealed to voters to use their votes to show their dis-
appointment with the way the prime minister was running the country. In 
turn, the PL responded with claims that it was keeping its electoral promises. 
The centrepiece of its campaign was the reduction of energy prices for house-
holds. Energy prices were one of the main issues on which the LP had won the 
2013 national election, and the price reduction was timed to occur in March 
2014 just before the start of the last phase of the electoral campaign.
Another relevant issue was the Civil Unions Bill approved on April 2014. 
This act permitted civil unions with same rights, responsibilities and obliga-
tions as marriage, including the right of joint adoption and recognition of for-
eign same sex marriage. The enactment of the law had been promised by both 
parties in their respective 2013 national electoral programmes, but the NP 
abstained on the bill because it included the right of adoption by gay couples. 
The NP abstention was not greeted well, neither by the LGBT community nor 
by a sizeable majority of the public.
In sum, the election campaign in Malta followed the script of second-order 
elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), with national issues dominating and Euro-
pean themes confined to the periphery. The only ‘moments’ when ample space 
was afforded to European issues was when Martin Schultz and Jean Claude 
Junker addressed meetings during their visits to Malta to campaign as the 
presidential candidates of their respective political groups, although the sali-
ency of these events in comparison with the rest of the campaign was rather 
circumscribed.
However, to conclude that the EU was entirely absent from the electoral 
campaign would be misleading. The contested path towards EU membership, 
sanctioned by the 2003 referendum, left a deep footprint in party competi-
tion, and the ‘usage of the EU’ (Garcia, 2014) occasionally recurred in this 
campaign. Notwithstanding the pro-EU turn of the new PL leadership, the 
EU retained some relevance in electoral competition, though declined in do-
mestic terms.
The results
Approximately 258,000 voters went to the polls, 74.8% of those entitled to 
vote. This is considered as a remarkable participation rate in the European 
context, but it is less so in the Maltese, one which is used to ‘near-universal 
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turnout’ (Hirczy, 1995). Turnout in the 2013 national elections was 93%, simi-
lar to that of 2008 but lower than the 96% of the 2003. This decline has raised 
some concern among several commentators. Even in comparison with the 
previous European elections, the four-point downturn was significant (for a 
discussion of past European elections, see Pace, 2005 and 2009).
Once again, the 2014 European election rewarded the PL. Running for the 
first time as the incumbent, it managed to gain 54.3% of ‘first preferences’. 
This was 1.5 percentage points less than what it obtained in the 2009 EP elec-
tions and was similar to the result of the 2013 national elections.
With 40% of first preferences, the NP went 3.5 points below the 2013 na-
tional elections. The Nationalists replicated the performance of last EP elec-
tions - when, however, they were still in government. The gap between the two 
main parties enlarged from 11.5 to 13.4 percentage points.












Labour Party (PL) S&D 53.4 3 −1.4 −1
Nationalist Party (PN) EPP 40.0 3 −0.5 +1
Democratic Alternative (AD) G-EFA 3.0 0 +0.6 0
Europe Empire (IE) – 2.7 0 +1.2 0
Others – 1.0 0 0
Total 100.0 6 100.0 0
Turnout (%) 74.8 −4
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) 35.975 votes
Note on the electoral system: the ‘quota’ for electing a candidate is based on the number of 
valid votes cast. The Droop Quota is used to establish the number of votes that candidates 
need to poll to secure a seat: Q=((Valid votes)/(Total number of seats + 1)) + 1
*In the 2009 European election, Malta elected five MEPs, two PN e three PL. Following the 
entry into force of the protocol to the Lisbon Treaty on December 2011, a sixth seat was 
added, which was obtained by the PL. Since the sixth seat was attributed based on the results 
of the 2009 election, the table includes it in the comparison between the 2009 and the 2014 
elections.
Abbreviations for EP groups: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The 
Greens–European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, 




The vote essentially consolidates the realignment of the Maltese electorate, 
as shown by the PL’s progress in all the electoral districts, including the traditio-
nally Nationalist ones. The PN’s defeat, however, was alleviated by the effect of 
transfer of voting preferences among the candidates, which turned a remarkable 
deficit in first-count votes into a draw in terms of seats. Following the allocation 
of the first seats, which happened relatively quickly, it appeared certain that La-
bour would elect three seats and the Nationalists two, while the sixth one could 
go to either party. The complex transfer of voters’ preferences completed four 
days after the election finally gave the seat to the NP with a meagre margin of 
206 votes. For the first time, the NP had managed to win three seats at the EP.
The share of votes gained by the two main parties remains very large, 
amounting to 93.4% of suffrages and all seats. However, this share is sig-
nificantly less than that of last year’s national elections. The space left free 
by the PL and PN reserved some surprises. The greens of AD gained a half 
point on the last European election—and almost one point on the 2013 na-
tional elections. But with a total tally of 3%, they confirmed their inability to 
achieve parliamentary representation at both the domestic and the EU levels. 
Not surprisingly, given the swing to the right in the whole of Europe, it was 
the growth of the neofascist extreme right Imperium Europa (IE), which al-
most doubled its votes in comparison with the 2009 European elections with 
a jump from 1.5% to 2.7%, a result that is very close to AD’s. In the context of 
Malta’s bipolarism consolidated around PN-PL duopoly, AD is no longer the 
only outsider or ‘third party’.
Conclusions
Apparently, the results of the European elections did not reserve any sur-
prise. The six MEPs elected by Malta are equally divided by the two main 
parties, which once again gained the majority of votes and kept smaller par-
ties away from parliamentary representation. However, traces of change loom 
behind the apparent stability.
The elections consolidate the realignment of voters along the main parties, 
deepening the Labour’s hold on the country and extending it to traditionally 
Nationalist areas. Abstention increased, with turnout 20 points down from 
the recent national elections, 4 points below the last EP elections, and 8 points 
down from those held in 2004.
Because of the STV electoral system, the two main parties send three 
members each to the EP despite the large gap in votes that separates them. 
This confirms once again the disproportional effects of the system, with hard-
ly predictable consequences (Doron, 1977). This time, the losers benefit.
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A relevant change is the number of elected women, higher than men (4 
vs. 2) despite that the STV has traditionally been considered to penalise them 
(Lane, 1995). Malta had not elected women to the EP until one year ago, when 
three women replaced the MEPs who resigned after being elected to the na-
tional parliament. The prevalence of women can be read against the context of 
the broader societal change of the last years, culminating in the 2011 divorce 
referendum and in the 2013 Civil Unions bill.
Although the success of the extreme-right Imperium Europa surprised ob-
servers, no explicitly Eurosceptic party elected members to the EP. In this re-
spect, the Maltese vote departs from the outcome of the elections in most EU 
member countries, notably from those of the other southern member states, 
compared with which, however, Malta was only marginally touched by the 
economic crisis.4 However, to conclude from this that Euroscepticism is not 
represented might be misleading. Dr Alfred Sant may have gathered the EU-
critical vote, which explains why he was the most voted candidate.
This outcome is indicative of the ability of the two main parties to rep-
resent a wide range of positions, thus neutralising the challenge of smaller 
parties. Yet the great success of the Eurosceptical candidate Alfred Sant may 
indicate the persistence of a considerable share of Eurosceptical voters, par-
ticularly among Labour supporters. So long as the EU leads to a clear positive 
sum game, it is highly probable that the main parties will manage to absorb 
and internalise opposition to the European project. However, an economic or 
political crisis could trigger latent tensions, and awaken the ‘sleeping giant’ 
(Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004).
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Introduction: The context
The European Parliamentary (EP) election held on May 25 was the third 
EP elections in the modern history of Poland. The first was held in 2004, just 
after Poland joined the European Union (EU), and the second was in 2009. 
The main characteristics of previous Polish EP elections were low voter turn-
out and relatively good results of small and radical parties.
Voter turnout in the 2004 EP elections in Poland was 21%, and it was the 
second lowest rate among EU countries in the 2004 EP elections. The only 
country with a lower voter turnout was Slovakia (17%). The voter turnout in 
2004 EP elections was also low in relation to the closest-in-time elections on 
the national level. The voter turnout in national parliamentary elections held 
in 2005 was 41%, and in the presidential elections held in the same year, it 
was 50%. Voter turnout was also relatively low in the 2009 EP elections—25%. 
It was one of the lowest turnout rates in Europe in the 2009 EP elections. 
Voter turnout in the closest-in-time national elections was also substantially 
higher—54% in the parliamentary election held in 2007 and 55% in the presi-
dential election held in 2010. As one can see, voter turnout in Polish EP elec-
tions was low in comparison with both EP elections in other EU countries and 
national level elections.
In the first Polish EP elections (held in 2004), small parties achieved rela-
tively good scores. They were either anti-EU parties such as League of Polish 
Families (16% vote share) and Self-Defence (11%) or pro-EU parties such as 
Freedom Union (7%) and Social Democrats of Poland (5%). Small parties did 
not attain a good score in the second EP election (2009), and election results 
were very similar to national parliamentary results held two years before. This 
lack of difference could be caused by relative stabilisation of the Polish party 
system and weakness or absence of small parties at that time.
Because of low turnout and relatively good results of small and radical par-
ties (only in the 2004 case), Polish EP elections could be classified as second-
224
Mikołaj Cześnik and Michał Kotnarowski
order elections, the term introduced by Reif and Schmitt (1980). It means that 
EP elections in Poland were viewed by voters as less important and dependent 
on first-order elections, which are national elections.
The important contextual information about EP elections in Poland is 
high public support for European integration among Polish citizens. Ap-
proximately 60% of Poles supported joining EU in June 2004, whereas 30% 
was against European integration in the survey conducted a few weeks after 
joining the EU and a few weeks before the first Polish EP elections. Public 
support for the EU was growing in subsequent years until mid-2008, when 
European integration was supported by almost 90% of Poles. From the second 
half of 2008, the share of supporters of integration slightly decreased; how-
ever, it still remained on high level. Almost 75% of Polish citizens supported 
European integration at the beginning of 2014. Massive support for European 
integration is probably related to huge financial support from the Structural 
Funds and the Cohesion Fund of the EU. Almost every person could notice 
in his/her surrounding many investments cofinanced from EU funds. One 
point should be mentioned here. While Poles in general support the presence 
of Poland in the EU, their opinions are divided as far as further and deeper 
integration with EU is concerned. In May 2013, one third of Poles supported 
strengthening European integration, another one third declared that integra-
tion already gone too far, and the remaining one third did not have an opinion 
in this matter.
There is important contextual information. The 2014 EP election was the 
first election in Poland after a four-year period without any election (exclud-
ing local elections or local referenda in a few places). The last nationwide elec-
tions before the 2014 EP ones were local ones held in November 2010. Moreo-
ver, this year, EP elections are first in the ‘four-election marathon’, which is 
taking place from spring 2014 to autumn 2015. The next will be local elec-
tions planned for autumn 2014, then the presidential election on spring 2015 
and the last one, national parliamentary elections, which will be held autumn 
2015. Such a long period without elections could make media as well as politi-
cal parties yearning for important political events. On the other hand, as a 
first election in this ‘four-election marathon’, the EP elections could be treated 
as a first skirmish before a serious battle in first-order elections (national one), 
which will be held next year.
Main issues in the campaign
The main topic of the campaign was Ukraine. Because of geopolitical 
reasons, Ukrainian issues have always been a central topic in Polish politics. 
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Therefore, the last crisis in Ukraine has been very closely monitored in Poland 
from its very beginning. In the campaign, 2–3 months before the EP election, 
the issue of Ukraine dominated political discussions and public discourse.
Obviously, most of the discussions focused on safety issues, including pre-
dominantly military and external security. Poland is a country bordering Rus-
sia, exposed to its imperial attempts. Ukrainian crisis provided evidence that 
the previous Polish security policy (which was intercorrelated with the politics 
of the EU towards Russia), characterised by spirit of cooperation and agree-
ment and focused on rapprochement with Russia, was ineffective. The prime 
minister, Donald Tusk, who was ‘the face’ of this policy, has been heavily criti-
cised during the campaign, especially by the main opposition party Law and 
Justice. Moreover, during the crisis (and the campaign), he changed quite im-
portantly his position and accepted a more militant attitude towards Russia.
Another important issue raised in the campaign was the topic of energy’s 
security. Main directions of the country’s energy policy have been thoroughly 
discussed. Poland is the biggest hard coal producer in the EU, and nearly all 
of its generated electricity (approximately 92%–94%) comes from coal-fired 
power plants fuelled principally by hard coal and lignite. But Poland imports 
nearly 90% of its crude oil and 66% of its natural gas. Its main supplier re-
mains to be Russia. This heavy reliance on external supplies of gas and oil to 
Poland remains a threat to the security of energy supply to the nation. The 
Russian-Ukrainian conflict (including gas disputes) undoubtedly endangers 
the security of gas and oil supply to Poland.
In general, the campaign was rather rational and programmatically struc-
tured (at least for the Polish standards). Meritocratic and programmatic dis-
course prevailed; political quarrels, scandals and clashes were relatively infre-
quent (especially in comparison with previous electoral campaigns in Poland).
Election results
Voter turnout in the 2014 EP election in Poland was 23.8%. The turnout 
rate is similarly low as in previous EP elections held in Poland. The fact that 
in three other EU countries voter turnout level was even lower (Slovakia 13%, 
Czech Republic 19.5% and Slovenia 21%) is not very heartening.
Polish voters elected 51 Members of European Parliament (MEP). The 
best result in the elections was won by senior incumbent party Civic Platform 
(Platforma Obywatelska – PO, EPP group in European Parliament)—32.1% 
votes. However, very close results were won by the main opposition party Law 
and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PIS, ECR in group in European Par-
liament)—31.8%. In fact, this result could be treated as draw. Apart from a 
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very similar vote share, both parties gained 19 seats in the EP. The third place 
in the election race was taken by Left-Democratic Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy 
Demokratycznej – SLD). This party received 9.4% of votes and won five seats 
in the EP. SLD is a member of the S&D group in the EP. The real surprise of 
these elections was the fourth result of New Right (Nowa Prawica Janusza Ko-
rwin-Mikke – NP). This party got 7.2% of vote shares and four seats in the EP. 
This party is strongly against the EU. One of the points of its manifesto is dis-
solution of the EU. The leader of the party (Janusz Korwin-Mikke) is a person 
with a strong charismatic personality, who quite often used populist slogans. 
This is the best results of the leader of this party ever—the party is not present 
in national parliament. The fifth position in the election race was taken by 
Polish Peasants Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – PSL, EPP group in EP). 
PSL won 6.8% vote shares and four seats in the EP. PSL is a junior incumbent 
party and belongs to the EPP group in EP.
According to the Polish electoral system, there is 5% electoral threshold in 
EP elections. Among parties that did not cross the threshold, the best result is 
won by Solidary Poland (Solidarna Polska – SP)—4%. SP was established by 
former PIS politicians—all SP members of national parliament were elected 
from PIS electoral lists. The next position in the electoral race was taken by Eu-
rope+ Your Move (Europa + Twój Ruch – E+TR)—3.6%. E+TR is a liberal-left 
coalition of different parties or groups, but a base of it was Palikot Movement, 
the third power in national parliament. In the last national parliamentary elec-
tions, Palikot Movement got 10% vote share. The result of this coalition is a 
surprise at least for three reasons. First, E+TR was one of the left alternative for 
the rightist parties, which are dominant in the Polish party system (rightist or 
centre-rightist parties got together at least 69% of votes in each election since 
2007). Second, the former president of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, who 
is still popular in Poland, officially supported E+TR and was presented as pa-
tron of this coalition. Last, a group of popular politicians with leftist or liberal 
origins run in EP elections as leaders of electoral lists of E+TR.
Likewise, in other elections held in Poland, there is a strong and clear ter-
ritorial diversification of results of the 2014 EP elections. The highest support 
for PO is observed in the north and west part of Poland. These are former 
German territories incorporated to Poland after the Second World War and 
settled mainly by people from former Polish territories on the east, which be-
came part of Soviet Union after the war. High support for PO was also present 
in Silesia region (southwest part of Poland). People living there have strong lo-
cal identification and cultural identity. PO won very good results in the capi-
tal, Warsaw, and other big cities. On the other hand, high support for main 
opposition party PIS was noted mainly on the east part of Poland. People liv-
ing on these areas did not experience strong migration movements—they are 
mainly settled there for generations. People from east regions of Poland are 
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also more religious and attached to traditional values. High support for PIS, 
which is a conservative party, is understandable from this perspective. PIS got 
high vote shares also in smaller towns and villages.
Conclusions
Polish MEPs are going to constitute the sixth largest group in the EP. PO 
and PSL MEPs are going to join the EPP group; SLD MEPs will join the S&D 
group. Still rather unknown is the future of the right-wing parties; PIS MEPs 
will most probably join the ECR group; the NP MEPs can form an anti-EU 
group with other Eurosceptics. It is worth noting that the Polish MEPs are 
going to constitute the second largest group in the EPP.
Unquestionably, the 2014 EP elections results are going to influence Pol-
ish politics. In the context of previously mentioned ‘four-election marathon’, 
they have provided a new impetus for all the political parties. The winners—












Civic Platform (PO) EPP 32.1 19 −12.3 −6
Law and Justice (PIS) ECR 31.78 19 +4.4 +4
Democratic Left Aliance (SLD) S&D 9.44 5 −2.9 −2
New Right (NP JKM) new in EP 7.15 4 +6.1 +4
Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) EPP 6.8 4 −0.2 +1
Solidary Poland (SP) EFD 3.98 0 +4.0 +0
Europe+ Your Move (E+TR) ALDE 3.58 0 +3.6 +0
Others   5.15 0      
Total 100.0 51 -
Turnout (%) 23.83 −0.7
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) 5%
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
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PO and PIS—have strengthened their hegemonic role in electoral politics of 
Poland. Without a doubt, they are going to dominate the upcoming electoral 
campaigns (local elections in fall 2014, presidential election in late spring or 
early summer 2015, parliamentary election in fall 2015). SLD and PSL have 
fortified their positions; NP has grown as an important player on the right-
wing of Polish politics. The losers of the 2014 EP election in Poland—SP, 
E+TR, and others—need to rethink their political appeals, in order not to be 
annihilated in the next elections.
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Portugal is experiencing a huge economic and social crisis that has not trig-
gered—at least until now—significant changes in the political system, as it hap-
pened in Greece or Italy. The financial default of the Portuguese state led the 
three main parties—the Socialist Party (PS), the Social Democratic Party (PSD)1 
and the Social Democratic Centre–People’s Party (CDS-PP)—to sign in April 
2011 a three-year bailout with the so-called troika (International Monetary 
Fund, European Commission and European Central Bank). The memorandum 
of understanding established the implementation of structural reforms based 
on a neoliberal agenda in exchange for a 78-billion-euro bailout (Moury and 
Freire, 2013). The program terminated just when the electoral campaign took 
off (May 4) and inevitably influenced not only party programmatic orientations 
but also the political debate and the main issues of competition. The 2014 Euro-
pean elections were thus the opportunity for Portuguese voters to evaluate the 
austerity policies adopted by the right government (PSD and CDS-PP) led by 
Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho (in office since June 2011).
The electoral campaign
The electoral campaign started with the debate about the ‘post-troika’ 
scenarios, that is, whether Portugal would follow the Irish example with a 
‘clean exit’ from the external intervention or whether the government would 
request a program of financial assistance. While the government announced 




the decision to reject additional aids, the electoral competition focused on 
the responsibility of the two main parties to cause the external intervention 
and the austerity policies that followed the bailout (see Magalhães, 2014). The 
PS’ strategy aimed to make the European elections a referendum against the 
government, blaming the right coalition to aggravate the economic and social 
situation with its neoliberal orthodoxy. On the other hand, Passos Coelho em-
phasised the successful exit from the program and the socialists’ bad manage-
ment of the 2008 crisis, considering the PS the only responsible for the troika 
intervention. The campaign developed towards an increasing personalisation 
around the former socialist Prime Minister José Sócrates (in office from 2005 
to 2011), who was addressed by right parties as the main blamable for the eco-
nomic and financial crisis.
Radical left parties campaigned more on European issues than governing 
parties. The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP)—one of the most orthodox 
communist parties in Europe (March 2011)—has always adopted Eurosceptic 
stances, severely criticising both the political and the economic dimensions of 
European integration (Lobo and Magalhães, 2011). In the electoral campaign, 
this criticism assumed clear nationalist tones due to the external intervention. 
Besides this, the communists accused the three main governing parties (PS, 
PSD and CDS-PP) to represent the ‘domestic troika’. On the other hand, the 
Left Block (BE) adopted a relatively positive position towards the political in-
tegration of the European Union, although it severely criticised the economic 
and social dimensions (Fernandes and Pereira, 2014).
While the right coalition presented a preelectoral alliance through a joint 
list of candidates under the label ‘Portugal Alliance’, the left was much more 
fragmented. Two new forces emerged from the BE: the MAS (Socialist Alter-
native Mouvement) and the LIVRE, led by the ex–Member of the European 
Parliament (MEP) Rui Tavares. The first is an extremist left party with strong 
Eurosceptic positions, whereas the second displays a positive—but critical—
stance towards the EU and a more open attitude towards the socialists.
The results: a bitter victory or a sweet defeat?
Portugal elects 21 MEPs, one fewer than in the previous European elec-
tions. The vote is based on a proportional system with a national district and 
closed party lists.
The first important aspect to notice is the increase in the abstention rate. 
In these elections, the abstention achieved a historical 66.1%, almost 3 per-
centage points more than the 2009 score (63.2%). The level of turnout has 
steadily decreased over the years (it was 72.4% in 1987), but in these elections, 
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the abstention rate has been substantially higher than previous legislative or 
presidential elections.
The second interesting aspect is the marginal victory of the main opposi-
tion party. Taking into account the expectations of the socialist leadership, the 
result obtained by the PS (31.5%) had a bitter taste, especially if we consider 
that the competition presented ideal conditions for an excellent performance 
of the opposition. The extremely high levels of government dissatisfaction, 
high rates of prime minister’s unpopularity, as well as high levels of unem-
ployment (more than 15%) and a difficult economic recovery were all factors 
playing in favour of the PS.
Actually, the ‘perfect storm’ for the right government did take place, and 
this is confirmed by the results of the right coalition: 27.7% of the votes and 
the election of seven MEPs (three less than the 2009 elections). The final re-
sults were disappointing, even considering the worst scenario prospected be-












Socialist Party (PS) S&D 31.5 8 +5.0 +1
Portugal Alliance (AP) EPP 27.7 7 −12.4 −3
Democratic Unitarian Coalition (CDU) GUE-N-GL 12.7 3 +2.1 +1
Earth Party (MPT) ALDE 7.1 2 +6.4 +2




Total 100 21 −
Turnout (%) 33.9 –2.9
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) none
Note: The difference of votes and seats of the Portugal Alliance (AP) has been calculated con-
sidering the sum of votes and seats of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and of the People’s 
Party (CDS–PP) in the 2009 elections.
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
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fore the elections. The two right parties lost votes throughout the country, 
especially in the north, which is their traditional stronghold.
Despite the collapse of the government, the PS was not able to benefit from 
voters’ dissatisfaction towards the austerity policies. Who won then the elec-
tions? Two contenders were particularly successful. The first is the PCP, which 
increased both its number of MEPs (from two to three) and its vote share. 
However, the main surprise came from the MPT, an ecologist party that has 
always had a poor performance in both European and legislative elections 
(below 1% of the votes). In the 2014 elections, the MPT obtained 7.1% of the 
votes, electing two MEPs. This success was due, in the first place, to its top 
candidate Marinho e Pinto, an ex-journalist and well-known lawyer. In ad-
dition, this excellent result was based on its antiestablishment discourse: the 
MPT campaigned not only in favour of the renewal of the political elite but 
also against Brussels’ technocracy, its disproportionate bureaucracy and the 
lack of legitimacy of its political elite. Many observers did not hesitate to criti-
cise the populist nature of this discourse, although deprived of the direct de-
mocracy component typical of populist parties. Despite this, the MPT rejects 
the Eurosceptic position adopted by the two radical left parties, displaying a 
rather vague orientation on this topic. The distribution of the vote is relatively 
homogeneous, which reflects the gains of the votes from the two main moder-
ate parties. The MPT performed very well in some districts in the north and 
the coast (Porto, Aveiro, Viana do Castelo, Coimbra), whereas in the south, its 
vote share is above the national average.
To conclude the analysis of election results, we need to emphasise the de-
feat of the BE (just 4.6% of the votes) and the poor performance of the LIVRE 
(2.2%). The protest vote against the austerity policies inflated blank and in-
valid votes, which achieved significant figures (4.4% and 3.1%, respectively).
Conclusions
The results of the 2014 European elections will certainly influence the 
next legislative elections (scheduled for 2015). The poor performance of the 
socialists has strengthened internal criticism towards the leader, and a com-
petition for the leadership is taking place. António José Seguro, the PS secre-
tary-general, will compete against António Costa, the mayor of Lisbon, who 
seems more popular and more effective than the current leader. On the other 
hand, the results of the right coalition, although negative, seem to give them 
some chances for the next electoral contest, especially if we take into account 
the relatively positive evolution of the economy forecasted for the next year. 
However, it is still unknown whether the two parties will present separate 
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lists or whether they will form a preelectoral alliance as what happened in the 
last European elections. Radical left parties are also expected to change their 
strategy, especially the BE and the LIVRE, with the aim to consolidate their 
popularity and increase their competitiveness with regard to the PCP.
The main lesson that we can draw from these elections is the crisis of the 
main parties to maintain their basis of support, while dissatisfaction towards 
the political elite is growing fast. The high levels of mistrust towards parties, 
the lack of clear alternative programs and the growing distance between par-
ties and citizens are some of the main problems that moderate parties have 
to solve in order to avoid a political earthquake. The semipresidential system, 
the significant impact of leaders on voters’ choice and the mass media person-
alisation are some of the elements that pose serious threats to the hegemony 
of the main governing parties. Portuguese voters have already displayed their 
availability for new solutions and alternatives. It remains to be seen whether 
traditional parties will learn the lesson or whether they will ignore the need 
of change that comes from civil society.
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Over the past 25 years, Romania has experienced a complex process of 
democratisation with moments of crisis, economic stagnation, radical nation-
alism and extreme polarisation (Bunce and Wolchick, 2006; Soare, 2011). De-
spite Romania’s admission into NATO in 2004, and into the European Union 
(EU) in 2007, the political situation remained unstable (Levitz and Pop Elech-
es 2010, Spendzharova and Vachudova 2012, Sedelmeier 2014), with recurrent 
institutional clashes between the president, prime minister and parliament, 
such as in 2007 and 2012 (Gherghina and Mişcoiu, 2013), and tough austerity 
measures that fuelled social tensions.
The results1
The European elections in Romania confirmed the Social Democratic 
Party’s (PSD) upward wave, which was already visible in the 2012 legislative 
elections. With over 37% of the votes, the PSD and its two small allies received 
half of the seats available for the Romanian delegation (16/32 seats). If it is 
easy to recognise the winner of the elections, looking for the ‘losers’ seems to 
be an easy task too. First, the populist parties were kept out of the European 
Parliament (EP). In the previous European elections, the nationalist Greater 
Romania Party had three seats, whereas in May 2014, they received only 2.7% 
of the votes, well below the electoral threshold. In the 2012 legislative elec-
tions, the People’s Party—led by Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD)—obtained 14.7% 




of the votes in the Senate and 14.0% in the House. However, the European 
elections demonstrate the political deadlock of a party born and bread on the 
television network of its founder, which has been banned from broadcast-
ing since January 2014 by the National Audiovisual Council. Deprived of its 
most incisive electoral tribune, the PP-DD obtained only 3.7% of the votes. 
The other big ‘losers’ are the two main centre-right parties: the Democratic 
Liberal Party (PD-L) with 12.2% of the votes and the liberals (PNL) with 15%. 
Although in rough terms, the number of liberal Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) increased from five to six in comparison with the 2009 
EU elections, the electoral results have been generally understood as a major 
failure, not only in comparison with the PSD triumph but also and mainly 
in view of the presidential election scheduled for the end of 2014. In the case 
of the PD-L party, the electoral defeat is even more visible considering that 
the party lost half of its previous delegation in the EP. Part of this failure can 
be connected to the relative success obtained by the recently created People’s 
Movement Party (PMP), which gathered 6.2% of the votes (equating to two 
MEPs). Still, the PMP result can only be considered as a partial success; the 
party scored less than the independent candidate Mircea Diaconu and the 
Hungarian Alliance (UDMR) and well below the preelection expectations.2 
Last but not least, an independent candidate succeeded in reaching the EP. 
Similar successes were registered in the 2007 and 2009 EU elections. In 2007, 
the Hungarian pastor László Tőkés was elected with 176,533 votes (3.4%), 
and in 2009, President T. Băsescu’s daughter, Elena Băsescu, was elected with 
204,280 votes (4.2%). In 2014, following various judicial vicissitudes, a new 
independent candidate managed to attract the spotlight and a broad electoral 
support. Mircea Diaconu, a well-known theatre actor, as well as a former 
PNL senator and Minister of Culture, found himself out of the lists of his 
party and decided to stand alone. The outstanding result goes beyond the 
success of collecting the necessary number of signatures (100,000 signatures) 
in order to register as a candidate, considering that he did not benefit from 
the financial and logistical support of his former party. Diaconu received in-
direct support not only from the PSD prime minister, Victor Ponta, but also 
from the media trust Intact Media Group directed by the PC’s founder—Dan 
Voiculescu.3 Devoid of a real electoral program, Diaconu sought to establish 
direct contact with the voters and preached in favour of a restored relation-
2  “PSD e la scor maxim. PMP nu e in situatia de a impune prezidentiabilul dreptei. In-
terviu cu Cristian Preda”, May 27, 2014, www.ziare.com
3  For more details on this issue, see M. Bird e S. Candea “Romanian renegate bids for EP 
seat”, EuObserver, May 19, 2014.
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ship between Europe and the Romanians, the latter being too often and un-
fairly seen as second-class citizens. Hence, the slogan of his campaign was ‘I 
speak the truth about our country’.4
The election campaign and its main players
In a political landscape in turmoil, for the third time in seven years, the 
Romanian voters are being asked to cast their preferences for the EP. Fifteen 
4  According to the official internet site of the candidate - http://www.mirceadiaconu2014.eu/












Electoral Alliance Social Democratic party 
+ National Union for the Progress of Ro-
mania + Conservative Party (PSD+UNPR 
+ PC)
S&D 37.6 16 +6.5 +5
National Liberal Party (PNL) ALDE/EPP 15.0 6 +0.5 +1
Democratic Liberal Party (PD-L) EPP 12.2 5 −17.5 −5
Mircea Diaconu (indep.) NI 6.8 1
Democratic union of Hungarians in Roma-
nia (UDMR) EPP 6.3 2 −2.6 −1
People’s Movement Party (PMP) EPP 6.2 2
Great Romania Party (PRM) 2.7 0 −6.0 −3
Dan Diaconescu–People’s Party (PP-DD) 3.7 0
Others 9.5
Total 100 32 −1
Turnout (%) 32.4 +4.8
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) 5%
Note on electoral system: Proportional representation, closed lists, one national constituency.
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
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political parties and electoral alliances and eight independent candidates have 
officially registered.5 Although Europe has been a constant reference on the 
main election billboards or in the main parties’ official programs, internal is-
sues have prevailed in the electoral debates. Since the beginning, the electoral 
competition has been marked by a polarisation around the personality of the 
incumbent president, T. Băsescu. On the one side, there are the two parties 
directly related to the political career of the current president of Romania: the 
Liberal Democratic Party (PD-L), the party T. Băsescu was leader of before 
his first election to the Romanian presidency in 2004, and the new PMP. On 
the other side, there is the winning coalition of the 2012 legislative elections, 
whose members were in government until recently: the PSD, the PNL, the 
small Conservative Party (PC) and the National Union for the Progress of 
Romania (UNPR). In February 2014, the PNL leadership decided to break the 
Social Liberal Union (USL) and to withdraw from the government following 
regular clashes with the PSD. On the eve of the European elections and in 
preparation of the upcoming presidential elections, the PNL’s decision was 
an open bet, eventually lost. The representatives of the Hungarian minority 
in Romania (UDMR) occupy a pivotal position with interchanging alliances 
between the two polls.
In the context of the 2014 campaign, the issue most covered by the media 
was that of the controversial photos of President Băsescu wearing a T-shirt 
with the PMP logo, one of the parties registered in the campaign. These pic-
tures were posted by the PML leader on her Facebook account under a sym-
bolic heading ‘Traian Băsescu with the young men and women of PMP’. In 
those pictures, the president was wearing a T-shirt with the slogan ‘Vote for 
PMP’. According to the Romanian Constitution, the president is defined as 
‘a mediator between the powers in the State, as well as between the State and 
society’ (art. 80, 2), while according to art 84§2, ‘during his term of office, the 
President of Romania may not be a member of any political party, nor may he 
perform any other public or private office’.6 In line with these constitutional 
dispositions, the prime minister asked the constitutional court to clarify if the 
president overpassed his prerogatives. Meanwhile, President Băsescu denied 
a violation of the constitution since ‘he is entitled to wear whatever clothes he 
wishes’, provokingly adding that ‘he will vote for the People’s Movement Party 
because voting is not illegal’. ‘I will vote for the People’s Movement Party. 
You asked. If you hadn’t asked me, I wouldn’t have answered. (…) I’m vot-
5  “Proces verbal privind rimanerii definitive a candidaturilor la alegerile pentru membrii 
din Romania in Parlamentul european din anul 2014”.
6  Constitution of Romania (2003).
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ing for the People’s Movement Party’.7 Four days before the election date, the 
president eventually won the dispute between President Băsescu and Premier 
Ponta when the constitutional court ruled on President Băsescu’s involvement 
in the EP campaign.
In parallel, the European elections’ campaign was seen as a test run of 
the presidential elections scheduled for November 2014. Symbolically, a lot 
of electoral posters reproduced the images of the main parties’ potential can-
didates for the presidential elections. In this context, beyond the forecasted 
candidacy of Prime Minister Ponta on behalf of the socialists, a major player 
was the PNL and, in particular, its leader Crin Antonescu. The PNL’s sud-
den decision to exit the coalition government in February 2014 was a prelude 
to the candidacy of its leader in the presidential elections. However, the 15% 
electoral result (−22.6 percentage points in comparison with the PSD) was at-
tributed to lack of strategy. It is also interesting to note that the PNL leadership 
decided to reassign its MEPs from the ALDE group to the European Popular 
Party. This political realignment was interpreted as a last strategic attempt to 
fight back the PSD on the European battlefield by hampering the chance of a 
socialist candidate to be appointed as the head of the European Commission.8 
This move was also interpreted as a first step ahead for an alliance for the 
presidential majority with the PD-L, former coalition partner in 2004.
In this electoral landscape, we can find elements of the founding cleavage 
the Romanian postcommunist political life: the opposition between ex-com-
munist versus anticommunists. This issue has often been used by the PMP and 
the PD-L to distinguish themselves from the PSD whose origins led to the for-
mer PCR (Pop Eleches, 2008). The exhortations of one of the most well-known 
representatives of the PD-L MEPs, Monica Macovei, are quite significant. To 
motivate a vote in favour of the PD-L, Macovei criticised the alleged betrayal 
of the interests of Eastern Europe by the social democrat Martin Schultz—the 
socialist candidate for the presidency of the European Commission. Schulz 
was also criticised for his attempts to calm the tensions with Russia, as well 
as for blocking the criminal investigations of corruption being conducted on 
the Romanian MEP, Ovidiu Silaghi (then PNL, today PSD). According to a 
syllogism that is fairly rudimentary but symbolic for its anticommunist rheto-
ric, in synthesis to vote for the PSD lists was equated with voting against the 
interests of Romania and in favour of a pro-Russian president of the European 
Commission.9
7  Raluca Tonita, “President Basescu: I’m voting PMP!”, May 4, 2014.
8  “Romania’s second largest party PNL moves from ALDE to EPP”, May 27, 2014.
9  “Monica Macovei: Suntem sub amenintarea Federatiei Ruse; europarlamentarii polon-
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The UDMR is in a quite different position; its constant electoral successes 
are largely due to the characteristics of the ethnic vote. The EU was also not 
the core of the electoral campaign. At the opening of the election campaign, 
the UDMR president symbolically declared that the vote on May 25 would 
have contributed to the dearest objective of ‘bringing Südtirol and Catalonia10 
in Transylvania’, an implicit support for the UDMR’s aim to obtain regional 
autonomy for its ethnic basis. He continued on the same line, ‘Our interests 
can only be represented by Magyars MEPs (...). If we do not enter (na—the EP), 
our place will be taken by the Romanian MEPs. This is about our future.’11 
Consistent with these positions, European issues such as multilingualism and 
decentralisation were present in the UDMR’s electoral statements.
Among the participants in the May elections, there were also the repre-
sentatives of the national populist family: the PRM and the PP-DD. Rather 
peripheral in the public debates, both parties promoted a discourse focused 
on issues such as the defence of national unity and dignity, criticisms over the 
political establishment and a tougher fight against corruption. The PRM’s slo-
gans were quite symbolic: ‘Vote with the Patriots, not the mafia!’ or ‘Patriots 
vote the PRM!’ The PP-DD slogan followed the same tune: ‘On May 25th vote 
with a Romanian soul!’ However, both parties’ election results placed them 
below the electoral threshold.
Final remarks
Rather than a campaign of ideas or a debate between different visions 
on Europe, the 2014 election campaign has been a tribune for the potential 
presidential candidates with elections scheduled for November 2014. This 
gives us a certain sense of déjà vu: European elections with a low participa-
tion and a strong emphasis on national issues like in 2007 and 2009. Given 
the results, Romanians have cast a vote of confidence for the current coali-
tion government and penalised the two main representatives of the centre-
right, the PD-L and the PNL. The shockwave of the results was immediately 
felt by the latter: Crin Antonescu and the PNL direction resigned, and an 
ezi si cei din tarile baltice vorbesc despre pregatiri pentru aparare in caz de razboi”, April 
12, 2014, Ziarul de Iaşi o “Ce vrea Macovei de la Schulz privind anchetarea lui Silaghi”, 
HotnewsRo, May 22, 2014.
10  UDMR si-a lansat candidatii pentru europarlamentare. Kelemen Hunor: “Sa aducem 
Catalonia in Ardeal”, Mediafax, March 29, 2014.
11  Ibid.
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extraordinary congress was scheduled for the end of June 2014. Without the 
direct support of the President Băsescu, the PD-L halved its mandates (from 
10 to 5), although the total number of Romanian in the EPP group will most 
likely be strengthened by the two MEPs from the PMP and the six liberal 
MEPs. The success of the PSD also has a European consequence, which goes 
beyond the fact that the PSD’s two smaller allies obtained half of the man-
dates available: the Romanian socialists are the strongest delegation coming 
from a postcommunist country. Note that the electoral participation regis-
tered a slight increase (+4.8 compared with that in 2009) but remains lower 
than the European average.
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Slovakia: Record holder in the lowest turnout
Peter Spáč
30 May 2014
On May 24, the election to European Parliament (EP) was held in Slovakia. 
This election was the third since the country’s entry to the European Union 
(EU). As in the previous contests, the turnout was extremely low, and in 2014, 
it reached its historical minimum as only 13% of the Slovak citizens partici-
pated on the polls.
The elections to EP in Slovakia are held under a proportional electoral sys-
tem with a single nationwide constituency where all 13 Members of the Eu-
ropean Parliament (MEPs) are elected. Originally, Slovakia had 14 MEPs, but 
after Romania and Bulgaria entered the EU, this number was slightly reduced. 
In the election, only political parties may compete and the country applies 
a 5% threshold what limits the chances for smaller parties. This system was 
adopted before the country’s first European election in 2004 and has not been 
modified so far.
The campaign
The election to European parliament was affected by the presidential elec-
tion, which was held in March 2014. Since 1999, Slovak citizens choose their 
head of state directly and the president’s term lasts for five years.1 This means 
that the presidential elections in Slovakia always precede the competition to 
European parliament as the former are held only about two months before 
the latter.
1  The president was originally elected by the parliament, but the high polarisation of the 
party system in the second half of the ’90s eliminated any chance to choose the head of 
the state in this way. As a result, until the adoption of direct election, Slovakia had no 
president for nearly one year (Henderson, 2002).
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The main consequence here is quite straightforward. The contest for the 
head of state is of great importance in the domestic politics and the one in 
2014 was no exemption. At least two factors played a role here. First, the cam-
paign was very intensive and lasted for a long time. Some of the candidates 
started with their presentation during summer 2013, and such, the campaign 
lasted for nearly a whole year. Second, the presidential election in 2014 re-
ceived great attention as the prime minister and the leader of dominant party 
Smer–Social Democracy (Smer-SD) Robert Fico entered the competition. The 
race thus provided a strong rivalry between the candidate of the ruling party 
with nominees of the opposition and a few independents. The presidential 
contest ended in the end of March, leaving citizens tired from the long lasting 
campaign.
Until the new head of state was decided, the topic of European election 
in fact did not exist in Slovak politics. Even in the following days, it did not 
become the prime question as the media were more occupied with the vic-
tory of nonpartisan Andrej Kiska and even more with the failure of the prime 
minister. This was an important point as it was less than two months before 
the election to EP and the campaign for it did not even start.
Based on the aforementioned, the campaign for the European election was 
not intense in Slovakia and it was not far from being invisible. The main po-
litical parties did not open any conflicting debate, and they presented rather 
moderate views on the EU and its function. The valence issues as the impor-
tance of the country’s position in the EU, lower bureaucracy, support of edu-
cation and research, and so on, ruled the campaign what was quite striking 
when compared with previous presidential election, which included repeated 
clashes between candidates.
From the relevant parties, only the right-wing liberal Freedom and Soli-
darity (SaS) presented itself as the only true advocate of Slovakia in Europe. 
With the main campaign quote All for Brussels, we for you! it tried to visibly 
distinguish itself from the remaining mainstream parties by claiming that it 
only protects the country’s economic interests.2 Although SaS is the parlia-
mentary party with the most reserved opinion on the EU, it is still far from 
stances held by the British UKIP led by Nigel Farage. For example, it criticises 
the adoption of the Euro by Slovakia as premature, but as a solution, it does 
not call for its abandoning and return to previous currency, but only for a 
higher responsibility of the member states.
2  In 2011 SaS was the only party which refused to support the bailout rescue programs 
and thus laid down the government of Iveta Radičová of which it was a member.
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Results
The election was won by the ruling social democratic Smer-SD, which got 
4 of 13 seats. Although the party won with a fairly high margin, its result 
of 24.1% was rather a disappointment. When compared with the European 
election in 2009, the party lost nearly 8 percentage points and one seat in the 
European parliament as it dropped from five to four mandates.
The remaining nine seats were divided between seven parties. The stron-
gest oppositional party, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), slightly 
increased its vote share from 2009 (+2.3 percentage points) and equaled its 
seat gain, as it got two mandates. On the other hand, a more liberal Slovak 
Democratic and Christian Union–Democratic Party (SDKU-DS) lost more 
than half of its support from the previous European election, but due to the 
formula of the system, it was able to remain at two seats.












Smer–Social Democracy (Smer-SD) S&D 24.1 4 −7.9 −1
Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) EPP 13.2 2 +2.3 +0
Slovak Democratic and Christian Union–De-
mocratic Party (SDKU-DS) EPP 7.8 2 −9.2 +0
Ordinary People and Independent Persona-
lities (OLaNO) NI 7.5 1 +7.5 +1
NOVA, Conservative Democrats of Slova-
kia (KDS), Civic Conservative Party (OKS) ECR 6.8 1 +6.8 +1
Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) ALDE 6.7 1 +2.0 +1
Party of Hungarian Community (SMK) EPP 6.5 1 −4.8 −1
Bridge (Most) EPP 5.8 1 +5.8 +1
Others   21.5 0      
Total 100 13 –
Turnout (%) 13 −6.6
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) 5
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.
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All the other parties were able to secure one mandate each. Of this group, 
only the party of the Hungarian Community (SMK), representing the Hun-
garian minority living in southern parts of Slovakia, had MEPs even before 
election 2014. The other four subjects contested in the European election for 
the first time as they were mostly created after 2009. Most of them may be 
labeled as centre-right, and their vote shares were quite similar as they ranged 
between 5.8% and 7.5% of votes.3
Despite the anticipated trends in recent Europe, the far-right parties failed 
in election 2014 in Slovakia. The once popular nationalist Slovak National 
Party (SNS) secured only 3.6% of votes and lost its only MEP from the pre-
vious term. Even lower result was gained by the continuously rising extreme 
right People’s Party–Our Slovakia (LSNS), whose leader succeeded in regional 
election in 2013 when he got the office of a regional president. The party, how-
ever, got only 1.7% of votes and was not even close to obtain a seat. The Slovak 
far right will thus be not represented in EP for the following five years.
Interpretation
The European election 2014 in Slovakia provided several interesting in-
sights. First of all, for the third time, the parties grouped in European People’s 
Party (EPP) gained the most seats. Although they were not able to match their 
success in 2004, when they acquired nine mandates, their share remained the 
same as in 2009 with six seats. As before the Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats (S&D), represented by Smer-SD, ended as second with one lost 
seat when compared with election 2009.
As for the results of respective political parties, the victory of Smer-SD was 
clear but rather unsatisfying for the party. Since its emergence in 1999, the 
party of Robert Fico became the dominant subject of the party system with 
hegemony of the centre-left ideological axis (Leška, 2013). It won all general 
elections since 2006, continuously increasing its results. In the last parliamen-
tary election in 2012, Smer-SD got more than 44% of votes, thus receiving a 
majority in Slovak parliament, which allowed it to form a government without 
any need for coalition partners (Spáč, 2014). However, in recent years, some 
signals indicating the party’s decline have been shown, i.e. the regional elec-
3  One of these parties, the Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OLaNO), 
is a specific subject. It profiles itself as a platform for independent candidates and has 
strong antiestablishment sentiments. As such, the party has only four members who are 
its founders (Spáč, 2012).
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tion in 2013 and presidential contest in March 2014. The European election in 
2014 confirmed this potential trend.
Figure 1. MEPs of EP groups in Slovak elections
Note: In 2004, Slovakia had 14 MEPs; in 2009 and 2014, only 13 MEPs.
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.
The election also showed that important discussions regarding potential 
increase of far-right and populist parties in Europe have avoided Slovakia so 
far. Both far-right parties have failed to secure any seat. The potential expla-
nation lies in the fact that these parties typically mobilise their voters on do-
mestic topics. This is especially true for the extreme LSNS, which is oriented 
strongly negatively against Roma minority in Slovakia while the EU and its 
aspects are of secondary importance to it.
However, the most striking result of the election 2014 was the extremely 
low turnout. Despite fairly high support of EU institutions in Slovakia, only 
13% of citizens participated on the polls, thus creating a negative record in 
the history of European elections.4 This outcome may be partly attributed to 
the crucial presidential race held only two months earlier, as this competition 
took enormous attention and led to some fatigue of voters. The weak and short 
campaign before European election only supported this contrast. Although 
the poor turnout may be rated as a negative factor, it opened discussions about 




a possible change of the electoral system to mobilise more voters in later con-
tests. In 2014, a grand codification of all electoral laws is being prepared in 
Slovakia, thus creating a chance to modify the current system and its parts.
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Slovenia: Internal political crisis and the 
success of the opposition
Simona Kustec Lipicer
11 June 2014
The European Union (EU) was almost completely absent from the third 
Slovenian elections to the European Parliament (EP). In times when official 
campaign for the EP elections took place, domestic political crisis finally 
erupted in its whole complexity, although even before no really visible signs of 
European elections atmosphere could be detected either within political par-
ties, publics, or even media.
At the end, election results in a way confirmed a typical second-order 
character of EP elections in a part that is related to the opposition and new 
alternative parties’ election success (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), although 2014 
EP election results in a country primarily needs to be related to the highly 
idiosyncratic national political circumstances through the whole preelectoral 
period. The prism of national parties’ micro level conditions as well as the 
state’s macro level circumstances seem to be central in explaining the deter-
minants of the Slovenian electoral atmosphere.
Domestic political circumstances as predeterminants of EP elections
In general, the attitudes of Slovenian parliamentary parties towards EP 
elections were very much reserved. Both coalition and opposition parties had 
not officially declared neither their election intentions nor even the list of the 
candidates competing almost until one month before the elections, when the 
official deadline for the submission of the candidates’ lists needed to be sub-
mitted. Therefore, parties did not initiate any comprehensive EU-related elec-
tion identities and even those parties that had their representatives in the EP 
2009–2014 session quite rarely referred to their own MPSs and their work.
The preliminary analysis of the already mentioned party attitudes could 
be—although very partially—explained with the generally low public satis-
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faction with the EU and demands from Brussels towards the country that had 
been for a long time regarded as one of the most matured candidates for the 
‘troika visit’. On the other hand, internal crisis in (a) domestic political par-
ties, (b) parliamentary as well as (c) governmental arena, together with a low 
level of political culture that was especially seen through low political trust 
and satisfaction (Toš et al., 2014) explained the distant and calm attitude to-
wards the EP elections inside the country.
In the beginning of 2014, serious internal crisis in Positive Slovenia (PS), 
the leading coalition party, was officially disclosed, pointing to the division of 
the party in two blocks. One block was close to the PM Bratušek and govern-
mental coalition agenda, and the other to the party’s founding father Janković, 
mayor of the capital city of Ljubljana, who needed to step down from the posi-
tion of the party president because of the set of corruption accusations.
Further on the second biggest coalition party of Social Democrats (SD) 
similarly fought their internal party leadership struggles that ended with al-
most self-nomination of the party leader as a holder of the party list for the EP 
elections. The third coalition member, Democratic Party of Retired Persons 
of Slovenia (DeSUS), in the beginning of the election year officially declared 
their non participation in the elections because of their internal party austeri-
ty measures and related own internal cost-benefit calculations for nonsuccess. 
However, later on, the party gave its name to the ex–For Real (Zares) EP MEP 
Vajgl, who lost its party base in the middle of the EP 2009–2014 term because 
of the instability of the party structure.
Similarly, the main opposition party Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) 
faced their internal party crisis mainly because of the trails of their party 
president Janša, accusing him of taking bribes in the procurement of military 
equipment from Finland’s Patria Oyj. The other two opposition parties, cen-
tre-right Slovenian People’s Party (SLS) and Christian democratic New Slove-
nia (NSi) decided to form preelectoral coalition and attended the EP elections 
with a joint list. This was the first attempt of that kind for the EP elections on 
the right end of the political spectrum so far. Citizens List (DL) as the fourth 
opposition party, and alike the coalition government member Positive Slove-
nia (PS), a highly successful new comer of the national 2011 parliamentary 
arena, had in times of EP elections fought with their internal party democracy 
problems that affected their capacities and chances to compete at the EP elec-
tions as well.
Because of the civil society protest movements that took place at the end 
of 2013, also a couple of new political parties were formed afterwards (such as 
Solidarnost), one completely new party that was leader-focused (Believe, run 
by ex-president of the Court of Auditors, Šoltes) and a new alliance party run 
by EP MEP Kacin (ex–Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) in term 2009–
2014, now a candidate on its own list Kacin Specifically), who lost his party 
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identity because of the disappearance of LDS from the political scene in times 
of his EP MEP’s term of office.
The campaign
It is no surprise that in such confused circumstances, Slovenian EP elec-
toral campaign experience was nonstructured, very much blurred, without 
any visible image and short termed as well. It remainded to a mixture of vari-
ous types of campaigns, from premodern, modern to postmodern (Farrell 
and Schmitt‐Beck, 2002; Whiteley and Seyd, 2003). The winning party SDS’s 
campaign was recognisable through its direct interpersonal communication 
and support from other European politicians; the campaign of the second 
best party NSI-SLS, by its USA-driven campaign model approach, whereas 
SD, which gained one MEP, was, except some negative campaign inputs, simi-
lar to SDS’s approach. Igor Šoltes’s list Believe campaign was, in particular, 
branding Šoltes as a new, fresh and positive political actor on the political 
scene (Rtvslo, 2014; Siol, 2014). Party campaigns were mainly led through 
their homepages and also parties’ and candidates’ own social networks, such 
as Facebook and Twitter. Traditional forms of applied campaign techniques 
and material were used in very limited scope.
Almost all competing parties prepared by scope short electoral programs, 
which were available online on their web pages. The main issues emphasised 
in the programs referred either to the EU-related democratic deficit topics as 
well as national EU-related topics, concerning the role of the country in the 
EU and specific actual financial, economic, employment, social justice and 
youth policy issues. Except DeSUS and Believe, which are not yet members of 
any European party group, all the other winning parties closely referred their 
programs also to their European party group’s manifestos.
Media interest for the campaign was, compared with other past electoral 
campaigns, very limited and focused on a couple of confrontations on the na-
tional television and radio and short contributions in printed and Web media. 
The campaign was moderate and quite ‘peaceful’, with only slight negative 
campaign issues, mainly addressed towards Igor Šoltes’s list Believe, which 
at the end won one MEP seat, and in the SD campaign speech towards SDS 
party leader Janša due to his Patria trials. Media-related campaign issues quite 
atypically for the existing Slovenian circumstances closely referred to the par-
ties’ election program contents. In addition, Eurosceptic-related topics and 





Voting is based on the proportional system with preferential votes. The 
country as a whole constitutes a single electoral district. The division of seats 
is performed for the country as a whole, with seats being allocated to candi-
date lists under the d’Hondt method. No fixed threshold for obtaining MEP’s 
position is defined in such electoral system (DVK, 2014).
Turnout at the 2014 EP elections was 24.55%, which is almost 4% less than 
at the 2009 elections and in general one of the lowest in the whole EU.
As seen from the election results in the table, right-centred parties of SDS 
and SLS-NSi, both members of EPP won the majority seats of Slovenian quo-












Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) EPP 24.78 3 −1.88 0
New Slovenia–Christian People’s Party 
(NSi) + Slovenian People’s Party (SLS) EPP 16.60 2 +3.6 1
Believe! Dr. Igor Šoltes List none 10.33 1 +10.3 1
Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slo-
venia (DeSUS) none 8.12 1 +0.94 1*
Social Democrats (SD) S&D 8.08 1 −10.35 −1
For Real (ZARES) ALDE 0.95 0 −8.8 −1
Positive Slovenia (PS) none 6.63 0 +6.6 0
Civic List (DL) ALDE 1.14 0 +1.1 0
Others   23.37 0 +5.57 −1**
Total   100 8   0
Turnout 24.55 −3.82
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) none
Source: DVK (2014a).
*The seat was won by Vajgl, who was the holder at DeSUS list, and the EP MEP of the party 
Zares in 2009–2014 term.
** One seat for others in 2009 for LDS, which did not compete at the 2014 elections.
Abbreviations for EP groups: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The 
Greens–European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, 
European United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, 
Non-Inscrits.                                                                                                                
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ta of eight MEP seats in the EP. Although successful, the 2014 results were 
quite relative compared with the 2009 EP elections—SDS gained even less 
votes than in 2009, while also NSi and SLS together gathered less votes than 
in 2009. Established left-centred parties faced a huge election failure with ap-
proximately 20 percentage points less than the 2009 score. In addition, the 
leading coalition party of PS was not even able to collect enough votes to win 
at least one seat. A kind of a surprise of the elections are a new party Believe 
and so far not on the EU political floors active coalition party DeSUS, both 
gaining their first success at the EP elections. In addition, the voting results 
also pointed to an increase in the number of votes for ‘other’ parties, which 
can be explained with the fact that also the number of competing parties from 
2009 to 2014 increased from 12 to 16.
Final remarks
The preliminary analysis of the Slovenian elections to the EP 2014 shows 
a quite clear pattern of Reif and Schmitt’s (1980) national second-order elec-
tion character, despite that some later analytical conclusions pointed that the 
applicability of the second-order election theory in ‘new’ member states, par-
ticularly those joining in 2004 (e.g., also Slovenia), may not be as straightfor-
ward as it is in ‘old’ member states (Hix and Marsh, 2011). At the same time, 
2014 Slovenian experiences clearly confirmed also a three-decade-old finding 
from ‘old’ member states that the EP second-order election results are signifi-
cantly influenced by the situation in the first-order arena at the national level 
(Reif, 1984).
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Spain: The beginning of the end of bipartisan 
rule?
Enrique Hernández and Marta Fraile
11 June 2014
Once more, and as is typical in Spain (see, for instance, Font and Torcal, 
2012), the main messages and discourses of the electoral campaign were made 
in national (and not in European) terms. Elections took place when the in-
cumbent government (Partido Popular, PP: conservative) was in the middle of 
its mandate and had already implemented a number of controversial political 
decisions. On top of that, there was a general climate of distrust and disaffec-
tion with political elites and traditional political parties without precedents 
in Spain.1
The electoral campaign
The most relevant topic of the campaign (and again in national terms) has 
been the beginning of the end of bipartisan rule. Citizens’ levels of disaffec-
tion with traditional political parties and elites have reached their maximum 
in the history of the Spanish democracy. Especially after a long period of so-
cial mobilisation and protest that since the organisation of the 15M movement 
(los indignados) in 2011 has constantly promoted protest initiatives during 
the PP mandate.
European elections constitute the best scenario for small parties to obtain 
a higher percentage of representation since the use of only one nationwide 
electoral district favors a higher level of proportionality, and the number of 
1  According to the latest wave of the European Social Survey in Spain, the average trust 
on political parties is of 1.87 (and for a scale that ranges from 0 to10 where 0 means a 
complete lack of confidence).
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votes required to obtain a seat is smaller than in general elections. Despite the 
fact that the majority of small parties have based their campaigns on critics 
towards Spain’s nearly bipartisan party system, the two main parties (the in-
cumbent PP and the main opposition party: PSOE, social democrats) agreed 
upon organising a television debate only between their respective candidates 
but not including any other candidates.
This debate, again, focused on Spanish national problems (basically a dis-
cussion about who should be blamed for the deep economic crisis in Spain and 
its consequences), with a complete lack of discussion about potential projects 
for the future of Spain in Europe. Another topic that was debated extensively 
during the electoral campaign was the independence of Catalonia and its po-
tential consequences for the inclusion of Catalonia in the European Union.
The results
Turnout projections were very pessimistic, since they predicted the highest 
level of abstention since the first 1986 European elections in Spain. Conse-
quently, all parties called for participation in their campaigns. Finally, par-
ticipation has been similar to previous elections. More specifically, electoral 
turnout in European elections gradually decreased during the 1986–2002 pe-
riod. Since then, it has been stable approximately 45% (Figure 1). This figure, 
however, is significantly lower than turnout at the general (national) elections 
where, for example, in 2011, 69% of electors participated. This suggests that 
even if all parties campaigned on the importance (and need) to participate in 
the European elections, Spanish citizens still consider the latter as ‘second-
order’ elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980).
Figure 2 shows a decrease in electoral support for the two main parties in 
Spain: PP and PSOE. In absolute terms, both lost approximately 2.5 million of 
votes, which implies a decrease of 15% of the total vote. Indeed, this has been 
the worst result obtained by the PSOE in a European election since 1986. The 
fact that that the socialists conceived this election as a plebiscite of the incum-
bent’s mandate and of their own performance as the main opposition party 
motivated the resignation of the main party leaders, which was announced 
the day immediately after the elections. In contrast, the incumbent PP has 
positively interpreted these results, pointing out the fact that they have ob-
tained the highest percentage of electoral support and seats in the European 
Parliament. In fact, they are one of the few European political parties (togeth-
er with CDU in Germany and PD in Italy) that, while being the incumbent, 
has won the elections.
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Overall, left wing parties have enjoyed greater support in this election. 
The vote share of PSOE, Izquierda Unida / Iniciativa por Cataluña (IU/ICV), 
Podemos, Los Pueblos Deciden (LPD) and Primavera adds up to more than 
50% of the valid votes. At the regional level, it is also worth noting that in 
Catalonia, the main nationalist left-wing party (L’esquerra pel dret a decidir) 
received 4% of the votes, defeating, for the first time, the main nationalist 
right-wing party Convergència i Unió (CIU).
A possible interpretation of the results of this election is that large tradi-
tional mainstream parties have been the main losers, whereas small parties 
(some traditional and some new) have widely benefited from these losses. On 
the one hand, the party located at the left from PSOE: IU/ICV has tripled 
its vote share. On the other hand, relatively new parties such as UPyD have 
doubled their vote share. At the same time, newly created parties, such as 
Ciudadanos or Podemos, won more than 3% of the votes. The most remark-
able success has been that of Podemos, which won 8% of the vote in the first 
election the party had ever contested. This party was created only four months 
before the elections and campaigned on a simple critical message against the 
political system and its main parties and institutions, focusing on issues such 
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as corruption, lack of internal democracy, or politicians being out of touch 
with citizens. That is, a discourse, which was clearly at odds with mainstream 
politics and focused on reinvigorating citizens’ political engagement through 
a new style of politics very much against the establishment. In fact, Podemos 
intended to be the political choice not only of those electors who were will-
ing to punish mainstream left parties, such as PSOE or IU, but also of those 
who had abstained in previous elections but wanted to participate again as a 
consequence of the politicisation experienced through the increase of political 
conflict since the onset of the Great Recession in Spain.
Another peculiarity of the Spanish case is that, even if nonmainstream 
parties have enjoyed increasing support, none of these parties can be classified 
as overtly anti-European. This clearly contrasts with other European coun-
tries where parties clearly opposed to European integration, such as UKIP in 
the UK, the FN in France, or AfD in Germany, enjoyed great support.
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Conclusion
In sum, small nonmainstream parties (Podemos, Ciudadanos, UPyD, 
Primavera) have won approximately 20% of the votes (see Figure 3), whereas 
traditional small parties (IU/ICV, CEU, EPDD) have increased their vote 
share winning also 20% of the votes. The great support of these parties, to-
gether with the fact that traditional mainstream parties have received, for the 
first time, less than 50% of the votes, has generated a debate among politi-
cal commentators and leaders of small parties about the end of bipartisan 
rule. However, even if we cannot predict the results of future elections, it is 












POPULAR PARTY (PP) EPP 26.1 16 −16.1 −8





10.0 6 +6.3 +4
PODEMOS (PODEMOS) GUE-N-GL 8.0 5 +8.0 +5
UNION FOR PROGRESS AND DEMO-
CRACY (UPyD) ALDE 6.5 4 +3.7 +3
COALITION FOR EUROPE (CEU) ALDE 5.4 3 +0.3 +0
LEFT FOR THE RIGHT TO DECIDE (EPDD) G-EFA 4.0 2 +1.5 +1
CITIZENS (C’s) NI 3.2 2 +3.2 +2
THE PEOPLE DECIDE (LPD) G-EFA 2.1 1 +1.0 +1
EUROPEAN SPRING G-EFA 1.9 1 +1.9 +1
Others 7.5 0
Blank ballots 2.3
Total 100 54 35
Turnout (%) 45.8
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%)   none        
Note: PODEMOS, C’s, and European Spring did not run in the previous European elections. 
LPD did not obtain representation in the previous European election when it run as II.
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
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worth pointing out that European elections have certain particularities that 
differentiate them from general elections. First, European elections are usu-
ally considered ‘second-order’ elections. This might increase the likelihood 
of citizens’ voting new parties, or parties that, a priori, have less chances of 
gaining representatives, such as Primavera, Ciudadanos, or Podemos. Sec-
ond, the use of a single national district in European elections increases the 
degree of proportionality in the translation of votes into seats. Hence, some 
electors who do not live in densely populated provinces may choose to vote 
for these parties in European elections, but they might vote strategically for 
larger parties in national elections because these are the parties more likely 
to gain seats in low-magnitude districts.
Although it is still soon to predict the end of bipartisan rule in Spain, the 
capacity of new parties to address the demands of the average citizen through 
a new style of politics implies a great challenge for mainstream parties. The 
latter seem to be aware of this challenge, since PSOE leaders have already 
argued for the need to revitalise and reform their party through a process 
of open primaries. In this regard, the results of the European elections can 
Figure 3. Evolution of support for mainstream and nonmainstream parties in European 
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be considered a manifestation of citizens’ dissatisfaction with the economic 
crisis and its related consequences such as unemployment or evictions, but 
more importantly, as an expression of citizens’ political disaffection and their 
critical stance towards mainstream politics. Hence, it seems that these elec-
tions might represent the start of a new era in Spanish politics: an era where 
political elites might need to change their strategies and get closer to their 
representatives.
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Sweden: An escape from mainstream parties
Nina Liljeqvist
30 May 2014
In the 2009 European elections, Swedish voters favoured government par-
ties on the centre-right and gave the cold shoulder to alternatives on both the 
far-left and far-right. Come 2014, things could not be more different. This is 
the fifth European Parliament election for Swedish voters, and while voter 
turnout is on the up, support for the mainstream parties on both the centre-
left and centre-right is decreasing.
From the campaign to the result: The winners
The voters are instead rewarding those that have emphasised specific issues 
and concrete alternatives in the campaign, namely, green politics, feminism, 
and nationalism. The Green Party (Mp) achieved an impressive election re-
sult, receiving an unprecedented 15% of the votes (Table 1) to become the 
second largest Swedish party in the European Parliament. Mp considers that 
this success is the result of focusing on the ‘right’ issues, that is, on issues that 
are regulated at the European level and where the party knows how to make 
a difference. Media has paid attention to how Green Member of the European 
Parliament (MEP) Isabella Lövin has single-handedly managed to bring about 
a fundamental change of the European Union’s (EU) fisheries policies in the 
last few years, which arguably has had considerable traction with voters.
The other two parties that have advanced this year are located at both 
extremes of the political spectrum. As in several other countries in Europe, 
the far-right is also experiencing a surge in support in Sweden. The Sweden 
Democrats (SD), with its anti-immigration and Eurosceptic stance, received 
10% of the votes and thereby enters the European Parliament for the first time 
with two seats. Despite the SD having to cancel a number of public election 
meetings because of violent protests—or, perhaps rather because of this—the 
party has almost tripled support received in the 2009 election. Besides the Left 
Party (V), which openly argues for an eventual exit from the European Un-
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ion, the SD certainly offers voters an alternative EU-stance compared with the 
centre parties. The party wishes to renegotiate Swedish EU membership, rein-
state national border controls, remain outside the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), but also ensure free trade with the rest of Europe. In other words, 
the party wants to keep Swedish access to the inner market, although with-
out complying with the corresponding regulations. How the party intends to 
work to advance these issues, which are all regulated at the national level, is 
uncertain to say the least. There is also uncertainty surrounding what parlia-
mentary party group they will join, which is essentially a question of whether 
the SD will shift even further right by joining Marine Le Pen’s proposed more 
extreme far-right group. Possibly for strategic reasons to avoid ‘guilt by asso-
ciation’, party leader Jimmie Åkesson has refused to discuss potential affilia-
tions, and it is reasonable to expect that the SD will not reveal what group to 
sit in until after the national elections this September.
The second Swedish newcomer is located at the opposite end of the spec-
trum. For the first time in Swedish history, as indeed European, Feminist 
Initiative (Fi) enters the European Parliament. A new type of political move-
ment based on feminism, the party’s ideology cuts across the socioeconomic 
left-right dimension, but is probably best positioned on the far-left. Having 
scored approximately 2% in the 2009 election, thereby falling far below the 
4% threshold, the party just garnered 5% of the votes. Although the one seat 
this grants Fi may sound meagre, it is monumental because feminism has en-
tered the political landscape for real. Party leader Gudrun Schyman has run 
a remarkable campaign over the last few months, getting considerable media 
attention by pressing ministers and party leaders on the importance of gender 
equality and human rights. Their slogan ‘Out with the racists, in with the fem-
inists!’ has found particular traction with voters in urban areas with higher 
education. At the time of writing, it is still not revealed whether Fi will join the 
group of the Nordic Green Left or European Free Alliance in the parliament.
From the campaign to the result: The losers
A loser in this election is the Pirate Party (PP), the Swedish initiative that 
has spread to over 30 countries worldwide. As transparency of state adminis-
tration has become a key issue for the party, along with free communication 
and personal integrity on the Web, the Snowden affair put wind in the sails 
of the PP throughout last year. However, the party just scored only 2% and 
thereby loses its two seats in the parliament. While not as catastrophic as for 
the PP, parties on the centre-left and centre-right all had a mediocre election. 
The Social Democrats (S) attracted a disappointing 24% of the vote share, one 
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of their worst results, which grants the party six seats. The S thereby remains 
the largest party in Sweden and, together with the 6% vote share of the ar-
mour bearer Left Party (V) and the 15% of possible coalition partner Mp, they 
easily bested their rivals on the centre-right. This includes the Alliance of four 
centre-right parties that have formed the government since 2006. The liberal 
conservative Moderate Party (M), the party of current Prime Minister Fredrik 
Reinfeldt and finance minister Anders Borg went ‘all in’ during the last few 
weeks of the campaign, but perhaps too little, too late. Instead, the Moder-
ates slumped to its worst European Parliament election to date, with support 
dropping from 19% to 13%, and the number of seats decreasing from four to 
only three. The situation is not much better for its coalition partner, the Lib-












Swedish Social Democratic Party (S) S&D 24.4 6 +0.0 +0
Moderate Party (M) EPP 13.6 3 −5.2 −1
Green Party (Mp) G-EFA 15.3 3 +4.3 +1
Liberal People’s Party (Fp) ALDE 10 2 −3.6 −1
Centre Party (C) ALDE 6.5 1 +1.0 +0
Sweden Democrats (Sd) 9.7 2 +6.4 +2
Left Party (V) GUE-N-GL 6.3 1 +0.6 +0
Christian Democrats (Kd) EPP 6 1 +1.3 +0
Pirate Party (PP) G-EFA 2.2 0 −4.9 −2
Feminist Initiative (Fi) 5.3 1 +3.1 +1
Others n/a 0.7 0   −3.1 +0
Total 100.0 20 −
Turnout (%) 48,9 +5.1
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) 4%
The 20 seats are distributed in proportional elections, using a modified form of the Sainte-
Laguë method of party lists. The entire country is a single electoral constituency with a thresh-
old limit of 4%.
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
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eral People’s Party (Fp), which, as the most pro-EU of the bunch, is fighting 
against the EU-critical winds of the time. While the winners in the 2009 elec-
tion, the Fp lost almost 4 percentage points, reduced to a measly 10% and two 
seats. Things do not look as grim for the Centre Party (C) and the Christian 
Democrats (Kd), both improving their results with about 1 percentage point 
each. As both parties have been hovering around the 4% threshold for the 
last few months, there was first and foremost a sense of relief in the C and Kd 
camps Sunday evening as they secured 6.5% and 6% of the votes, respectively, 
thereby keeping one seat each in the parliament.
In conclusion
Overall, Swedish voters rewarded the Greens and parties on both extremes 
of the left-right continuum, thus leaving the established parties at the centre 
in an unattractive state. It is true that parties in government position usually 
perform badly in European Parliament elections and that the centre-left has 
traditionally been poor at mobilising its voters in this election. It is also true 
that voters cast their ballot more expressively and with fewer calculations in 
mind in European vis-à-vis national elections. However, a lot was at stake 
in this year’s European election campaign, and it is obvious that established 
parties failed to rise to the occasion. For the first time ever, the European 
Parliament party groups have put forward candidates for the next president 
of the European Commission, a democratic experiment that Swedish parties 
have remained surprisingly indifferent to. Neither the parties nor the media 
paid any real attention to this in their campaigns. In addition, with the par-
ticular situation Europe finds itself in, and with voter dissatisfaction with the 
political elite, new policies and ideas are called for. Parties have had ample op-
portunity to politicise the EU more than in previous elections. Instead, a large 
part of debates tend to focus on issues that the European Parliament does 
not legislate, or a confusing set of goals for the EU in the future. Mainstream 
parties in Sweden have settled on a meaningless mantra perhaps summarised 
as ‘a slimmer, but sharper Europe’, without any coherent policy programme 
to go with it: the social democrats want common rules to avoid competition 
over minimum wages but at the same time want to keep the right to protect 
Swedish wages and workers’ conditions. The Moderates want to cut red tape 
and decrease bureaucracy, but they also want to set up a new commissioner 
portfolio for an improved surveillance of national implementation.
A lot was at stake in this election also because it coincides with national 
elections in September. Parties have one big campaign this year with extra 
money to splash. One possible spillover effect that the European election will 
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have on the national one is more focus on individual MPs rather than on par-
ties, which was very much the case this spring with top candidates attracting 
a lot of attention in TV and radio. With regard to actual election results, we 
can only speculate. The fiasco of M and Fp does not bode well for the survival 
of the Alliance. Conversely, Mp and Fiare cheered on with this recent success 
in the next few months of campaigning, if not at least psychologically. At the 
same time, voters behave differently in national elections, and the success of 
Mp is not very likely to be repeated at the national level. In addition, the SD’s 
10% vote share yet again reminds us of the fact that nationalism has entered 
the Swedish political arena and that is seems here to stay. However, the situa-
tion is not all bleak. With the success of environmentalism and feminism, at 
least it looks as if new ideas and new visions are back on the scene.
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On Thursday, May 22, citizens in the Netherlands and the United King-
dom (UK) voted to elect national delegates to the next European Parliament 
(EP). Irish citizens voted on the following day, Friday, the 23rd. In the UK, 
the electoral system in use is a closed list system with regional districts. In 
the Netherlands, the system is ordered (belonging to the group of open list 
systems), and there is one constituency for the whole country to choose the 26 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), one more than in 2009. Irish 
voters elected their 11 MEPs, (one less than in 2009) through proportional 
single transferable vote (PRSTV),1 a proportional system that allows voters to 
give ordered preferences to each and every candidate in the list. PRSTV is also 
used Northern Ireland, where 3 of the 73 UK representatives are elected. The 
possibility of given preferences to every candidate and the consequent transfer 
of votes result in a slow tally process that lasts for days after the polls close.
In the Netherlands, turnout was 37%, and in the UK, 36%, while Ireland 
was among the few member states where turnout was above 50% (51.6%). 
Turnout figures are important to a fuller understanding of the elections’ re-
sults. The Netherlands and the UK are two key arenas to sense the strength of 
Eurosceptic right-wing parties. In the former, the Party for Freedom (PVV) of 
the Europhobic Geert Wilders gained popularity and votes over the past few 
years. Wilders calls for a limit on the number of immigrants and the defence 
of national culture against the alleged threats of multiculturalism. In the UK, 
Nigel Farage’s UK Independence Party (UKIP) voices a similar position, but 
Farage’s discourse focuses on the economic implications of immigration far 




more than on the cultural ones. Many observers see these two parties as a 
signal of a growing anti–European Union (EU) movement that comprises also 
the French Front National. However, such a movement crucially lacks a trans-
national dimension and appears deeply fragmented. Moreover, the electoral 
fortunes of the UKIP and the PVV were very different last week.
Netherlands
We begin analysing the results of the 2014 elections by looking at what 
happened in the Netherlands. The PVV lost 3.5 percentage points from the EP 
elections of 2009 (−2 points when compared with the 2012 general elections) 
but managed to secure four MEPs, as many as in 2009.
With regard to government parties—a coalition formed by Labourists 
(PvDA) and Liberals (VVD)—both the PvDA and the VVD maintain the 
same number of MEPs, three each, than in the past European Parliament. The 
Christian Democrats lose 5 percentage points but keep their five seats, while 












Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) EPP 15.0 5   −4.8 +0
Democrats 66 (D66) ALDE 15.4 4   +4.0 +1
Party fo Freedom (PVV)   13.3 4   −3.5 +0
Labour Party (PvDA) S&D 9.4 3   −2.6 +0
People’s Party for Freedom and Demo-
cracy (VVD) ALDE 12.0 3   +0.6 +0
Green Left (GL) G-EFA 6.9 2   −1.9 −1
Socialist Party (SP) GUE-N-GL 9.6 2   +2.5 +0
Christian Union–Reformed Political Party 
(CU-SGP)
ECR/
EFD? 6.8 2   +0.9 +0
Party for the Animals (PvdD)   4.2 1   +0.6 +1
Others 7.4 0
Total   100 26     +1
Turnout (%) 37.0     +0.3
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) none
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the centrist D66 gains one MEP, sending to Strasbourg four representatives. 
On the left side of the political spectrum, the Green Party and the Socialist 
Party win two seats each, while the former loses 2 percentage points and the 
latter gains 2.5 points. The remaining three seats go to the Animals Party (1) 
and the Christian Union (2). Table 1  shows very little change from 2009 
and that the most remarkable element of this election remains to be the low 
level of turnout. Dutch commentators point at a low intensity campaign as 
one of the key determinants of such low turnout.
United Kingdom
Voters’ apathy has also characterised the election in the EU. However, un-
like in the Dutch case, quite a lot has changed in the UK when we look at 
the electoral results (Table 2). The government coalition—Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats—lost 17 seats (−10 for the Liberal Democrats and −7 for 












UK Independence Party (UKIP) EFD 27.4 24   +11.0 +11
Labour Party S&D 25.4 20   +9.7 +7
Conservative Party ECR 23.9 19   −3.8 −7
Green Party of England and Wales G-EFA 7.8 3   −0.8 +1
Scottish National Party (SNP) G-EFA 2.4 2   +0.3 +0
Liberal Democrats ALDE 6.8 1   −6.9 −10
The Party of Wales (Plaid Cymru) G-EFA 0.7 1   −0.1 +0
British National Party (BNP)   1.1 0   −5.1 −2
Others   4.2  0      
Total   100 25    
Turnout (%) 36.0     +1.7
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) none
Note: The results of Northern Ireland are not included.
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
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the Conservatives). Liberal Democrats suffer a dramatic loss in terms of vote 
share, losing half of the votes when we compare it with the outcomes of the 
2009 election. The Labour party gains 10 percentage points and registers a 
+7 in terms of elected representatives. All in all, the UKIP emerges as the 
clear winner of the election, and Farage, commenting on the results, claimed 
that his party’s performance represents an earthquake in British politics. The 
UKIP wins 4 million votes, 27% of vote shares, and sends 24 Eurosceptic 
MEPs to the new European Parliament. Clearly, UKIP emerges from the elec-
tion as a key domestic and European actor.
Importantly, the notorious British Euroscepticism seems to be stronger 
than ever. Over 50% of voters gave their preferences to parties that want ‘less 
Europe’ and promise to British voters an in/out referendum. Farage pushes for 
a referendum to be held before the 2015 general election and the conservative 
Prime Minister David Cameron promised to hold a referendum in 20172—
given that his party gets to lead a government after the 2015 election, which at 
the moment seems unlikely.
Ireland
With regard to Ireland, where voters on May 23 also cast a vote for local 
elections, results led quickly to the resignation as party leader of the labour-
ist Eamon Gilmore, who is also deputy prime minister (Tánaiste). The La-
bour Party is in government with Fine Gael since March 2011. Both parties 
performed poorly: Fine Gael, the party of Taoiseach (prime minister) Enda 
Kenny, lost 7 percentage points, while the Labour party lost 9 points and, 
notably, did not secure any MEP. Gerry Adams’s Sinn Féin makes a large gain 
(+8 percentage points) and secures three seats. Adams—a key player in de-
signing the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which brought peace to North-
ern Ireland after decades of violence—has been at the centre of media atten-
tion in the past few weeks. The Northern Ireland police recently questioned 
him—and then released him with no charges—for several days, in relation to 
an execution perpetrated by the IRA over 40 years ago. Despite such a con-
troversial event, Sinn Féin’s campaign succeeded in attracting a large number 
of votes and gaining a strong position in the Irish political system. The other 
key element of this election regards the electoral performance of Fianna Fáil,3 
2  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/11/david-cameron-european-union- 
referendum-pledge
3  Fianna Fáil is also known as the Republican Party for its opposition to the 1921 Treaty 
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the most successful party in the history of the Republic of Ireland. Fianna 
Fáil led coalition governments between 1997 and 2011, when suffered a major 
electoral defeat (−24 percentage points) at the February 2011 general election.4 
The management of the economic crisis by Fianna Fáil’s ministers and Taoi-
seach was both questionable and unpopular, but the party seems to have now 
remerged as a key actors. At the local election of May 23, Fianna Fáil won the 
largest share of votes despite losing two MEPs. 
Finally, we note the presence, and success, of a large number of independ-
ent candidates. This defining trait of Irish politics5 appears even more promi-
signed with Great Britain. The treaty while formally guaranteed independence to the Re-
public of Ireland established British control over the six counties of Northern Ireland. 
Republican therefore connotes the position of those who support the idea of a united Ire-
land completely independent from British rule (Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin) versus those 
who accepted the treaty (Fine Gael). Over the years Fianna Fáil has deemphasised the 
Northern Ireland issue and established itself as centrist party.
4  Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh, eds, How Ireland Voted 2011: The Full Story of 
Ireland’s Earthquake Election, Dublin: Palgrave McMilland, 2011.
5  Liam Weeks, We Don’t Like (to) Party. A Typology of Independents in Irish Political 












Family of the Irish (Fine Gael) EPP 22.3 4   −6.8 0
Soldiers of Destiny – The Republican Party 
(Fianna Fáil) ALDE 22.3 1   −1.8 −2
We ourselves – Independence Party (Sinn 
Féin)
GUE-N-
GL 19.5 3   +8.3 +3
Labour Party S&D 5.3 0 −8.6 −3
Independent candidates Others 25.7  3     +2
Others 4.9 0
Total   100 11    
Turnout (%) 51.6     −7.0
EP group abbreviations: EPP, European People’s Party; S&D, Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats; ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA, The Greens–
European Free Alliance; ECR, European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL, European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI, Non-Inscrits.
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nent at the 2014 EP election, where of 11 newly elected MEPs, three do not 
belong to any party.
In conclusion
In summary, the electoral results of the Netherlands, the UK and Ireland 
tell three different stories: in the Netherlands, the parties in government did 
not suffer any significant loss with respect to the 2009 European elections; 
on the contrary, the sitting governments of Ireland and the UK were severely 
punished by voters. Geert Wilders did not manage to secure large support, 
while in the UK, Nigel Farage succeeded in bringing anti-EU concerns at the 
top of the political agenda. Turnout was low, in line with the 2009 elections, 
in both the UK and the Netherlands; on the contrary, turnout in the Republic 
of Ireland was 8 percentage points higher than the European average, while 
lower than in 2009 (−7 points). These three different stories confirm the sec-
ond-order nature of EP elections,6 with domestic considerations outweighing 
European ones.
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A turnout like in 2009 but with many 
“Europes” within the EU
Nicola Maggini
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The European Parliament (EP) elections that took place between the 22nd 
and the 25th of May 2014 (depending on the country) have gained a much 
higher relevance than in the past. This can be understood by looking at how 
many European citizens turned out to choose their representatives at the EP. 
In the field of electoral studies, EP elections have always been considered as 
a second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), i.e., elections in which the 
stakes are lower (or are perceived as lower) compared to general elections (in 
which the formation of the national government is at stake). As a consequence, 
turnout is lower compared to national elections. As already mentioned in a 
previous article,2 over time, there has been a decrease in the turnout: in 1979, 
62% of the voters went to the polls while 43% turned out in 2009, with a de-
crease of 19 percentage points. The first figure of these elections is that this de-
creasing trend in the turnout has stopped. In the entire European Union, the 
turnout has been 43.1%, which is almost identical to the percentage in 2009 
(see Figure 1). This figure represents already a signal of how these EP elections 
have triggered an interest among EU citizens.  However, the average figure at 
the EU level might conceal very different situations. It is therefore necessary 
to look at the turnout in the single EU countries and to compare it with the 
2009 percentages.
Table 1 shows turnout rates for each EU country in 2009 and 2014, in ad-
dition to the difference in the turnout between the two elections. The first 
figure is the high heterogeneity, ranging from countries with very low levels of 
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
2  See Maggini in this volume.
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turnout to countries with very high levels. With regards to 2014, turnout levels 
significantly above the European average are highlighted in bold. Among the 
countries with the highest turnout levels, Belgium and Luxembourg stand out 
with around 90% of voters going to the polls, in line with the levels of 2009. 
These figures are certainly linked to the fact that voting is compulsory in these 
two countries, but fairly high levels of turnout can be observed also in Malta 
(74.8%), Greece (60%), and Italy (57.2%). Clearly above the average EU turnout 
are also Denmark, Ireland, Germany, and Sweden. 
Among the countries with a low turnout (significantly below the average of 
43.1% at the EU level) are most of the Eastern European countries, in particu-
lar, Czech Republic, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Croatia 
(a country that was not member of the EU in 2009) with turnout levels rang-
ing from 13% to 30%. Low turnout levels can be observed also in Romania, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Portugal, the Netherlands, and in one of the countries that 
during the first EP elections was already part of the EU, namely, the United 
Kingdom. In these countries, the turnout ranges from 32% to around 37%.
A comparison with 2009 confirms this high level of heterogeneity. There 
are countries in which turnout increases and others in which it decreases. 
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Greece, Spain, Sweden, Finland, Lithu-
ania, and Romania belong to the first case. In some of these countries, how-
ever, turnout has increased only by few decimals of percentage points, thus 
remaining substantially stable. The countries in which the increase has been 
substantial are Sweden (+3.4 percentage points), Romania (+4.5), Germany 
(+4.8), Greece (+7.4), and especially Lithuania, where turnout has increased by 
a staggering 23.9 percentage points. In all other countries, turnout has either 
remained stable or decreased. In particular, decreases higher than 5 percent-
age points can be found in Slovakia (-6.6), Ireland (-7), Hungary (-7.4), Estonia 
(-7.4), Italy (-7.8), Czech Republic (-10), Cyprus (-15.4), and Latvia (-23.7). Thus, 
among the founders of the European Union, only Italy reveals a significant 
decrease in the turnout although it still remains among the countries where 
more citizens go to vote not only to national but also to European elections. 
The decrease in the turnout in Italy might be linked to the growing disaffec-
tion and disenchantment of the Italian electorate towards politicians—a trend 
that has been confirmed by numerous opinion polls. In this sense, over time 
EP elections in Italy tend to converge towards what has been postulated by 
theories of second-order elections with regards to turnout.
In line with what has been stated so far, the average turnout figure at the 
EU level concealed highly different levels of turnout for each country com-
pared to 2009. As an additional evidence, the average turnout at the last two 
EP elections divided by country groups has been provided. Figure 2 shows 
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the average turnout for four country groups: the nine original members3 (all 
from Western Europe), the three countries from Southern Europe that joined 
the EU in the 80s (Greece, Spain, and Portugal), the three countries from 
centre-north Europe that joined the EU in the 90s (Sweden, Austria, and 
Finland), and, finally, the countries from Eastern Europe that joined the EU 
in the early 2000s (in this group, Malta has also been added even if it doesn’t 
belong to the Eastern part). The first figure that comes out is the fact that the 
nine original members of the EU show in both elections a significantly high-
er turnout in comparison to the other groups: in 2009, the average turnout 
was 57.8% and in the recent European election has remained substantially 
stable (56.6%).
As already mentioned in another article,4 turnout in the Southern Euro-
pean countries (Italy excluded) has declined since 1999, thus widening the gap 
with the nine original members. Nowadays, this declining trend has stopped, 
and the average turnout has increased by 2 percentage points, reaching 46.6%. 
This result has been certainly driven by the significant increase in the turnout 
in Greece, which is one of the European countries most hit by the economic 
crisis and the austerity policies imposed by the EU. The impact of austerity 
policies decided in Brussels on everyday life has probably heightened the per-
ception of the importance of the stakes in these EP elections, in which radical-
left party Syriza—whose leader, Alexis Tsipras, run for the presidency of the 
European Commission to challenge austerity policies—has succeeded.
3 At the first elections in 1979, the country members were Germany, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland. 
4  See Maggini in this volume.
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Table 1 – Turnout rates for each EU country over time (%)
  2009 2014 Diff.
Austria 46.0 45.4 -0.6
Belgium 90.4 90.4 0.0
Bulgaria 39.0 35.5 -3.5
Croatia _ 25.2 _
Cyprus 59.4 44.0 -15.4
Czech Republic 28.2 18.2 -10.0
Denmark 59.5 56.4 -3.1
Estonia 43.9 36.5 -7.4
Finland 40.3 40.9 0.6
France 40.6 43.5 2.9
Germany 43.3 48.1 4.8
Greece 52.6 60.0 7.4
Hungary 36.3 28.9 -7.4
Ireland 58.6 51.6 -7.0
Italy 65.1 57.2 -7.8
Latvia 53.7 30.0 -23.7
Lithuania 21.0 44.9 23.9
Luxembourg 90.8 90.0 -0.8
Malta 78.8 74.8 -4.0
Netherlands 36.8 37.3 0.5
Poland 24.5 23.8 -0.7
Portugal 36.8 33.9 -2.9
Romania 27.7 32.2 4.5
Slovakia 19.6 13.1 -6.6
Slovenia 28.4 21.0 -7.4
Spain 44.9 45.8 0.9
Sweden 45.5 48.9 3.4
United Kingdom 34.7 34.2 -0.5
EU Total 43.0 43.1 0.1
Source: TNS/Scytl in cooperation with the European Parliament and Ministries of Internal 
Affairs
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The average turnout in the other three-country group (Austria, Sweden, 
and Finland) is almost the same as the turnout in the Southern European 
countries, and has fairly increased compared to 2009, in line with an increas-
ing trend started in 2004. Finally, the average turnout in the Eastern Euro-
pean country group is clearly the lowest (32.9%) and has gone down in com-
parison to 2009 (when the group didn’t include Croatia), with a decrease of 5.5 
percentage points. In 2014, the difference between the group with the highest 
average turnout (the nine original members) and the group with lowest aver-
age turnout (the Eastern European countries) accounts for a remarkable 23.6 
percentage points (while in 2009, it was 19.4 percentage points). Therefore, it 
can be stated not only that there is a significant gap in the turnout between the 
group of the original members and the group of the new Eastern European 
countries but also that this gap has widened compared to 2009.
In conclusion, the analysis conducted so far has shown that there are differ-
ent “Europes” within the EU when it comes to electoral participation. In some 
countries, turnout has increased compared to 2009. This can represent a signal 
of citizens’ increased interest in EP elections, which, over time, might lose their 
feature of second-order elections and approach the turnout levels of general 
elections. In other countries, however, not only turnout is very low but it has 
even diminished also compared to previous EP elections. EU politics continues 
to be perceived by many Europeans as something that is not worth mobilizing 
for when the day of the elections for the European Parliament comes.
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EPP loses votes and seats but remains the first 
party in the European Parliament
Vincenzo Emanuele
30 May 20141
In the end, the European People’s Party (EPP) made it. It is the first politi-
cal party in Europe for number of votes, in addition to being the group with 
the relative majority in the European Parliament (EP). The 2014 European 
elections appeared as a very difficult challenge for the EPP. After 10 years of 
Barroso’s presidency and three consecutive legislatures with the relative ma-
jority in the EP, EPP is now considered as the incumbent party of the EU. 
Given the extremely low consensus for the austerity policies carried out by the 
EU, many were foreseeing a change in the lead of the EU. As written in anoth-
er article before the election day, being perceived as the incumbent in a time 
of harsh economic crisis could have led to disastrous consequences for an EPP 
that was threatened both on the right by the growing support for the group of 
the anti-Europe parties and on the left by its historical rivalry, the PES, this 
time running with Martin Schultz, a strong and influential candidate to the 
European Commission. Even the choice of a candidate like the Luxemburgish 
Jean-Claude Juncker—who represented a perfect continuity with the auster-
ity policies carried on so far—could appear as a losing option. In brief, all the 
premises were there for an overturn among the leading forces in Europe and 
for a socialist victory.
Yet, the EPP succeeded in maintaining the relative majority in the EP. It 
gained 214 seats, which might soon become 220 since the Romanian National 
Liberal Party—so far member of the ALDE—asked to join the group, bringing 
six precious, additional seats. The 214 seats gained in these elections represent 
a clear step back compared to 2009 when seats were 270 (265 plus five seats 
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
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when Croatia joined the EU in 2013). A 56-seat loss mirrors the slight increase 
of the PES (191 seats, seven more compared to 2009). Thus, the gap between the 
two big European parties has now shrunk to 23 seats. This result makes even 
more indispensable the necessity to find an agreement for the government of 
the Union— an agreement that presumably will end up with the formation of 
a big EPP-PES coalition, with the EPP leading again the Commission.
As figure 1 shows, in terms of percentage of seats, the EPP has gained 32% 
of the seats in the new parliament. This is the lowest result in the last 15 years. 
Since the enlargement to other conservative and liberal forces extraneous 
to the Christian-democratic tradition was completed (Delwit, 2001; Hanley, 
2002; Hix, 2002), the EPP has always obtained around 36%–37% of the seats. 
However, the competition both at the national and the European levels was 
almost always configured as a challenge between the Populars and the Social-
ists, with a very few exceptions that included some liberal forces (Estonia). 
With these elections, the scenery has radically changed. In five countries, 
parties that are not linked to the two big popular and socialist groups have 
won (Estonia, France, UK, Denmark, and Belgium). The aggressive advance 
of the Eurosceptic parties (and even anti-Europe parties) could have damaged 
especially the EPP, given the far-right position of most of these parties. How-
ever, in many contexts, the Socialists also suffered the consequences of this 
advance (such as in France).
Table 1 shows for each country the percentage of votes gained by the par-
ties closed to the EPP, the total number of seats gained by the group, and the 
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Table 1 – Electoral results (votes percentage and seats) for the EPP in the member 
states and differences with 2009
Country
2014 Differences from 2009
% Votes Seats Votes Seats
Austria 27 5 -3 -1
Belgium 16.9 4 -2.6 -1
Bulgaria 30.9 6 -1.4 0
Croatia* 41.4 5 4.6 0
Cyprus 37.8 2 1.8 0
Czech Republic 26 7 18.3 5
Denmark 9.1 1 -3.6 0
Estonia 13.9 1 1.7 0
Finland 27.8 3 1 -1
France 20.8 20 -7.1 -9
Germany 35.3 34 -2.5 -8
Greece 22.7 5 -9.6 -3
Hungary 51.5 12 -4.9 -2
Ireland 22.3 4 -6.8 0
Italy 21.7 17 -20.1 -18
Latvia 46.2 4 12.5 1
Lithuania 17.4 2 -8.3 -2
Luxembourg 37.7 3 6.3 0
Malta 40 3 2.8 1
Netherlands 15 5 -4.8 0
Poland 38.1 23 -12.5 -5
Portugal 27.7 7 -12.4 -3
Romania** 24.7 9 -13.9 -5
Slovakia 33.2 6 6 0
Slovenia 41.4 5 -5.4 2
Spain 26.1 17 -16.1 -6
Sweden 19.6 4 -3.1 -1
United Kingdom 0 0 0 0
*The total share of votes for the 2014 elections refers to a joint list where it is also included 
a party that belongs to the ECR group. The differences in votes and seats compare the 2014 
elections with the elections held in 2013 after Croatia joined the EU.
**The result does not include the total share of votes and the total number of seats gained 
by the National Liberal Party (PNL), an ALDE Group member that has asked to enter the 
European People’s Party Group.
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differences (percentage points and seats) compared to 2009. It’s easy to notice 
a predominance of negative signs, which refer to a loss of votes (and seats) 
compared to 2009. In total, the EPP grows in nine countries and steps back in 
16 while the UK still doesn’t have any representatives. With the exception of 
Luxembourg, all the countries that joined the EU after the big enlargement in 
2004 are those in which the EPP grows more (Czech Republic, Latvia, Slova-
kia, Croatia, and Malta). On the other hand, the biggest losses are mostly in 
Western Europe, and, in particular, in Italy (-20.1 percentage points), Spain 
(-16.1), Portugal (-12.4), and to a smaller degree Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Compared 
to five years ago, in the old Europe-15, the EPP gained votes only in the tiny 
Luxembourg. Yet, even in the two main Eastern European countries—Poland 
and Romania—the EPP significantly steps back (-12.5 and -13.9 respectively). 
In some of these cases, due to the low number of seats assigned to a country, 
the electoral system, and the party system, a loss of votes doesn’t result in a 
loss of seats. From this point of view, the EPP literally collapses in Italy (-18 
seats) as result of the debacle of Forza Italia compared to the success of the 
PDL in 2009. 
Significant losses occur in Germany, France, and Spain (-8, -9, and -6) 
while the most relevant growth happens in Czech Republic, in which the 
Populars move from two to seven deputies. The relative majority in the group 
firmly remains in the hands of Chancellor Merkel and her party (the CDU-
CSU), with 34 seats (corresponding to 15.9% of the total seats in the group). 
On the whole, the internal power relations are shifting towards the Eastern 
countries, which now have 85 representatives accounting for almost 40% of 
the total of the group (in 2009, they also had 85 representatives, but they cor-
responded to 32% of the group). In sum, if the EPP still remains the first Eu-
ropean political force, this is due mostly to the contribution of the Central and 
Eastern Europe.
With regards to the results in terms of percentage votes, the unweighted 
average of the votes is 27.6% (-3.5 points compared to 2009). The sensational 
performance of the Hungarian FIDESZ that, notwithstanding a decrease of 5 
points, manages to remain above the absolute majority of consensus (51.5%) 
stands out. In addition, the EPP almost reaches 40% in three other Eastern 
countries (Croatia, Latvia, and Slovenia) while the worst results regard the 
representatives from Denmark (9.1%), Estonia (13.9%), and the Netherlands 
(15%).
Finally, incumbents’ performances—meaning those countries in which 
the EPP supports either the prime minister or the president—deserve conclu-
sive notes. These are 10 countries out of 28, highlighted in bold in table 1. In 
eight cases out of 10, the EPP has lost votes, in some cases, in a consistent way 
(Spain, Portugal, and Poland), meaning that, according to the predictions, 
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the combination of an economic crisis and a second-order election (Reif and 
Schmitt, 1980) has led to a punishment towards incumbent parties. Only in 
two cases—Cyprus and Finland—the governing party hasn’t lost votes, but 
has even grown, even at a small degree.
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In the last European elections, the progressive alliance between the Social-
ists and the Democrats (S&D) gained a narrow increment of seats (seven more 
in 2009) and remained stable at 25% of the consensus in the Eurozone. The 
gap with their historic rivals of the EPP has considerably shrunk. While in 
2009, the Populars had 265 MEPs against 184 of the Socialists (a gap of around 
80 seats), in 2014, the power relations are much more balanced, and the gap 
between the two main Euro-parties has decreased to 23 seats, still in favour 
of the Populars. The percentage of seats for the Socialists and the Progressists 
has moved from 25% to 25.4%.
Notwithstanding the trend in the stabilisation of the votes for the Social-
ists in Europe and the consistent losses of the Populars, this cannot be de-
scribed as an electoral success for the PES. The candidacy of former president 
of the EP, the German Martin Schulz (SPD), to the presidency of the European 
Commission (EC) was supported by all parties of the Socialist and Progres-
sive alliance with the aim to steal the lead of the government of the Union 
from the Populars by pursuing moderately anti-austerity policy but didn’t 
have an effect of attraction. Evidently, PES members have also been perceived 
as real incumbents as their popular rivals. Indeed, the European Socialists 
also have important positions of power and responsibility in the EC, and the 
boundary with the EPP has often appeared blurred. It is no surprise then that 
the anti-Europe wave has swamped the Socialist too, who have been consid-
ered—either truly or not—as part of the EU establishment. It is likely that in 
the near future, a big EPP-PES coalition will be formed, with a member of the 
EPP taking the lead of the EC.
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
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In four countries, the S&D parties registered a significant increase both 
in votes and seats. Firstly, in Italy, the PD lead by the Italian Prime Minister 
Matteo Renzi gained 31 seats (10 more in 2009) and will constitute the biggest 
delegation within the S&D in the next European Parliament. For sure, this is 
a historical and unexpected result for PD. Although not being directly elected, 
the prime minister could count on a very high “popularity capital,” almost as 
if it were a “honeymoon” with the Italian electorate. SPD also registered a sig-
nificant increase compared to previous European elections (four more seats), 
probably maximising the electoral campaign centred on Schulz’s candidacy 
to the presidency of the EC. In the UK, the Labour has advanced by almost 
10 more percentage points compared to 2009, gaining 20 seats (seven more 
in 2009). However, both British Labour and German Social democrats have 
remained the second party at the national level.
Another positive result for the S&D comes from Romania where a fairly 
heterogeneous coalition of parties built around the Social democratic Roma-
nian party, gained 37.6% and 16 seats (five more seats). The Romanian del-
egation in the S&D will be more numerous than the French and the Spanish 
delegations even if these countries weigh much more in terms of population. 
In general, the elections in Romania represent a positive signal for the Social-
ists and the Progressists, who succeeded in an Eastern European country in 
which they have historically lagged behind. At present, the Socialists and the 
Progressists can count on 94 seats in these four countries—that is an impor-
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tant share (48%) of their total representatives.
In Portugal, Austria, and Sweden, the S&D gain one more representative 
than in the previous legislature. In particular, it is a remarkable result that 
the Portuguese party that is at the opposition has become the first national 
party, brining eight representatives to Brussels. In Sweden and Austria, the 
Table 1 – Electoral results (percentage of votes and seats) for the S&D in the member 
states and differences with 2009
Country
2014 Changes from 2009
Votes % Seats Votes Seats
Austria 24.1 5 0.4 1
Belgium 19.2 4 0.1 -1
Bulgaria 19.1 4 0.6 0
Croatia 29.9 3 -2.1 -1
Cyprus 18.5 2 -3.6 0
Czech Republic 14.2 4 -8.2 -3
Denmark 19.1 3 -1.8 -1
Estonia 13.6 1 -4.9 0
Finland 12.3 2 -5.2 0
France 14.0 13 -2.5 -1
Germany 27.3 27 6.5 4
Greece 14.6 4 -22 -4
Hungary 19.7 4 2.31 0
Ireland 6.0 0 -7.9 -3
Italy 40.8 31 14.7 10
Latvia 13.0 1 -3.6 0
Lithuania 17.3 2 -1.3 -1
Luxembourg 14.8 1 -4.7 0
Malta 53.4 3 -1.4 0
Netherlands 9.4 3 -2.6 0
Poland 9.5 5 -2.8 -2
Portugal 31.5 8 4.9 1
Romania 37.6 16 6.5 5
Slovakia 24.1 4 -7.9 -1
Slovenia 8.0 1 -10.5 -1
Spain 23.0 14 -15.5 -7
Sweden 24.4 6 0.0 1
United Kingdom 25.4 20 9.7 7
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result is less impressive. Although they gained more seats, the Swedish social 
democrats remained stable compared to the last legislature (the seats assigned 
to Sweden have moved from 18 to 20). The Austrian Spö also slightly increased 
even if it remains the second party at the national level after the Övp.
The Socialist and Progressive parties have remained stable in nine coun-
tries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, and Hungary. This stability doesn’t need to be interpreted as 
an encouraging result though. Among these countries, only Malta has the 
Labour as its first party, and Bulgaria is the second. In all other countries, 
the results of the parties linked to the S&D are much more modest, and none 
of these parties have passed 20% of the votes. In Luxembourg, Finland, and 
Estonia, the parties from this group have reached the fourth place and fifth in 
the Netherlands. In Hungary and Cyprus, two parties linked to the S&D were 
running, and they reached respectively the third and the fourth place. It can 
be noticed how in these national contexts these parties are in a condition of 
high political and electoral weakness.
In the remaining countries, PES parties experienced a loss of seats. Al-
though the French socialists experienced a spectacular debacle plummeting 
to 14% of the valid votes, this defeat needs to be reconsidered. PS has lost only 
one seat compared to 2009. The incumbent President Francois Hollande has 
been swamped by the economic crisis and had to face a difficult mid-term 
election. It has to be mentioned that the European context has historically 
been a difficult arena for the two main French parties, which rarely manage to 
obtain the same consensus as in the national elections. The real losers among 
the Socialists and the Progressists is the Spanish Psoe, which has collapsed 
to 23% (15 points less than in 2009) and has confirmed only 14 out the 21 
members elected in 2009. The seven seats less in Psoe might have a relevant 
impact on the political equilibrium within the Union. Parties linked to the 
PES in Greece also obtained a quite catastrophic result compared to 2009. 
The Pasok-Elia and the River (To Potamì) gained four seats in total, and the 
Greek socialist delegations has halved. The Irish Labour, who had three rep-
resentatives in 2009, have completely disappeared from the EP. In Poland, the 
sixth European country in terms of population with 51 seats, the Socialists are 
under the 10% vote threshold and lost two seats. The result in Poland repre-
sents the weakness of the Socialist and Progressive alliance in many Eastern 
European countries.
In Belgium, Croatia, Demark, Lithuania, and Czech Republic, Socialists 
were either supporting the president or the prime minister. In all these na-
tional contexts, the results of the European elections seem to have punished 
the incumbent government. In Belgium, European elections had been held at 
the same time as the elections for the national Parliament, and the govern-
ment delegation that was supported by the two Belgian socialist parties (PSB 
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and SPA) was defeated. In Denmark, the Social democrats have lost one seat, 
appearing profoundly destabilised by the huge growth of the Danish People’s 
Party. Czech Republic and Slovakia losses have been massive also. In Czech 
Republic, the Prime Minister Botoska’s party has experienced a severe loss, 
losing 8 percentage points and three seats less, and becoming the third na-
tional party. In Slovakia, losses have been relevant (7.9 points less in 2009) 
even if the social democrats still remain the party with the relative majority.
Although reaching a fairly positive result in terms of gained seats, on the 
whole, the PES parties have confirmed the same weakness that was registered 
in the 2009 European elections. Certainly, the excellent result of the Social-
ist and Progressive parties in some big and medium countries (such as Italy, 
Germany, the UK, and Romania) has given PES an important boost in terms 
of seats in the whole Eurogroup, allowing it to go past the 2009 result. In any 
case, it cannot be forgotten that only in six countries out of 28 (Italy, Malta, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden), a party linked to the PES is the 
first national party. In addition, when these parties support either a presi-
dent or a prime minister (with the exception of Italy and Malta), they encoun-
ter general losses. The Romanian case seems particularly important because 
former communist party has become the fourth delegation within the S&D. 
The PES stability cannot be intended, however, as a real electoral success. Yet, 
given the massive step back of the Populars, the Socialists might increase their 
political and bargaining weight even without managing to impose one of their 
candidates to the presidency of the EC.
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2014 European Parliament election seems to be not so relevant anymore 
both in Italy (because of different Italian-related issues that have been setting 
media’s agenda) and in European institutions (because the selection of the 
president of the European Commission has been a difficult problem for many 
European politicians).2 Actually, it is very interesting to analyse the results of 
2014 European election in regard to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
for Europe Group (from now on, ALDE Group). 
Let us analyse liberal democratic3 parties’ results. Analysing Figure 1, it 
can be seen that the ALDE group has lost some seats compared to 2009 Eu-
ropean election. Indeed, Figure 1 tells us something more. The 2014 electoral 
result is the worst since 1999 for the liberal democratic group. We must go 
back to 1999 to find a liberal democratic group that was less numerous (in 
percentage) than the one emerged after 2014 European election.
Obviously, aggregate data is important when dealing with a general trend. 
Nevertheless, if we want to analyse results in a more detailed way, performances 
of liberal democratic parties at national level must be taken into consideration.
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
2  It seems that the next president of the European Commission could be chosen after 
more or less private negotiations among European politicians and parties. There is, there-
fore, the concrete risk of putting away pre-electoral promises about the necessity to partly 
overcome the European Union’s democratic deficit via the creation of a more competitive 
and more transparent process to select the president of the European Commission.
3  As similarly explained in another contribution, I will use this term when dealing with 
the ALDE Group (and with its predecessors) and with the parties that have been con-
nected to the ALDE Group.
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Taking a look at Table 1, a preliminary consideration can be made. Being 
incumbent at national level seemed not to have punished liberal democratic 
parties. This is an interesting element to consider even if it is related to just 
three countries. The Estonian party Eesti Reformierakond has increased its 
share of votes compared to the results of 2009 European election while Lux-
embourgian DP has suffered from some vote losses even if it has not lost any 
parliamentary seat in Europe. Finally, the Dutch VVD has slightly gained 
some votes (in percentage) compared to 2009 election. To sum up, liberal 
democratic prime ministers have not been punished by electors in European 
“second-order election” (Reif and Schmitt, 1980).
Analysing Table 1 in a more detailed way, liberal democratic defeat is 
strongly connected with poor performances of parties in some European 
countries, that is, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
To begin with, in Germany, the collapse of FDP has brought about an 
eight-seat loss for the ALDE Group. This could have dire consequences for 
liberal democratic politicians in Germany, given the increased political frag-
mentation in the last years and the relevant changes regarding post-electoral 
alliances (see the interesting contribution by Poguntke, 2012).
Figure 1 – Electoral results of liberal democratic parties. Percentage of seats in the 
European Parliament (1979–2014)






1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
ALDE
Data source: for 1979–2009 data, see http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/eu2.html; for 
2014 results, see http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/election-results-2014.html; see fur-
ther details on national results and on seats calculus in Table 1’s footnote.
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Table 1 – Electoral performances of liberal democratic parties in 2014 European elec-
tion at national level and differences from 2009 (percentage of votes and number of 
seats)
2014 Differences from 2009
% Votes Seats Votes Seats
Austria 8.1 1 +8.1 +1
Belgium 22.8 6 +0.3 +1
Bulgaria 17.3 4 -3.8 -1
Croatia 29.9 2 +29.9 +2
Cyprus        
Czech Republic 16.1 4 +16.1 +4
Denmark 23.5 3 +3.3 0
Estonia 46.7 3 +5.3 0
Finland 26.5 4 +1.4 0
France 9.9 7 +1.4 +1
Germany 4.9 4 -6.2 -8
Greece        
Hungary     -2.2  
Ireland 22.3 1 -1.8 -2
Italy 1.4 0 -6.6 -7
Latvia   0 -7.5 -1
Lithuania 29.4 3 +9.7 +1
Luxembourg 14.8 1 -3.9 0
Malta        
Netherlands 27.5 7 +4.8 +1
Poland        
Portugal        
Romania   0   -5
Slovakia 6.7 1 -2.3 0
Slovenia 8.1 1 -13.1 -1
Spain 11.9 6 +6.7 +4
Sweden 16.5 3 -2.5 -1
United Kingdom 6.7 1 -7.1 -10
Data source: for 2009 (unless otherwise specified), see http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/
eu2.html; for 2014 (unless otherwise specified), see http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/
election-results-2014.html; regarding 2014 Irish data, I have put data on the party that will 
join ALDE Group; regarding Romanian data, I have decided to include the National Liberal 
Party’s results, an ALDE Group member, which has asked to enter the European People’s Party 
Group; the Latvian LPP/LC has disappeared from national political landscape; regarding 
Spanish results, I have not considered the Union, Progress and Democracy’s results (6.5% and 
four seats) that could join the ALDE Group in the near future; and finally, I have indicated in 
bold the countries in which the prime minister comes from a liberal democratic party.
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Secondly, in Italy, the party that has been founded by Antonio Di Pietro, 
the former Mani Pulite prosecutor, called Italy of Values has basically disap-
peared from political landscape, having obtained just 0.7% of ballots. Moreo-
ver, the electoral coalition called Scelta Europea got less than 1% of votes. This 
coalition was formed by three political formations, i.e., Scelta Civica, founded 
by Mario Monti, former Italian Prime Minister; Fare per Fermare il Declino, a 
liberal democratic and pro-market formation founded by some Italian econo-
mists such as Michele Boldrin and Sandro Brusco; and Centro Democratico, 
led by Bruno Tabacci. Scelta Europea’s results have had a noticeable echo in 
Italian media, both because Scelta Civica was founded in order to be the ful-
crum of Italian politics in 2013 Italian general election and because the elec-
toral coalition had strong pro-Europe stances (on the relationship between 
Italian politics and pro-Europe rhetorical arguments, see Hay and Rosamond, 
2002, pg. 161–162).
Thirdly, and possibly most importantly, let us deal with Liberal Democrats’ 
defeat in the UK. Nick Clegg, leader of the party, tried to challenge Nigel Far-
age, leader of the xenophobic and anti-European UKIP, in two public debates 
focused on the relationship between United Kingdom and European Union. 
The leaders of the Conservative party and of the Labour party decided not to 
take part in these debates. Unfortunately, for Liberal Democrats, Clegg and 
his pro-Europe ideas and policy proposals were defeated. At the end of May, 
European and local elections in the UK confirmed the results of the debates. 
Liberal Democrats lost many councillors at local level and were almost swept 
away from European Parliament, having being able to confirm just one mem-
ber of the European Parliament (from now on, MEP) out of 11.
Liberal democratic results in Germany, Italy, and UK are fundamental to 
understand the decline of ALDE Group after 2014 European election. Indeed, 
in these three countries, liberal democratic parties lost 25 seats. This means 
that good performances of liberal democratic parties in other countries (such 
as Netherlands, Croatia, and Czech Republic) have not been able to compen-
sate the strong losses in the three abovementioned countries.
Moreover, looking at the power relations within the ALDE Group, French, 
Belgian, and Dutch MEPs represent more than 30% of ALDE MEPs. Con-
versely, British and German influence with the liberal democratic group has 
been strongly reduced.
In a contribution written before 2014 European election, I imagined that 
European and German austerity policies and the pre-electoral leap of anti-Eu-
rope and extremist parties could have fostered a defeat for liberal democratic 
parties. Indeed, 2014 European election were a dire moment for liberal demo-
cratic politicians. ALDE Group, possibly the most pro-Europe group within 
European Parliament, is less numerous (in percentage) than 2009 and 2004. 
This means that liberal democratic leadership and parties must deal with a 
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hostile environment at European and at national level. We often say that Eu-
ropean Union must change in order to survive. It may be the same phrase, 
mutatis mutandis, is useful for ALDE Group as well.
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The European elections of 22–25 May 2014 were expected to be disruptive 
and changing elections, especially for the parties that deeply criticized the 
idea of Europe carried in so far by the main European political groups.
The European Left Party (GUE-NGL) was one of these. However, differ-
ently from the Eurosceptic parties, the most lefty group in Strasbourg led by 
the Greek Alexis Tsipras was not against the Euro and the project of European 
integration but proposed a vision completely alternative to the neoliberal and 
predominant one, which was blamed not only for being the cause of the strong 
economic and financial crisis that hit the Union but also for offering totally 
insufficient answers to this situation. On these premises, many were foresee-
ing a positive result for the GUE-NGL—a result that would have inverted the 
decreasing trend that has affected the radical left in Europe.2
A first glance at the aggregate result (see figure 1) immediately reveals that 
this inversion of tendency has actually took place. GUE-NGL has moved from 
4.6% in 2009 to 6% in 2014—a clear leap of 1.4 points. This result certainly 
doesn’t lead the GUE-NGL to the levels of the first European elections, in 
which the radical left group was made up of mainly communist parties but 
still approaches the result of 1999 when the group obtained 6.7% of the elec-
toral consensus.
This result has accompanied an increase of GUE-NGL’s presence in the 
European Parliament (see figure 2), moving from 35 seats of 2009 to 45 seats 
of 2014, corresponding to an increase of 10 seats.
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
2  With this regard, see the article in this volume: “From the Italian Communist Party to 
Tsipras: The path of Europe’s radical left.”
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The radical left grows but only in the South of Europe
The disaggregated results by countries in Table 1 firstly reveal how, in 
comparison with the 2009 elections, the number of countries in which GUE-
NGL didn’t gain any electoral results (or at least a result as low as almost in-
significant) has increased to six (Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Hungary), moving from six to 12 countries. The most significant (and 
the only) case is Latvia where the breaking up of the “Saskanas Centrs” coali-
tion—which reached 19.6% gaining one seat—has led to no representation for 
the GUE-NGL at these elections. Even if it almost doesn’t influence the aggre-
gate result, this result signals a loss of representation by the GUE-NGL within 
the EU member states.
Focusing again on the general result of the GUE-NGL in these elections, it 
is fundamental to understand where this inversion of tendency comes from. 
To find an answer to this question, it is necessary to analyse the results ob-
tained by the parties in the Mediterranean countries, with the addition of 
some Nordic countries, in which radical left lists have remarkably increased 
their result compared to the past elections. (This has happened especially in 
Ireland, one of the countries that have suffered the most from the Brussels’ 
intervention in their internal economy.)
Clearly, GUE-NGL has gained the most positive results in the three coun-
tries both most hit by the recent economic crisis and most involved in the 
austerity policies imposed by the Troika of IMF, European Commission, and 
European Central Bank: Greece, Italy, and Spain. Two other Southern na-
tions, Portugal and Cyprus, add up to these three countries. Notwithstanding 
a slight decrease of consensus compared to previous elections, in these two 
countries, the parties linked to the radical left have managed to maintain a 
particularly high level of consensus compared to the EU average. (In Portugal, 
the “Coligação Democrática Unitária” has gained 17.2% of the votes and four 
seats, one less than in 2009, while in Cyprus, the Labour Progressive Party has 
gained 26.9% and two seats like in 2009).
In Greece, the result of GUE-NGL was the most expected. The Greek na-
tionality of its leader Tsipras and particularly harsh austerity policies imposed 
to the Greek people had led to an astonishing increase in the consensus for the 
parties that forcefully challenged those policies, and Syriza—a party linked 
to GUE-NGL—was the leading one. In Greece, the radical left remarkably 
increased its consensus in comparison to 2009—by far the biggest increase 
among the European countries. With an increment of 19.6 percentage points, 
Syriza has become the first party in Greece, gaining more one vote out of three 
(32.6%) among the Greek voters. This result has consequently increased the 
number of European representatives of Greece in Strasbourg, moving from 
three in 2009 to eight in the current legislature.
Also in Spain, GUE-NGL—more precisely the coalition “Izquierda Plu-
ral” without counting the list “Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds” that joined the 
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Green Group—has gained an excellent result, gaining 10% of the votes, 6.23 
percentage points more than the 3.77% of 2009. This had resulted in an in-
crease of four Spanish members of the European Parliament in the GUE-NGL 
group, moving from one to five members.
Table 1 – Electoral results for the GUE-NGL in 2009 and 2014 by countries
Country Votes 2009 Votes 2014 Seats 2009 Seats 2014
Austria 0.66 / 0 0
Belgium / / 0 0
Bulgaria / / 0 0
Croatia 5.8* / 0 /
Cyprus 34.8 26.9 2 2
Czech Republic 14.2 11 4 3
Denmark 7.0 8.0 1 1
Estonia 0.8 / 0 0
Finland 5.9 9.3 0 1
France 6.0 6.3 5 4
Germany 7.5 7.4 8 7
Greece 13.0 32.6 3 8
Hungary 1.0 / 0 0
Ireland 2.8 17.0 1 3
Italy 7.0 4.0 0 3
Latvia 19.6 / 1 0
Lithuania / / 0 0
Luxembourg 3.4 5.7 0 0
Malta / / 0 0
Netherlands 7.1 9.6 2 2
Poland 0.7 / 0 0
Portugal 21.3 17.2 5 4
Romania / / 0 0
Slovakia 1.7 / 0 0
Slovenia / / 0 0
Spain 3.8 10.0 1 5
Sweden 5.7 5.7 1 1
United Kingdom 0.6 0.6 1 1
Total 4.6 6.0 35 45
*Elections held on 14 April 2013
Source: www.elections2014.eu/it
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Italy represents a particular case, in which, even if the percentage level has 
decreased by 3 percentage points, GUE-NGL has gained three more members 
of the European Parliament compared to the previous elections, in which the 
radical left did not succeed to elect a representative. The explanation lies in 
the fairly high electoral threshold (4%) in the Italian electoral system. This 
has led to the fact that in 2009, the two parties linked to GUE-NGL—the list 
including the “Partito della Rifondazione Comunista” and the “Partito dei Co-
munisti Italiani” and the list “Sinistra e Libertà”—both remained below the 
threshold, reaching respectively 3.38% and 3.12%, thus not being able to elect 
any representatives. In these elections, the radical left has gathered into one 
list—“Un’altra Europa con Tsipras”—managing to breach the threshold (gain-
ing 4.03%) and consequently to elect three MEPs.
The case of Croatia is similar to Italy’s. At the elections of 14 April 2013, the 
two lists linked to GUE-NGL reached respectively 3.5% and 2.4% and didn’t 
manage to breach the threshold of 5% necessary to gain a seat.
It is useful to notice also the increase of some parties linked to GUE-NGL 
in some Central-Northern Europe states, such as the Netherlands, where the 
“Socialistische Partij” has gained 9.6% of the votes—2.5 percentage points 
more in 2009—obtaining however the same number of elected Eurodeputies. 
An increment can be observed also in the tiny Luxembourg where “DéiLénk” 
reaches 5.8% of the consensus, increasing by 2.3 percentage points, without 
nonetheless managing to gain any seats. Among the Northern countries with 
an increased consensus, Ireland clearly stands out—a country also strongly 
hit by the economic crisis and by the policies implemented by the Troika. In 
Ireland, the “Sinn Féin” has reached 17% of the consensus, with an astonish-
ing increase of 14.2 percentage points compared to 2009, thus gaining three 
Eurodeputies, two more than in the previous elections. In addition, also in 
Denmark and Finland, the parties linked to GUE-NGL have grown, espe-
cially in the second case, in which the Left Alliance has increased its result by 
3.4 percentage points.
The performance of the parties linked to GUE-NGL in France and Ger-
many has remained stable while in Czech Republic, similarly to Cyprus and 
Portugal, there has been a decrease of 4 percentage points, but the consensus 
and the numbers of Eurodeputies still remain high (11% and 3 Eurodeputies).
With the aim to provide an explanation to these results, it can be stated 
that GUE-NGL surely has benefited from the climate of protest against the 
austerity policies that have hit different countries of the Union. It is no coin-
cidence that most relevant successes in percentage points—and in some cases 
also in terms of gained seats—come from the countries that have suffered the 
most from the cuts imposed by Brussels (Greece, Spain, and Ireland, above 
all, but also Portugal and Italy). However, the general impression is that the 
growth of radical left parties has not been as general as the growth of popu-
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list and Eurosceptic parties—only eight countries out of 28 have registered a 
percentage increase in the consensus. If we add up what previously mentioned 
with regard to the longstanding low representation of GUE-NGL in Europe—
only 16 countries out of 28 had a list linked to GUE-NGL—and the problem of 
the electoral thresholds—which mostly seems to be a problem of vote disper-
sion, as in 2009 in Italy and 2013 in Croatia—the result begins to show a clear 
logic and still remains below many expectations.
In any case, it is necessary to underline the importance of an inversion of 
tendency for GUE-NGL compared to the last elections. This inversion tenden-
cy, however, will have to consolidate during this legislature and gather around 
a well-defined programmatic platform, in order to build a project with a solid 
foundation for 2019. An important part of the increment registered in these 
elections can be linked to the feelings of protest against the current status quo 
of the Union. In five years, it might be much more difficult to see the same 
context. It is therefore urgent to strengthen the party at the European level 
and its network of parties in each member state. This is the only way to give a 
sense and a future to the radical left in Europe.
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The 2014 European elections have now ended with the consequent alloca-
tion of the seats among the various parties at the national level. The national 
parties will then have to gather into political groups2 within the European 
Parliament (EP). In this article, I will firstly analyse the electoral results of the 
parties that belonged to the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group 
in the previous parliament. This political group gathers the populist and Eu-
rosceptic parties and, in some cases, even some explicitly anti-Euro and anti-
EU parties in the EP (Taggart, 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004; Szczerbiak 
and Taggart, 2008). As Figure 1 shows, the EFD gained 38 seats3 out of 751—
which correspond to 5% of the total EP seats—increasing its presence in the 
parliament by seven seats compared to 2009 (when it gained 31 seats).
As already mentioned in a previous article4, the EFD was born as a political 
group on 1 July 2009, and in the previous legislatures, it was made of 13 par-
ties from 12 member states of the EU. In particular, the most important par-
ties were Northern League (Lega Nord), the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP), the ultra-conservative Greek LAOS, the Danish People’s Party, 
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
2  European groups and parties do not completely overlap as underlined by Bardi (2002). 
Some national parties belong to a parliamentary group in the EP although they are not 
member of the Euro-party.
3  It is worth mentioning that each political group has to be made of 25 Eurodeputies 
coming from at least seven different member states. At present, the EFD gathers deputies 
from six countries. In order to remain in the parliament, it has to convince at least one 
Eurodeputy from another country to join the group.
4  See Maggini in this volume.
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the French Mouvement pour la France, the Dutch SGP, the “True Finnish” 
Party in Finland, and the National Party in Slovakia. 
At present, the EFD parties that had gained seats have shifted5 from 13 to 
six, belonging to the same number of countries (see Table 1). Within the EFD, 
the party that has gained more seats (24) is Nigel Farage’s UKIP, which has 
conquered 27.4% of the consensus, thus becoming the first party in the UK 
and with a staggering increase of 11 percentage points and 11 seats compared 
to 2009. One of the aims of Farage’s party is to call for a referendum for Great 
Britain to leave to EU. With five seats in the EFD, the second national del-
egation is Matteo Salvini’s Lega Nord, which has gained a satisfactory 6.2%, 
even if it has lost 4 percentage points and three seats compared to the 2009 
EP elections. The Danish People’s Party is the third national delegation with 
four seats (three more than in 2009), and with 26.6% of the votes and an in-
crease of 11.8 percentage points compared to 2009 is now the first party in 
Denmark. Two seats each have been assigned to the Lithuanian Order and 
Justice—which maintains the same seats of 2009 and increases its consen-
sus by 2.1 percentage points reaching 14.3%—and the Finnish Party that is 
now around 12.9% with one more seat and increases by 3.1 percentage points 
compared to previous EP elections. Finally, the Dutch cartel made of the Re-
5 Among those who have been surprisingly excluded from the parliament are the Greek 
Laos and Slovak National Party.
Figure 1 – Seats in the European Parliament for the Europe of Freedom and Democ-















The electoral progress of the populist and Eurosceptic right
formed Political Party and the Christian Union (SGP-CU) has gained 7.6% of 
the votes and two seats as in 2009—one of these seats, the one belonging to 
the SGP, is part of the EFD.
As already mentioned in a previous article,6 the majority of the EFD parties 
belong to the Europarty Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy 
(MELD) apart from UKIP. Also, Lega Nord doesn’t belong to MELD anymore 
but belongs to the Europarty The European Alliance for Freedom (EAF), made 
of populist right-wing and anti-EU parties such as the French Front National 
of Marine Le Pen, the Flemish Vlaams Belang, the Austrian Freedom Party 
(FPÖ), the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) of Geert Wilders (these are all parties 
that are not linked to any EP group), and the Swedish Democrats (which have 
never had any EP members until the 2014 EP elections).
Alternative for Germany (AFD) gained seven seats with 7% of the votes, 
but it refused to join the new alliance and will probably join the European 
Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) while the most radical and anti-Semite 
national parties, such as the German National Democratic Party, the Greek 
Golden Dawn, and the Hungarian Jobbik, have not been allowed to join the 
alliance. In any case, in this article, extreme-right and neofascist parties are 
not taken into account. The common features of the parties belonging to the 
MELD and the EAF are the conservative and xenophobic political orienta-
tion, the aversion towards Europe, and the populism (Mudde, 2007; Pirro and 
6 See Maggini in this volume.
Table 1 – Electoral results for the EFD parties that have gained seats in the EU member 
states at the EP elections (vote differences and seat differences between 2009 and 
2014)





Denmark Danish People’s Party 26.6 4 +11.8 +3
Finland Finns Party 12.9 2 +3.1 +1
Italy Northern League 6.2 5 -4 -3
Lithuania Order and Justice 14.3 2 +2.1 0
Netherlands Reformed Political Party¹ 7.6 1 +0.8 0
United Kingdom United Kingdom Inde-pendence Party 27.4 24 +11 +11
In the Netherlands in 2014 and 2009, SGP is allied with CU (Christian Union) gaining two 
seats. Only the SGP seat belongs to the EFD.
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van Kessel, 2013). Often, charismatic politicians, who consider themselves as 
leader of a community full of virtues, engage in a populist challenge against 
an establishment considered as full of vices (Tarchi, 2003).
Table 2 illustrates the results of the EAF parties who don’t belong to any 
political group in the EP, by showing the differences in seats and votes (in 
percentage points) compared to previous EP elections. Parties that didn’t gain 
any seats are excluded. The party that conquered more seats (24) is Marine 
Le Pen’s Front National; with 25% of the votes, it is now the first party in 
France, overcoming the Gaullist and the Socialists, with an increase of 18.6 
percentage points in the votes and 21 seats compared to 2009. The Austrian 
FPÖ performed well too, gaining 19.7% and conquering four seats (two more 
in 2009), with an increase of 7 percentage points in its consensus compared to 
previous EP elections.
The Eurosceptic and anti-immigration Swedish Democrats (SD) obtained 
9.7% of the votes, thus making it to the EP for the first time with two seats. In 
the Netherlands, the populist party (PVV) led by the anti-Europe Geert Wil-
ders has lost 3.5 percentage points compared to 2009 EP elections, going down 
to 13.3%, but still managing to elect four representatives in the EP like in 2009. 
Finally, in Belgium, the Flemish populist right party Vlaams Belang has suf-
fered from a significant loss of 9.1 percentage points, managing to obtain only 
one seat with 6.8% of the votes.
After adding up the seats of the EAF parties that don’t belong to any 
groups to the seats of the EFD, the populist and Eurosceptic right can count 
on 73 seats in the EP (without including either the most moderate Eurosceptic 
parties that will join the ECR or the extreme neofascist parties). In addition 
to these 73 seats, there have to be considered also the four seats gained by the 
Eurodeputies of Korwin Mikke’s Polish New Right that made it for the first 
time to the EP with 7.2% of the votes; the two seats conquered by the Bulgar-
ian nationalists of Bulgaria Without Censorship (BBT), which have reached 
more than 10% of the votes; and the seat conquered by the Greek Independ-
ents (ANEL) with 3.5% of the votes. With these extra seats, the populist and 
Eurosceptic right can count on around 80 deputies.
After the elections, Marine Le Pen gathered in Brussels with Matteo Salvi-
ni from the Lega Nord, the Dutch Geert Wilders from PVV, and the delegates 
from the Austrian FPÖ, the Swedish Democrats, and the Flemish Vlaam Bel-
ang. The aim is to give birth to the Alliance for Freedom, a new EP Eurosceptic 
group that Le Pen had already announced in March. What are new are the 
possible inclusion of the Eastern Europe nationalist movements and the defi-
nition of a series of joint initiatives, such as the request to call for anti-Euro 
referendums in each member state and the stop to the Free Trade Agreement 
between the EU and the US. Being Eurosceptic, however, hasn’t reached the 
expected high level of consensus. Apart from the unquestionable success of 
311
The electoral progress of the populist and Eurosceptic right
the Front National, the excellent result of the FPÖ, and the good results of the 
Swedish Democrats and the Lega Nord, the consensus for the other Le Pen’s 
allies has severely shrunk while the Slovak Nationalist didn’t even make it 
to the EP. As already mentioned before, a parliamentary group can be built 
only with at least 25 Eurodeputies elected in at least seven member states. So 
far, Marine Le Pen has 35 Eurodeputies, but they have been elected only in 
six nations. Nigel Farage’s UKIP has refused to join the group. Now, the only 
possible ways lead to Eastern Europe. Korwin Mikke’s Polish New Right, the 
Bulgarian Nationalists, and some Hungarian Independents elected in Vik-
tor Orban’s Fidesz party are ready to join the Alliance for Freedom. Nothing 
has been decided yet, and negotiations are still ongoing. In any case, when it 
comes to single parliamentary initiatives, this group will have the support of 
the Eurodeputies of EFD led by Farage, who is also trying to join force with 
Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement.
In conclusion, in the recent EP elections, populist and anti-Europe parties 
have been moving forward on the whole even if this move has not happened in 
an even way within the EU. As already mentioned, in some countries, the par-
ties belonging to the Eurosceptic right have stepped back compared to 2009. 
On whole, in any case, even if only the EFD is taken into account, the presence 
of these parties in the EP has strengthened. The reasons for this fact lie, on the 
one hand, on the fact that the EP elections traditionally represent a favour-
able context for opposition and protest parties in line with the “second order 
elections” theories (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). According to this theory, at EP 
elections, stakes are minor (or are perceived as minor) compared to general 
elections, and the electorate feels less constrained in its electoral choices, with 
the eventual punishment of traditional parties when they are not  supposed 
to pursue effective policies. On the other hand, following the toughest eco-
nomic crisis since the Second World War, antiestablishment parties that are 
Table 2 – Electoral results for the EAF parties that are not enrolled in any group in the 
countries where they obtained seats at the EP elections (differences in votes and seats 
between 2009 and 2014)
Country Party Votes (%) Seats Votes (change from 2009)
Seats (change 
from 2009)
Austria FPÖ 19.7 4 +7.0 +2
Belgium VB 6.8 1 -9.1 -1
France FN 25.0 24 +18.6 +21
Netherlands PVV 13.3 4 -3.5 0
Sweden SD 9.7 2 +6.4 +2
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openly against EU austerity policies and European integration have increased 
their consensus in many countries. By gathering such a relevant share of votes 
in Europe against Europe, these parties have made these elections closer to 
first-order elections.
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A “revolutionary” election: The Italian party 
system is the most simplified in Europe
Luigi Di Gregorio
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The Italian party system has always been described as characterized by an 
excessive number of political parties. This feature is considered as one of the 
main causes of the poor performance of Italian democratic institutions. In a 
parliamentary democracy, as Italy is, parliament has the last word. If in par-
liament (moreover with two chambers with equal powers) there are too many 
parties, coalition governments are the rule (often coalitions too large and het-
erogeneous), and this slows down, if not paralyzes, the decision-making be-
cause of blackmail, veto players, and the like.
Several party leaders have argued for years—Berlusconi more than oth-
ers—to be slowed by “small parties” and that Italian people “must learn how 
to vote,” favouring larger parties and not expressing their vote for minor par-
ties. Grillo says more or less the same thing when he states his movement 
should get to 51% of the vote. His movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) does not 
want to be in coalition with any other party: it points to the majority of votes 
(and of seats) to have a single party government. If Grillo fails to achieve 51%, 
as for Berlusconi, it’s because Italians do not know how to vote unlike the vot-
ers of other established democracies: this is their thesis. 
The last European elections, however, tell us that everything is changing. 
While Italian political leaders—but also the most part of comparative politics 
books—tell us that Italy should point to the reduction of the parties, possibly 
up to a two-party system, “as is the case in other Western countries,” in those 
countries, the two-party system—or even the “limited and moderate multi-
party system” (Sartori, 1982)—is more and more a “distant memory” and as a 
result, the number of relevant political parties is growing dramatically.
1  This article was originally published in Italian on the CISE website. It appears in Eng-
lish for the first time in this book.
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Going beyond public statements and impressions, let’s analyse data of the 
latest European elections. How can we calculate the number of relevant par-
ties in a political system?
 A first elementary (but impressionistic) way is to take a quick look at the 
election results. That would make us understand that in other countries his-
torically characterized by a few large parties, the scenario has changed com-
pletely. But we need more precise and synthetic indexes to go beyond the sim-
ple “look” at the results.
The index of fractionalization
The first index that we will use is the index of fractionalization, proposed 
by Douglas Rae (1971). It is a relative index that gives us a first picture of 
how concentrated (or fractionalized) the consensus is among the political 
parties competing in the elections. When the index value approaches 1, 
this means that the party system is highly fractionalized; when it is close 
to 0, the party system approximates the maximum concentration, i.e., the 
single-party system. The intermediate value of 0.5 is obtained in a perfect 
two-party system. This index measures the relative strength of parties. In 
other words, in a system in which there are 10 political parties, we can 
face different situations: one party could get 90% of the vote, or the first 
two parties could get 45% of the vote each, or even all 10 parties could get 
respectively 10% of the vote. Therefore, with the same high number of par-
ties, we have completely different systems: single-party system, two-party 
system, and up to a highly fractionalized party system. This is exactly what 
the Rae’s index measures: if the result is 0, that means we have a political 
party that get 100% of vote. If the result is 0.5, we have two parties with 
50% of vote. If the result is 0.9, we have 10 parties with 10% of vote each. 
It’s possible to calculate this index at electoral level, i.e., on the basis of the 
percentage of votes obtained by the parties, and at parliamentary level, i.e., 
on the basis of the percentage of seats obtained by parties after the reduc-
tion made by the electoral system. 
The case of the European elections is particularly suitable to compare Eu-
ropean party systems because all 28 EU Member States have to adopt a pro-
portional formula. Furthermore, the disproportionality of different systems 
is minimum (an electoral threshold that never exceeds 5%), and therefore, 
the voting behaviour should tend to be similar from one country to another, 
favouring sincere voting rather than tactical voting. 
Let’s see what happens if we apply Rae’s index at the results of last Euro-
pean elections, in Figure 1.
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As can be seen easily from the graph, Italy has the fifth less fractionalized 
party system among the 28 EU Member States: only Malta, Hungary, Croatia, 
and Latvia have party systems more concentrated (i.e., with a small number of 
relevant political parties) than the Italian one. Moreover, these four cases are 
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not usually compared to Italy. Let’s see then what is the ranking when com-
paring Italian data with those of 12 more comparable countries, in Figure 2.
If we do not consider new (or less mature) democracies and small countries 
such as Malta or Luxembourg, the result is that Italy has the party system less 
fragmented in Europe. The one in which the relative strength among political 
parties is more concentrated. This outcome is somehow “revolutionary” and 
could make obsolete almost all comparative political systems books.
The effective number of parties 
There is another, newer, and more effective index that can give us a realistic 
picture of Italian and European party systems. It is the “effective number of 
parties” (Laakso-Taagepera, 1979): an index with a good approximation guar-
antee, concerning the number of relevant parties in every country, again on 
the basis of the concentration/dispersion of the vote. Figure 3 illustrates the 
situation in the EU-28 scenario, and Figure 4, the one in the EU-13, reduced 
to the most “comparable” cases to Italian party system.
With an effective number of parties equal to 4.0, Italy for the first time has 
a lower number of relevant parties than UK, which has always been the em-
blem of two-party system, or than Austria, which was, according to Giovanni 
Sartori, a two-party system despite adopting a proportional representation 
formula. Today, Italy, which has always been the symbol of ungovernability 
due to an excessive number of parties, is the country with the lowest number 
of relevant parties, in the group of comparable EU Member States.
The index of bipartisanship
The last index we use is the index of bipartisanship, which is obtained by 
summing votes of the two main parties in a single election. In Figure 5 and 
Figure 6, we can see respectively the comparison in EU-28 Member States and 
in EU-13, respectively.
Even the latter figure confirms the “redemption” of Italy in the ranking of 
European simplified party systems. Or, maybe, it shows that European party 
systems are all crumbling, giving rise to proliferation of new political subjects, 
often with occasional leaders and with electoral programs that are attractive 
today, but tomorrow, who knows . . .
These data show a very fluid political context. Since the end of ideolo-
gies and consequent decline of the ideological vote—that is, the party faith-
ful vote—we face with voters who feel free to decide “if and how to vote,” 
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Figure 3 – Effective number of parties EU - 28 MS
Figure 4 - Effective number of parties EU-13 MS
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Figure 5 - Index of bipartisanship EU-28 MS
93.4
71.3
66.2 64.6 63.6 62.6 62
60 59.2
52.6 52.6 51.5 51.1 49.5 49.3 49.1


















MT HR HU CY PL DE IT LV PT RO LU UK AT BG EL ES EE IE DK FR FI SI SE SK LT CZ NL BE
Fig. 5 - Index of Bipartisanship EU - 28 SM
Figure 6 - Index of bipartisanship EU-13 MS
319
A “revolutionary” election: The Italian party system is the most simplified in Europe
and therefore, we see highly unstable and unpredictable electoral results. This 
freedom to decide if and how to vote has also been one of the drivers of the 
progressive political disaffection that has generated steady declines of political 
participation in Europe. 
Today’s politics is completely different from 20th century politics. The 
electoral volatility (i.e., the degree of changing in voting behaviour between 
elections) is increasing, and the voters’ loyalty to political parties looks like 
a distant memory. It seems that the main drivers of loyalty, which once were 
ideologies and social class identities, are missing whereas a generalized dein-
stitutionalization of political parties and a very high fluidity of electoral be-
haviour are increasing.
In liquid society where perceptions and emotions seem to prevail, leaders 
are most important than political parties, and the voters’ trust is based on pre-
political “feelings” more than on ideas and organizations. In this scenario, 
anything can happen, even the unexpected: even that Italy will become the 
country closer to the two-party system in Europe.
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We opened this book with a number of research hypotheses, in order to out-
line an interpretation of the results of the 2014 EP elections. Has the economic 
crisis (together with the strengthening of the European Parliament following 
the Lisbon Treaty) challenged the well-established second-order elections theory 
(Reif and Schmitt, 1980)? Are the 2014 EP elections the first truly European elec-
tions, understood as elections where the national campaign in each member 
state is more focused on European issues than on domestic issues? An overall 
answer to these hypotheses would require further analysis, also definitely re-
quiring individual-level data. However, the pieces of research included in this 
book, based primarily (though not exclusively) on aggregate data, allow us to say 
that the answer to the hypothesis of the 2014 EP elections as first-order elections 
is complex. It is not a single answer, and it is geographically differentiated.
As a first point, second-order elections theory claims that the level of voter 
turnout of EP elections will be lower than in general elections as the stake in 
EP elections is lower (the national government is not at stake). From this point 
of view, overall turnout has not changed compared to the previous EP elec-
tions. Nonetheless, looking at overall, EU-wide turnout tells us little as there is 
wide internal variability among countries. In some countries, turnout has in-
creased compared to 2009 (Lithuania, Greece, and Germany) while in others, 
it has decreased (Cyprus, Latvia, and Czech Republic). This variability seems 
to suggest that the importance of these elections is mediated by the national 
economic and political context, as well as by other long-term characteristics, 
like voters’ electoral and turnout habits in each individual country (especially 
when comparing Western with Central and Eastern Europe).
As a second point, second-order elections theory deals with the electoral 
performance of governing parties: they are expected to lose votes compared to 
1 This piece is unpublished. 
322
Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele and Nicola Maggini
general elections, especially when EP elections fall towards the middle of the 
national electoral cycle (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 
1996). With respect to this point, the 2014 EP elections are not an exception 
but rather a confirmation of the theory. In the vast majority of countries, rul-
ing parties have lost ground. In some cases, they have experienced a real elec-
toral collapse (as in France, United Kingdom, and Denmark).
As the analyses on individual countries show, even the salience of Euro-
pean issues has been differentiated throughout EU countries. In some cases, 
European issues have been almost entirely absent from the campaign (Bel-
gium, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Hungary) while in other contexts, they have 
played a prominent role (Greece, Czech Republic, and France). Yet, it has to 
be observed that in the majority of countries, European issues—even when 
at the centre of the debate—have been politicised mainly with a negative em-
phasis: those who have mentioned Europe often have done it by indicating the 
negative consequences of the membership to the EU or to the Eurozone. As a 
consequence, parties of the populist and Eurosceptic right have taken centre 
stage, experiencing a general increase of their support as expected. Therefore, 
these parties have been the most capable to politicise the European issues—in 
a negative way and in terms of anti-system protest—taking advantage of the 
widespread discontent caused by austerity policies. On the contrary, Euro-
phile mainstream parties, fearing to move on a slippery ground, have gener-
ally preferred not to emphasise but rather depoliticise the issues related to the 
EU, preferring to shift the attention of voters on national issues.
Indeed, it should be strongly emphasised that the success of Eurosceptic 
parties has not been homogeneous in the 28 member countries. In the In-
troduction, we had hypothesised that the performance of Eurosceptic parties 
would have been linked to the macroeconomic features of individual coun-
tries. In particular, the electoral success of these parties would have been 
greater—inside the Eurozone—both among debtor states (namely, those put 
under the Troika’s economic control) and among the richest creditor states, 
forced to finance debtor countries, while outside the Eurozone, we expected a 
stronger success of the Eurosceptic parties in those more developed Western 
European countries, whose economy is stronger and less dependent from EU 
structural funds. The results tell us that there has been actually an internal 
differentiation of the electoral performance of Eurosceptic parties, but their 
success has not followed the suggested pattern.
Rather than linked to the features of the economic context, the emergence 
of European issues in the national electoral campaigns (mainly with a nega-
tive emphasis) seems to be instead closely related to the structure of the politi-
cal supply in the individual countries. With this term, we refer to all the main 
characteristics of the whole set of parties contesting the election, along with 
their electoral strategies (i.e., the issues parties have chosen to emphasise in 
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their campaign). In other words, an economic problem or a social conflict of 
any kind is not enough: to become a salient issue, it requires political actors 
who decide to politicise and electorally exploit it. And in this pattern, we see a 
new relevance of old theories: as in the traditional Rokkanian scheme, based 
on a series of social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), in any given country, 
a cleavage can emerge as relevant and structure the party system only pro-
vided that it is politicised by a party.
Through these lenses, we believe we can interpret the possible emergence 
of a new dimension of political conflict based on issues related to the Euro-
pean Union. This dimension of conflict, just like old social cleavages, needs 
to be politicised to emerge and structure party systems. Hence, what becomes 
crucial is the role of those political entrepreneurs who, only in some coun-
tries, have used Euroscepticism as a key strategic asset for electoral purposes. 
This allows to understand the success of Eurosceptic parties even in economic 
contexts such as France that were in an intermediate, less polarising position 
in terms of the debtors/creditors dichotomy. At the same time, in contexts 
that were potentially favourable to the success of Eurosceptic parties, such as 
Spain and Portugal, there has been no innovative, dynamic, populist politi-
cal entrepreneurship able to negatively exploit European issues from an elec-
toral standpoint. Finally, the importance of parties’ competitive strategies has 
been confirmed by the lack of success of Eurosceptic parties in those contexts 
where some mainstream parties have partly absorbed the Eurosceptic issues. 
This was the case in Finland and Hungary where there were already right-
wing populist parties with a sizeable electoral base (respectively Finns Party 
and Jobbik). This notwithstanding, their electoral advance has been success-
fully contained by mainstream political parties in government, which have 
been able to strategically focus on some Eurosceptic issues.
Finally, in the European context, Italy is an interesting and peculiar case. 
The result of the European elections in Italy is unequivocal: the Democratic 
Party  led by Matteo Renzi has won, and it is the only party in government 
that has increased its votes with respect to the general elections (the CDU-
CSU in Germany and Fidesz in Hungary have won clearly, but they have lost 
votes with respect to the general elections). The Democratic Party’s electoral 
success has been clear-cut reaching a record share of 40.8% of the votes, 
thus becoming the first party in terms of seats within the Socialist Group in 
the EP. No centre-left party had previously achieved a similar result in Italy. 
Since the first EP elections in 1979, the PD is the Italian political party that 
has obtained the highest share of votes ever. As shown by the analysis of vote 
shifts from the previous 2013 general election, the Democratic Party led by 
Matteo Renzi has been extremely efficient in keeping its voters and gaining 
new ones, especially by hollowing out the former centrist coalition led by 
Mario Monti.
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The Five Star Movement has lost about three million votes compared to the 
2013 general elections, falling to 21.2%. This result is certainly a defeat for the 
party led by Beppe Grillo, especially if we take into account that, according to 
second-order elections theory, EP elections are a very favourable electoral are-
na for opposition, antiestablishment parties like the M5S. This disappointing 
result may be explained by the relatively noncooperative attitudes of the M5S 
towards the other political groups in parliament, combined with the M5S ob-
session with the privileges of the political class, which may have weakened 
the credibility of the movement on facing the country’s economic problems. 
And Beppe Grillo’s harsh, aggressive electoral campaign certainly has not im-
proved this perception. However, it should be stressed that the M5S—whose 
performance has been disappointing—still represents, in absolute values, the 
first antiestablishment party in Europe. 
Even Berlusconi’s Forza Italia has faced a neat loss, falling to 16.8% com-
pared to 21.6% of the general elections and to 35.3% of the 2009 EP elections. 
In the case of Mr. Berlusconi’s party, however, many factors could predict 
an outcome of this kind, if we consider the split of the New Centre-Right led 
by Mr. Alfano and the personal situation of Berlusconi himself (sentenced 
to social services and ineligible). Indeed, Forza Italia has managed to retain 
only its most ideological electorate, being particularly damaged by the strong 
growth of abstention (-7.8 points). It is also interesting to note that the North-
ern League has managed to report satisfying results, compared to the disap-
pointing performance of the 2013 general election. Mr. Salvini’s party has ob-
tained 6.2%, as result of a campaign centred on the “Stop Euro” slogan, where 
the historical issues of federalism have been overshadowed by Euroscepticism, 
seen as a strategic resource for electoral purposes. Not surprisingly, thanks 
to this new Le Pen-style campaign, the party has also received votes in the 
central-south regions of the country.
In conclusion, the Italian case—in its specificity—suggests a common in-
terpretation with the other European cases, stressing very strongly the im-
portance of the available political supply. Indeed, our initial analyses show the 
importance of the competitive strategy adopted by the Democratic Party led 
by Matteo Renzi: a strategy that avoids ideological issues, and clearly focuses 
on valence issues, i.e., on the party’s ability to be perceived as credible to ad-
dress the main problems of Italy. And, last but not least, by using a deliberately 
simplified and ordinary language, with frequent populist tones. The results 
show that—confirming the importance of the political supply—an innova-
tive strategy can produce significant vote shifts, being able to challenge and 
beat Eurosceptic parties on their very ground. Historically—from Mussolini 
to Grillo, through Berlusconi—Italy has produced political innovations that 
have often been partially imitated and replicated in many other (not only) 
European countries. At this point, an interesting question for the future is 
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whether the particular competitive strategy of Renzi’s Democratic Party will 
have a similar fate—especially if political success will follow the electoral one. 
We will see.
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institutions as key players of economic policy for Euro member states, with relevant effects for 
the everyday life of citizens – but also due to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which 
has reinforced the link between the popular vote and the election of the President of the EU 
Commission. In this context, several commentators had anticipated a potential inadequacy of the 
consolidated theoretical framework that conceptualizes EP elections as second-order elections. 
In particular, European issues could be expected to gain a substantial importance in electoral 
campaigns, with a potential success of Eurosceptic parties due to their ability to politicize – in 
a negative direction – issues related to Europe and the Euro. A further question is then related 
to Italy: the third Eurozone economy, on the eve of assuming the Presidency of the EU, and with 
a government led by a young and energetic Matteo Renzi, but lacking an electoral legitimation. 
Also, a country that in 2013 saw the largest success of an anti-establishment party ever recorded 
in Europe. This leads to the main questions behind this book. What were electoral outcomes 
across Europe? Are we observing the first true first-order European elections? What factors might 
explain the heterogeneous electoral fortunes of Eurosceptic parties? And how should we interpret 
the success of the Renzi government in Italy? This book addresses these questions by presenting 
analyses performed by a large, international research group: for the first time, the CISE has 
expanded beyond its core group of Italian researchers, by assembling an additional research group 
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CISE website – few days after the elections – concise electoral reports about all 28 EU countries, 
which are now collected in this book, together with other analyses by the CISE core group. The 
result is a unique effort, providing – few weeks after the vote – fresh and detailed data, along with 
first interpretations of electoral results in all EU countries, in order to help practitioners, citizens 
and scholars develop a first impression – and overall interpretation – of these crucial European 
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